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Abstract 
 
It was long assumed that both multiculturalism and feminism are connected to 
progressive movements and hence have comparable and compatible goals. However, 
both in academia and in popular media the critique on multiculturalism has grown 
and is often accompanied with arguments related to gender equality and/or feminism.  
    According to political scientist Susan Moller Okin for example there are 
fundamental conflicts between our commitment to gender equality and the desire to 
respect the customs of minority cultures or religions. If we agree that women should 
not be disadvantaged because of their sex, she argues, we should not accept group 
rights that permit oppressive practices. Okin’s claims led to a complex and highly 
important debate both in academia and in public debates.    
    The main aim of this thesis is to explore in depth the different discourses about 
multiculturalism and feminism and develop a more inclusive and nuanced 
redefinition of the relationship between multiculturalism and feminism. The focus of 
the analysis will be on the Netherlands, where the debate has been intense and 
paradigmatic of similar debates in most countries. The first part of the thesis explores 
the literature on multiculturalism and feminism, and discusses the importance of for 
instance intersectionality, the politics of location and situated knowledges for a better 
understanding of the debates. The second part of the thesis is dedicated to fieldwork. 
A preliminary media analysis is undertaken to analyse the main aspects of the public 
debate as they appear in the feminist magazine Opzij. On the basis of this analysis, a 
series of focus groups with women belonging to organisations that are considered 
stakeholders in the debate (e.g. feminist, religious, cultural or sub-cultural) is 
organised. 
    The thesis provides a comprehensive understanding of the complex relationship 
between the concepts of multiculturalism and feminism. It argues that gender equality 
is often misused in islamophobic and anti-migration discussions, which also harms 
the position of minority women. Furthermore, it demonstrates that a more nuanced 
and inclusive interpretation of multiculturalism and feminism acknowledges the 
multiple layers of this debate, starts from intersectionality and includes critical 
accounts of secularism and religion, colonial history and subjectivity.  
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Introduction    Challenging the Relationship between Multiculturalism and 
Feminism 
 
At the end of 2004, two weeks after Theo van Gogh, the well-known Dutch 
filmmaker, was murdered, the Dutch Minister of Immigration and Integration had a 
meeting with approximately 50 imams. Before the discussion started things went 
wrong: one of the Imams refused to shake hands with the (female) Minister. “I am not 
allowed to shake the hand of a woman” (translation EM), he said (Soomer, 2004). The 
Minister was offended and did not even try to hide her anger. The following day all 
Dutch newspapers mentioned this ‘hand-shaking-incident’; hardly any wrote about 
the actual conversation between the Minister and the Imams. The popular Dutch 
historian Geert Mak accused the Minister of making a show and misusing the 
situation: “she kept her hand up in the air for seconds. She didn’t act like a minister of 
integration, assuming mutual adaptation” (translation EM) (Mak, 2005, pp 84-85). 
According to Mak this incident marked a fundamental shift in Dutch integration 
policy: “Who comes to this country, has to leave everything behind. Either you are 
Dutch or you are not” (translation EM) (Mak, 2005, pp 84-8). 
    In the debate that followed, two positions were dominant in the popular media. There 
was a group of people who supported the Imam and criticized the Minister for 
deliberately increasing the division between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The second group agreed 
with the Minister. They believed she was discriminated against on the basis of her sex. 
According to this group the incident was an illustration of two bigger problems in 
Dutch society: the lack of integration of Muslims and gender inequality in Islam. 
    In a lecture on the debate on multiculturalism, anthropologist Gloria Wekker 
discusses the importance of taking into account the discourses that circulate in society 
and construct the ways in which we are persuaded to think and talk about the 
relationship between men and women, and between members of different ethnic groups 
(Wekker, 2005). The first thing we notice here then is how typical (ie confirming the 
dominant discourse) the ‘hand-shaking-incident’ was: a white/emancipated woman 
challenges the beliefs of a traditional/un-emancipated Muslim man. We might want to 
ask ourselves whether the media would have been just as interested if it was the other 
way around (a Muslim woman challenging the beliefs of a white/secular man). The 
second striking thing about the debate is the division between those who defended the 
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Imam and those who supported the Minister. Although women and minority rights have 
traditionally been seen as ‘progressive’ issues, they now seem to be opposites in the 
political debate. This might imply that women and minority rights are incompatible in 
some cases.  
    Susan Moller Okin addresses this question in her well-known essay Is 
Multiculturalism bad for Women? (Okin, 1999). She argues that if we agree that women 
should not be disadvantaged because of their sex, then we should not accept group 
rights that permit oppressive practices. The Dutch ‘hand-shaking-incident’ seems to be 
a quite innocent (if unfortunate) situation merely involving two (perhaps) stubborn 
people. But what if we are not talking about shaking hands anymore, but about more 
extreme cases such as genital mutilation, not being accepted for a job because you wear 
a veil, forced marriages or racial violence? In this project I aim to address these issues 
and the supposed tension between feminism and multiculturalism.  
 
 
Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? 
 
Both feminism and multiculturalism aim to protect the rights of groups; either women 
or minority communities. According to Okin, progressive people who are against all 
forms of oppression, assume too easily that multiculturalism and feminism are 
compatible (Okin, 1999). Cultures are suffused with practices and ideologies 
concerning gender, and most cultures facilitate control over women in various ways. 
Okin believes there are two essential problems that advocates of group rights for 
minorities have not adequately addressed. First of all, they tend to treat cultural groups 
as monolithic and pay little attention to the differences within these groups, most 
importantly the substantial differences in power and advantage between men and 
women. Advocates of multiculturalism also seem to ignore the private sphere. 
According to Okin, most (minority) cultures are patriarchal and most cultural customs 
aim to control women and keep them in the private sphere. She recognizes that women 
are also discriminated against in Western democracies, but argues that they are legally 
guaranteed the same opportunities and freedoms as men. Okin argues that women who 
come from more patriarchal cultures than the United States (or some other Western, 
basically liberal, state), should not be less protected from male violence than other 
women are (Okin, 1999). 
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    Okin published her essay together with about a dozen responding papers. I would like 
to argue that there are three main points of criticism of her arguments represented in 
those papers. First of all, the respondents claim that Okin’s essay is rather judgmental 
and one-sided. She asks whether multiculturalism is bad for women, but only evaluates 
minority cultures, not Western liberal societies. Okin seems to argue that Western 
women have been emancipated and that women from minority cultures should just 
follow the same path, but her critics ask whether there is just one route to emancipation. 
A second issue is that Okin fails to recognize differences within groups except for those 
between men and women. According to her, one of the most important forms of 
oppression for women is (culturally based) sexual discrimination. Okin notes that other 
considerations, such as racial discrimination, need to be taken into account as well, but 
thinks that gender inequality in cultures should take priority. This assumes that different 
forms of oppression work independently from each other. However, other (particularly 
black) feminists have shown, that racism and sexism should be both analyzed and 
fought against together (see for instance Wekker, 1995). Thirdly, Okin has an ahistoric 
and static vision of cultures. She does not mention differences between generations or 
interpretations. There can be progressive forces within a culture that might be able to 
change certain habits and norms from the inside.  
 
 
Rethinking Multiculturalism and Feminism 
 
Okin’s claims led to a complex and important debate, reaching beyond the book and 
responding articles discussed above. This thesis starts from this discussion as initiated 
by Susan Moller Okin, not only because her essay was highly contested, but mainly 
because it pointed out an essential issue in feminism. Not only in academia, but also in 
the popular media, the relationship between multiculturalism and feminism is receiving 
more and more attention and leads to serious clashes between feminists. Culture and 
religion are important to many women in the world, but can also be sources of 
oppression as Okin argues. Despite the fact that this issue is essential to feminism, the 
debate remains problematic. The different actors, interests and frameworks make it very 
difficult to develop a clear view of the problems and solutions at stake. The first aim of 
this project is therefore to elucidate the debate, primarily by asking different questions. 
I will approach the relationship between multiculturalism and feminism as a discursive 
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issue. Therefore my first research question will be: How do people discuss the 
relationship between multiculturalism and feminism? I will critically analyse the 
different positions, arguments and interests of the most important actors in the debate. 
The second and most important aim of this research is to redefine the relationship 
between multiculturalism and feminism. After analyzing the relevant discourses in 
society and offering a comprehensive perspective on this issue, a critique on current 
debates on multiculturalism and feminism will be provided, in combination with an 
alternative perspective. Hence, the second research question is: How can the 
relationship between multiculturalism and feminism be re- conceptualized? 
    The research project is set in the Netherlands for two reasons. First, the debate in the 
Netherlands is rather heated and at the top of the political agenda; think for example of 
the violent occurrences in the recent past (the murder of the film director Theo van 
Gogh and the constant threats to kill politicians like Ayaan Hirsi Ali), but also of the 
recent dismissal of Tariq Ramadan, both as advisory of the city of Rotterdam and as 
Professor at the University of Rotterdam.1 Secondly, I grew up and studied in the 
Netherlands, and am therefore familiar with Dutch political relations and history. 
Through my honorary work for women’s organisations, I have great familiarity with the 
recent debate and excellent access to debate stakeholders in the Netherlands.  
    In that context the rationale for studying this specific country is twofold. First of all, 
due to my background and location, the Netherlands is the most logical starting point 
for my research. I am familiar with the political, social and historical context and can 
therefore explore parameters in the debate that only someone who has lived in this 
location can. In that sense it is as valid a starting point as any other location. However, 
as Braidotti, Esche and Hlavajova point out; research based on case studies can: 
 
 “neither claim universality nor a particular status that is unique to itself. Its 
peculiarities are tempered by generic Western-European and global conditions, 
but they do not override them” (2007, p 19).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See for instance: 
//www.nrc.nl/international/article2332245.ece/Rotterdam_fires_Tariq_Ramadan_over_Iranian_TV_sh
ow 
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Hence, this research is first of all based on my own location, but that does not mean that 
it is a solely a particular case. The debates about multiculturalism, integration, and 
migration are not only important in the Netherlands, but in many other (European) 
countries as well. And even though some of the historical, political and social contexts 
differ in these countries, other aspects of the debate are similar. The recurrent debates 
about headscarves and burquas in for example Britain, France, Germany and Belgium 
show that ideas about womanhood, gender equality, agency, cultural difference, and 
religious practices play an important role in public discourses all over Europe (and 
probably beyond). In that sense, the instruments that I employ to investigate and rethink 
the relationship between multiculturalism and feminism are very relevant for other 
countries as well. Moreover, the particular aspects of the Dutch case make it an 
excellent learning case. Since the murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh 
multiculturalism in general, and Islam specifically, has been high on the political 
agenda. A climate arose in which a so-called ‘political correctness’ was left behind and 
it was argued that people should be able to say everything they want about other groups 
in society.2 Due to the abandonment of ‘political correctness’, we are faced with a 
debate which takes place almost without filtering. This makes the Dutch case 
particularly interesting for argumentation and discourse analysis as it represents a ‘par 
excellence’ debate on the issues that any similar debate around the world would also be 
based on. As I argue throughout this thesis, these harsh public debates need to be taken 
into account when one investigates the relationship between multiculturalism and 
feminism. As this case study of the Netherlands will show, rather than bluntly 
criticising other cultures for their gender relations, a rethinking of the relationship 
between multiculturalism and feminism needs to critically analyse the power relations 
at stake, and hence also take into account colonial histories. The Netherlands are an 
excellent starting point for this.  
    The thesis consists of four main parts. The first part of the research is a narrative 
analysis of the literature. The main argumentation and viewpoints in the debate as it is 
evident in the academic literature will be analysed. The second and third parts of the 
research are dedicated to fieldwork. A preliminary media analysis will be undertaken to 
describe the main aspects of the public debate as they appear in the feminist magazine 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See chapter one for a more elaborate description of these debates  
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Opzij. This analysis starts on the day the director Theo van Gogh was killed (November 
2, 2004) and ends a year later. On the basis of this analysis, a series of focus groups 
with women belonging to organisations that are considered stakeholders in the debate 
(e.g. feminist, religious, cultural or sub-cultural) are organised. The focus groups are 
semi-structured on selected themes such as culture, religion, current political issues etc, 
while also allowing for free association on the relationship between multiculturalism 
and feminism. Both the media sample and the focus group discussions are analysed 
through a combined methodology of argumentation and discourse analysis. This means 
that the structure and content of the arguments are placed at the centre of the 
investigation, as well as the rules and categories applied in the different discourses. The 
final part of the thesis reconceptualises the relationship between multiculturalism and 
feminism, on the basis of the results of the empirical research and theoretical analyses.  
 
 
Approaching Multiculturalism and Feminism 
 
In the debate that followed the publication of Okin’s essay, Saskia Sassen mentions the 
importance of framing an argument or discussion (Sassen, 1999). Small shifts in the 
frame of Okin’s argument lead to important questions. Sassen asks us for example: 
“what if ‘culture’ cannot be made to pivot so exclusively on the oppression of women?” 
(Sassen, 1999, p 77). For many women the intercultural battles are just as important as 
the intra-cultural gender inequalities; criticizing their culture alone will not help them. 
Following Sassen’s advice I want to develop an alternative framework and change the 
debate by asking other questions.  
    I find it important to start this investigation with Susan Moller Okin’s controversial 
essay because it points out essential issues in feminist theory and activism that need to 
be addressed further. However, I would like to make it clear that feminism has a long 
history of thinking about difference and that Susan Moller Okin is not the first to 
address these issues. Okin’s essay represents an important discussion within feminism 
at this moment, and her arguments need to be investigated in more detail, but they also 
have to be contextualised within a longer history of feminist thought about differences 
and power relations among women. In Chapter 3, I will outline how (mainly black) 
feminists have demonstrated the importance of differences between women and how it 
is not enough to look at gender alone to understand women’s oppression. The 
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combination of gender, ethnicity, class and sexuality (etc) together determine women’s 
experiences. An analysis that separates these categories ignores the intersections of for 
example gender and ethnicity and therefore cannot truly understand the situation in 
which women live. Hence, I propose to make an intersectional analysis of the 
relationship between multiculturalism and feminism, which makes it possible to take 
into account several power relations at the same time, rather than separating them 
(Wekker, 2005).  
    Another important part of my approach towards this research is that I find it very 
important to recognise my own background and how this influences me. Adrienne Rich 
points out, in ‘Politics of Location’ that feminists have to recognise our location; we 
need to name the ground we are coming from and build a white Western feminist 
consciousness that is not simply centred on itself: 
 
 “marginalized though we have been as women, as white and Western makers of 
theory we also marginalize others because our lived experience is thoughtlessly 
white, because even our ‘women cultures’ are rooted in some Western tradition” 
(Rich, 1987, p 219).  
 
This thesis is the result of a search for a more nuanced way of thinking about 
multiculturalism and feminism. When I watch the news, I often hear white men arguing 
about why the headscarf is a problem. When I read feminist texts, both in academic 
works and in the popular media, I read why Islam is a possible threat to gender equality. 
On the other hand, I also know the work of black feminists who struggle against both 
sexism and racism, just as I have read the articles of Muslim women who argue that 
religion is a source of inspiration for their emancipation. Therefore, this is first of all a 
project about bringing these different arguments together: why are certain feminists 
concerned about the consequences of multiculturalism and how do others combine their 
feminist ideals with faith or solidarity with their community? My commitment to this 
probably originates from a certain void in my own vocabulary and thinking when it 
comes to these issues. I am a white, non-religious feminist, but do not adhere to the 
politics of secular feminists who condemn others women’s faiths and cultures as 
problematic. On the other hand, I find it difficult to understand that some women do not 
fight patriarchal traditions, which are part of their culture or religion.  
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    In my view, the current political discussions about migration and integration 
challenge feminism to develop a framework that combines inclusion with emancipation 
and affirmation of difference. My aim with this research project is to develop the 
vocabulary and analytical tools to better understand the complexity of the relationship 
between multiculturalism and feminism, and to develop more nuanced perspectives 
towards it. For my approach this has a number of consequences. First of all, power 
plays an important role in the analyses. Okin argues that multiculturalists have not paid 
enough attention to the power differences between men and women. I would like to 
emphasise that the differences between women and the different aspects of women’s 
identities are also important for the discussion about multiculturalism and feminism.      
For that reason I propose contextualised and intersectional analyses of issues related to 
the relationship between multiculturalism and feminism. A second aspect of the way 
my location influences the thesis’ approach is in the importance it gives to women’s 
experiences. As I explained above, I write this thesis as a non-believing, secular, Dutch 
woman who wants to develop a perspective on feminism that goes beyond this rather 
dominant position. In that context it is my aim to learn, with an open mind, from other 
women’s experiences and perspectives on feminism and emancipation. Spivak taught us 
(1988) that given existing power relations ‘the subaltern cannot speak’ (or be heard), so 
it is not my aim to simply ‘give these women a voice’ or to represent their opinions or 
interests. Rather, I try to investigate and problematize dominant positions in the debate 
about multiculturalism and feminism and develop an alternative perspective on these 
issues, based on my conversations with women and what I learned from them.  
    Moreover, this project is interdisciplinary in approach. My own background is 
influenced by various disciplines (political science, history, gender studies, and 
philosophy) and the multi-layeredness of the subject of this thesis asks for 
interdisciplinarity. My gender studies background taught me to make situated analyses, 
investigate the complexity of different power relations and to acknowledge the 
intersections of the various aspects of our identities. The experience in political science 
was useful for the conceptualisation of the extensive empirical research. Finally, 
through various philosophical approaches, I developed the framework for the 
(normative) alternative to the current debates about multiculturalism and feminism. 
Hence, I not only bring together approaches from the humanities and social sciences, 
but also combine theoretical analyses with extensive empirical research. The reasoning 
behind this is that the discussions about multiculturalism and feminism need both the 
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creativity and radical ideas about changes from critical theory, but also the more 
practical informed arguments and experiences from people in the field. I believe that 
this combined approach will provide new insights that help to better understand the 
relationship between multiculturalism and feminism.  
 
 
Thesis Outline  
 
In the first chapter of this thesis, I will review the debate on multiculturalism and 
feminism as initiated by Susan Moller Okin; in the second part of this chapter I discuss 
the public debates in the Netherlands on the same issue. The main aim is to give 
insights into which arguments and statements that are made in these debates need 
answers in order to rethink the relationship between multiculturalism and feminism. 
    The second chapter focuses on one of the two key concepts in this thesis: 
multiculturalism. It summarizes its main aspects, forms and interpretations and 
theorizes the role of ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’ in the conceptualisation of 
multiculturalism. Finally, the chapter gives more insight into the position of culture and 
religion within multiculturalism and evaluates whether multiculturalism could exist 
without culture. In this context alternative interpretations of the concept are put 
forward. The main aim is to demonstrate the multi-layeredness and complexity of 
multiculturalism. 
    The second key concept of this thesis, feminism, is subject of the third chapter. Here, 
I focus on the connections between feminism and diversity and argue that it is the 
combination of gender, ethnicity, class, sexuality etc that creates the oppression of 
women. Because these categories of difference arise together and influence each other, 
they should not be separated in analysis. Another key point for this chapter is 
accountability for one’s background and the acknowledgment of whiteness as a colour 
and non-neutral position. Chapter 4 is the last theoretical chapter and discusses issues of 
experience and subjectivity. If feminists acknowledge the differences between women, 
they need instruments and theoretical tools to apply these women’s distinct experiences 
in feminist theories and activities. Hence, the main aim of this chapter is to demonstrate 
why feminists have to take into account the experiences, strategies and arguments of 
religious women and/or women from minority cultures, even if those women do not 
fight for equality themselves.  
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     The second part of the thesis presents my empirical work on the relationship 
between multiculturalism and feminism. I have conducted a qualitative analysis of the 
discourse in the Dutch feminist magazine Opzij on these issues and have carried out a 
series of focus groups with women from women’s organisations. The aim of this 
empirical work was both to develop a more thorough understanding of the debates 
about multiculturalism and feminism, and to rethink the main issues, arguments and 
concepts in order to produce an alternative, more inclusive interpretation of 
multiculturalism and feminism. In the concluding chapter, the empirical and theoretical 
parts of the thesis will be brought together and analysed in order to present a re-
conceptualisation of the relationship between multiculturalism and feminism. This 
alternative perspective starts from the complexity and multi-layeredness of the issues at 
stake and develops a more situated, intersectional and inclusive view of 
multiculturalism and feminism.  
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Chapter 1 Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? Discourses on 
Multiculturalism and Feminism in Academia and the Dutch public 
Sphere 
   
 
Introduction 
 
Multiculturalism and integration are recurrent themes in European public and 
academic debates. Often women and gender equality are central themes in these 
debates. Think for example of the headscarf bans in both French and Flemish public 
schools, but also of the statements by opinion leaders such as Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who 
criticise gender inequality within Islam. In the article the ‘caged virgin’, Hirsi Ali 
argues that Islamic sexual morality keeps Muslim men, women and children in a 
“virgin cage”, which prevents them from adapting their religion to Western values 
such as individualism and freedom (Ali, 2004, p 8). In the academic sphere, political 
scientist Susan Moller Okin claims in her famous essay Is Multiculturalism bad for 
Women? that if we agree women should not be disadvantaged because of their sex, 
then we should not accept group rights that permit oppressive practices (Okin, 1999a). 
According to Okin there are fundamental conflicts between our commitment to 
gender equality and the desire to respect the customs of minority cultures or religions. 
Hence, although women’s and minority rights are traditionally seen as ‘progressive’ 
topics, they now seem to be on opposite sides in various debates.  
    Even though the debates about multiculturalism and gender equality in the 
(international) academic sphere are rather different to those in the (Dutch) public 
sphere, they also show resemblances, and in some cases have even influenced each 
other. Ayaan Hirsi Ali, for example, refers to the work of Susan Moller Okin to 
support her statement that emphasising the Muslim identity with the accompanying 
group rights harms Muslim women (Ali, 2002a, p 51). This chapter brings the 
academic debate on multiculturalism, as initiated by Susan Moller Okin, together with 
the Dutch debate on this issue. The main aim is to introduce both discussions and to 
present the issues, standpoints and arguments to which I will respond throughout this 
thesis. In the course of this chapter the assumptions and arguments on which the 
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public and academic debates are based and the way they are framed will become 
clear. I will subsequently analyse what is missing and how we can develop a more 
thorough and nuanced understanding of the relationship between multiculturalism and 
feminism.  
 
Gender equality and Cultural Diversity: Susan Moller Okin’s Earlier Work  
 
Most of Susan Moller Okin’s work is on gender issues, very often related to human 
rights or social justice. After her book Women in Western Political Thought (1979) in 
which she argues that gender belongs at the core of political philosophy, she wrote the 
influential Justice, Gender and the Family (Okin, 1989). In this book she criticizes 
theories of social justice that do not take gender issues into account. By 
deconstructing the dichotomy between the public and the private sphere, she argues 
that theories of justice should be applied to the family and family life. 
Multiculturalism is not really an issue in this book, but she does mention the tensions 
between traditions and gender equality. Referring to (mostly) Western traditions she 
warns of the possible consequences of those traditions for the emancipation of women 
in our society. Subsequently, Okin’s work deals more extensively with issues related 
to gender, culture and human rights (see e.g. Okin, 1994; Okin, 1998; Okin, 2000). 
    The article Gender Inequality and Cultural Difference (1994) is an important step 
towards her arguments on multiculturalism. Gender Inequality and Cultural 
Difference analyzes the tensions between gender and culture from a broader feminist 
discussion of differences and essentialism on the one hand, and theories of justice and 
ideas on universalism and relativism on the other. Contrary to what the title might 
imply, the article does not really deal with cultural diversity, but more with 
differences and similarities in women’s oppression. According to Okin, the 
experiences of women in poor countries are not really different from those in richer 
ones, indeed she says, “they are similar but much worse” (Okin, 1994, p. 430). 
Sexism, from this perspective, is an identifiable form of oppression whose effects are 
felt by women regardless of their race or class. What is needed from scholars, 
according to Okin, is a serious critique of the dichotomization of the public and 
private spheres and a transition of the unit of analysis from the household to the 
individual. Through these arguments, Okin aims to go against the anti-essentialist 
approach within feminism, which is more concerned with differences among women. 
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Okin believes that the anti-essentialist approach will lead towards relativism and 
makes it impossible to develop any principles or theories of justice.  
    Jane Flax responded to Okin’s article a year after publication, arguing mainly that 
Okin’s view of gender is problematic. Okin claims that sexism is an identifiable form 
of oppression, but according to Flax there are no women who experience oppression 
unmarked by race or class (Flax, 1995). Flax believes that an adequate theory of 
justice and gender should take inequalities between women into account. 
Furthermore, she wants to warn of the dangers of  “enlisting poor women from other 
countries as evidence in a dispute among women in the First World” (Flax, 1995, p. 
437). She is concerned that this way the former remain mere objects for the latter, 
who “become the true subjects of the counter history” (Flax, 1995, p. 437). Or, to put 
it in other words, Western feminists describe the oppression of women in the 
developing countries and aim to save them from this situation, but in fact implicitly 
deny the agency of these women.  
    Flax asks Okin why justice would be undermined by thinking about difference. 
Why do we need universal claims about the oppression of women and most 
importantly: who gains from these beliefs? Flax claims that Okin’s exclusive focus on 
women’s similarities obscures not only their differences, but also the relations of 
domination between women. This way she says, First World women are put outside 
the social relations that produce poor women. Furthermore, Flax argues that Okin: 
 
“splits agency and determination so that the agency exercised by racialised 
and ‘Third World women’ and the determined aspects of First World women 
theorists are invisible” (Flax, 1995, p. 437). 
 
Okin claims that poor women wouldn’t be able to critically judge their lives (they 
tend to ‘settle for very little’), but First World women, who also suffer from sex 
discrimination, can apparently distance themselves and critically analyse oppression. 
Another argument made by Flax that I would like to draw attention to here, is 
regarding the recognition of racism. Flax argues that while race issues mark all 
women’s lives, white women can avoid recognizing this. In this ability of ignoring the 
effects of racism, Flax says, white women differ radically from non-white women: 
under no circumstances can black women do that. Therefore, Flax argues, in order to 
develop a truly equal and respectful theory of justice, we should recognise 
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differences, especially in power relations. Investigating the effects of racism on the 
‘perpetuators’, instead of just the objects, would be an important start in her view. 
    Okin responded to Flax’s comments, but the two authors do not seem to manage to 
connect with each other. While Flax tries to convince Okin with philosophical and 
political arguments about how to approach this issue, Okin (trained as a political 
scientist) is mostly focussed on empirical evidence. Okin claims that Flax is not 
criticising her on the basis of what she has done or said, but for who she is. Okin 
wants to do something about women’s oppression and prevent a feminist “retreat into 
self-analysis (...), on the grounds that differences among women make it impossible 
for us to speak about anyone but ourselves” (Okin, 1995, p 445). Flax on the other 
hand, believes that Okin will never truly understand the lives of non-white women or 
help them in their struggles, as long as she doesn’t recognize the different experiences 
of white and non-white women. Even though this dialogue between Okin and Flax 
does not lead to agreement, it is an important introduction to other discussions about 
multiculturalism, where many of these arguments can be recognised. 
    
Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? 
 
In 1999, Susan Moller Okin published the highly contested essay Is Multiculturalism 
Bad for Women? This article is generally considered to be the start of the academic 
debate on the relationship between multiculturalism and gender equality. Feminists 
had of course been theorizing feminism and difference related issues for some time, 
but the essay written by Okin certainly re-opened these debates.. According to Okin, 
progressive people who are opposed to all forms of oppression tend to assume too 
easily that multiculturalism and feminism are compatible. She believes that cultures 
are suffused with practices and ideologies concerning gender and that most cultures 
facilitate control over women in various ways. Okin concludes that there is a 
fundamental conflict between our commitment to gender equality and the desire to 
respect the customs of minority cultures and religions. If we agree that women should 
not be disadvantaged because of their sex, we should not accept group rights that 
permit oppressive practices, she argues (Okin, 1999a).  
    Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? received enormous attention in both the 
general media and academia. However, Okin published a longer and more 
philosophical version of the famous essay on the relationship between cultural 
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diversity and gender equality in the journal Ethics in the same period that should also 
be mentioned.  In this second article Okin analyses the subject more extensively and 
less provocatively, which can be seen from the more neutral title, Feminism and 
Multiculturalism: some tensions. Her main argument here is that: 
 
“there is a considerable likelihood of conflict between feminism and group 
rights for minority cultures, and that this conflict persists even when the latter 
are claimed on liberal grounds, and are limited to some extent by being so 
grounded” (Okin, 1998, p 664)  
 
    According to Okin both multiculturalists and feminists tend to ignore the tensions 
between cultural diversity and gender equality (Okin, 1998, 1999a). First of all, 
multiculturalists fail to adequately address the differences within cultures. They are 
likely to treat cultural groups as monolithic and pay little attention to the substantial 
differences in power and advantage between men and women, she says. Societies are 
gendered and according to Okin we should first look at the content of cultures 
(specifically at their beliefs and practices concerning gender) before we think about 
giving these groups special rights.  
    The second point of critique that advocates of multiculturalism seem to ignore is 
the private sphere. Home is the place where culture is practiced, preserved and 
transmitted to the young, Okin tells us. Therefore, the defence of cultural traditions 
will have much more influence on the lives of women and girls, since they spend 
most of their time and energy in preserving and maintaining the personal, familial and 
reproductive side of life. Furthermore, she argues that the distribution of 
responsibilities and power at home has a major impact on who can participate in the 
public sphere. The more a culture requires or expects from women in the private 
sphere, the less opportunity they have of achieving equality with men in either sphere 
(Okin, 1999a).  
    Feminists on the other hand, neglect the tensions with multiculturalism, according 
to Okin, because of an “excessive attention” to differences among women and a 
“hyper concern to avoid cultural imperialism that leads, at worst, to a paralyzing 
degree of cultural relativism” (Okin, 1998, p 665). Okin argues that she does not want 
to deny all differences between women, however she does believe that some feminists 
have gone too far in recognizing differences, resulting in a rejection of all 
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generalizations about women as essentialist. 
 
 
Okin on Multiculturalism, Feminism and Liberalism 
 
In her analysis of the conflicts between multiculturalism and feminism, Okin focuses 
on a specific kind of argument in favour of multicultural group rights, namely 
arguments based on liberal grounds. According to Okin, these liberal justifications of 
group rights for minority cultures are least likely to come into conflict with feminist 
claims and are therefore the most challenging to investigate (Okin, 1998). The major 
part of Multiculturalism and Feminism: Some Tensions (1998, pp. 670-681) is 
therefore dedicated by Okin to describing and responding to three main liberal 
arguments for group rights. This way she tries to show that it is very difficult, if not 
impossible, to justify group rights for minority cultures on liberal grounds, if one 
takes gender equality into account. Implicitly, she also seems to assume that if there is 
a conflict between group rights for minority cultures based on liberal grounds and 
gender equality, then there will always be a conflict between those rights and 
women’s emancipation.  
    The first argument that Okin discusses comes from Margalit and Halbertal. They 
claim that human beings have a right to their own culture and that this right may 
justify the support of cultures that flout the rights of individual members (Okin, 
1999a). According to these authors, group rights are essential for each group member 
to develop a “personality identity”. They use the example of Israel’s Ultra Orthodox 
Jews and Okin responds to that same example. According to Margalit and Halbertal, 
subsidies and privileges for this group are justified, because they help Orthodox Jews 
to survive in a mostly secular majority culture. According to Okin however, girls and 
boys in this group are raised in such a tight regime, with fixed roles and positions for 
both sexes, that it is impossible to justify support for this on liberal or feminist 
grounds.  
    The second argument for group rights comes from Kukathas, who is, in the eyes of 
Okin, clearly more liberal than Margalit and Halbertal. Kukathas is interested in 
cultures because they are important for the well-being of individuals. He doesn’t 
believe that cultures should be actively protected, instead he thinks they should be 
‘left alone’ by liberal states (Okin, 1998). Autonomy and free choice do not play a 
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role in Kukathas’ argument: he believes that the only thing that matters is whether the 
individuals taking part are prepared to acquiesce in it. Okin responds to this idea by 
asking 
 
“what if the ‘acquiescence’ by some in cultural practices stems from lack of 
power, or socialization into inferior roles, resulting in lack of self-esteem or a 
sense of entitlement?” (Okin, 1998, p. 675). 
 
Kukathas does allow that individuals from a minority culture can appeal to the liberal 
state when it comes to harmful traditions. According to Okin however this argument 
doesn’t take into account the enormous coercion that exists in the private sphere in 
family life. She believes that in reality this position would lead to a situation in which 
families can do whatever they want to individual members, as long as they do not get 
caught.  
    Kymlicka is the last author that Okin responds to in her article. He believes that 
culture is an important basis for individual freedom; since it often forms the basis for 
ideas about how to live one’s life (Okin, 1998). He does, however, describe strict 
conditions for the justification of group rights. A culture must “govern itself by 
recognizably liberal principles, neither infringing on the basic liberties of its own 
members nor discriminating among them” (Okin, 1998, p. 677). Okin recognizes two 
problems with this argument. First of all, she says, fewer cultures than Kymlicka 
assumes might be able to claim rights under this condition. More importantly, Okin 
argues that Kymlicka’s conditions might still not really protect girls and women in 
minority cultures. He wants to prevent overt and formal discrimination against 
women, but according to Okin most sex discrimination is not particularly overt and is 
often hidden in the private sphere.  
    Okin concludes her analysis with the statement that female members of a culture 
have no clear interest in its preservation. She even goes as far to say that: 
 
 “while a number of factors would have to be taken into account in assessing 
the situation, they [women, EM] might be better off, from a liberal point of 
view, if the culture into which they were born were either gradually to become 
distinct (...) or, preferably to be encouraged and supported to substantially 
alter itself so as to reinforce the equality of women” (Okin, 1998, p. 680). 
 	   27 
 
This harsh statement of Okin’s has received much criticism. I will go on to discuss 
these, and other, responses to her essay and article, but I will first describe the issues 
raised by authors whose critiques were published in the same volume as Okin’s essay, 
and then describe Okin’s replies to these. 
  
 
The Debate Widens: Direct Responses to the Essay 
 
Okin’s essay is published together with fifteen responses to her argument. Opalski 
briefly summarizes the arguments in the book into four different categories (Opalski, 
2002). The first group of critics generally agree with Okin that there are conflicts 
between multiculturalism and feminism. However most of them think that, rather than 
giving up on multiculturalism, we should monitor minority cultures closely. Will 
Kymlicka is probably the most well-known theorist of this approach. He writes, in his 
reply to Okin, that both multiculturalism and feminism are engaged in a struggle for a 
more inclusive conception of justice (Kymlicka, 1999). He agrees with Okin that a 
liberal approach to multiculturalism should take gender inequalities into account, but 
doesn’t believe we should therefore doubt the legitimacy of group rights. His thesis is 
clear: “Group rights are permissible if they help promote justice between ethno 
cultural groups, but are impermissible if they create or exacerbate gender inequalities 
within the group” (Kymlicka, 1999, p. 31). He pleads for a division of group rights: 
“internal restrictions” should not be allowed in a liberal society, since they restrict 
individuals within a group; “external protections” (e.g. language rights or guaranteed 
political representation) however, can and should be permitted.  
    The second group of critics disagrees with Okin on the grounds that: 
 
“she seems to preclude the possibility for developing culturally rooted brands 
of feminisms that, though different from hers, can nevertheless work for 
women’s collective interest within a specific culture” (Opalski, 2002, p. 3). 
 
Martha Nussbaum for example, argues that Okin simplifies the issue too much 
(Nussbaum, 1999). Concentrating on religion, she criticises Okin for not looking at 
the positives sides of religion and the good things it brings into human life. 
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Furthermore, she believes that Okin makes her own struggle for gender equality more 
difficult by alienating potential allies. Nussbaum proposes a different approach; she 
thinks minority religions should get special protection. However, this should be 
combined with laws that protect women in these groups, using the principle of the 
“substantial burden”. When a law (for gender equality) doesn’t impose such a burden 
on a person’s free exercise of his/her religion, there is no problem. When it does, then 
different interests should be taken into account and evaluated.  
    A third argument raised against Okin’s essay refers to the cultural imperialism 
implied in her defence of feminism against multiculturalism. She only evaluates 
minority cultures, not Western liberal societies. Bonnie Honig warns us not to 
conflate culture with ‘foreignness’ as not only minorities have cultures (Honig, 1999). 
Furthermore, she argues that we might want to ask ourselves whether liberalism and 
feminism are necessarily compatible. Feminism might not be entirely well-served by 
its association with liberalism, Honig says. An-Na’im adds “that all cultures should be 
held to the same standards, not only of gender equality, but also of all other human 
rights” (An-Na’im, 1999, p. 61). Okin’s ultimatum that minority cultures should meet 
the standards set by the majority, is not fair while that same majority can take it’s own 
time in achieving gender equality.  
    The final form of criticism claims that Okin has accurately depicted the clash 
between multiculturalism and feminism, “but that such a clash does not need to exist 
and that avoiding this clash does not require making casualty out of multiculturalism 
or feminism” (Opalsky, 2002, p. 3). Homi Bhabha, for example, argues that Okin’s 
claims are based on a very restricted understanding of liberalism, and that combined 
with her sole focus on conflicts, she therefore produces a monolithic discourse on 
(minority) cultures (Bhabha, 1999). According to him, Okin fails to understand the 
lives and problems of migrants in Western countries because she only uses extreme 
stories, namely criminal charges from cultural defence cases. Bhabha instead 
proposes an approach, which is placed in the context of the lives of migrants in the 
West, and also takes into account discrimination and citizenship-related problems. 
Bhikhu Parekh uses a similar argument, stating that because Okin focuses on extreme 
cases, she ignores the complexities and problems involved in judging other cultures. 
Furthermore, he argues that by taking liberalism as a starting point Okin reduces 
multiculturalism to a discussion on group rights, which is, according to Parekh, only a 
small part of it.  
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 Opalski’s classification of the arguments against Okin’s essay is a useful tool when 
one wants to get a better understanding of the different standpoints in this debate.  
However we can also divide most of the critiques between those focussed on Okin’s 
understanding of multiculturalism or culture, and those focussed on feminism and/or 
emancipation. First of all, several authors criticize Okin for having an ahistoric and 
static vision of culture (e.g. Bhabha, 1999). She does not mention differences between 
generations, subcultures or political ideologies within a culture. Younger people, for 
example, might be a progressive force and can change certain habits and norms. By 
only recognizing the conservative people and visions of cultures, Okin strongly limits 
her own analysis and does exactly the opposite of what she wants to do: she excludes 
the minorities (or less powerful groups) within the minority, e.g. women. 
    The second type of criticism aims at Okin’s definition of feminism. According to 
Al-Hibri, Okin is right to be concerned about her sisters, however she should be more 
careful and considerate. Even though Okin claims that she wants to include women 
from minority cultures in a dialogue, she also makes it clear that outsiders will 
probably be better critics of a culture (Okin, 1998). Parekh argues that Okin should 
pay more attention to what these women really want and how they perceive the 
situation. He thinks it is patronizing and wrong to decide for them what is best for 
them (Parekh, 1999).  
 
 
The Debate Crystallizes: Okin’s Reply 
 
At the end of the book Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, Okin responds to her 
critics. She recognizes two main lines of criticism and addresses three other issues 
raised in the responses (Okin, 1999b). Both of the criticisms she deals with refer to 
her definition of feminism. The first one is concerned that it is too narrowly oriented 
on women and gender inequality, rather than taking into account broader issues like 
human rights and socio-economic justice. The second refers to the ‘intolerance’ of her 
version of feminism; being hostile towards religion, and not appreciating things from 
the perspective of the Other. I believe Okin presents a rather narrow interpretation of 
the comments on her work (she does not discuss criticisms of her definition of 
multiculturalism for example). 
    The first section of her reply is entitled “Recognition that the argument can and 
 	   30 
should be broadened”. This title seems to imply that Okin agrees with this part of the 
criticism from her respondents. However, her interpretation of ‘broadening the 
argument’ differs from some of her respondents; prioritization is the key word here. 
Okin starts by saying that she does not accept the degree of gender equality reached in 
Western societies, as An-Naím claims she does, instead she believes that “liberal 
societies cannot reasonably expect minority cultures within them to surpass whatever 
level of equality between the sexes the majority culture has achieved” (Okin, 1999b, 
p. 119). One might wonder why Okin chooses to focus on ‘other’ cultures, instead of 
her ‘own’, but there is another question that is more important here: why does she 
separate the two (in this way)? Even though Okin claims that the current level of 
gender inequality in the West is not acceptable, but she does seem to be saying that 
liberal societies have progressed further down the road to equality and that minority 
cultures should follow ‘the West’ in this. According to some of Okin’s respondents 
however, the situation is much more complex. Parekh for example tells us that most 
women might be better off with a dialogue in which different cultures can learn from 
each other, contrary to the one-way approach Okin proposes.  
    In the second part of her reply, Okin answers the criticism concerning the 
‘intolerance’ of her version of feminism. This is one of the most difficult parts of this 
debate since it touches the relativism versus universalism opposition. In my view, 
none of the participants in the discussion truly believe that we cannot judge traditions 
of other cultures at all, and most of them condemn things like clitoridectomy. The 
differences arise when we ask more specific questions such as: how do we know or 
decide what is best for certain groups, like minority women? Okin is concerned about 
false consciousness. Especially when it comes to older women, who have been raised 
in very patriarchal cultures, she believes there is a good chance that they are not able 
to critically judge their lives.  
    The third issue Okin responds to in detail is the tension between freedom and 
autonomy in a liberal state, for instance regarding religion. Unfortunately she does not 
discuss the deeper criticism of using liberalism/liberal values as a basis for the 
discussion at all. At the beginning of her reply she points out that this debate can only 
take place because its participants live in liberal societies; so striking out at liberal 
values is not appropriate, according to her. I believe that participants in the debate 
didn’t necessarily criticize these values, but rather how Okin used them as a starting 
point for this particular discussion. Okin finds Martha Nussbaum’s comments more 
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important to respond to. Nussbaum discusses the tensions within liberalism when it 
comes to religious education. Should parents be free to send their children to a school 
where they are only taught one religion, or should all children be educated about all 
religions, as well as secularism, in order for them to make an autonomous choice 
about religion themselves? Okin believes in the last option, choosing (a certain 
interpretation of) autonomy over freedom. 
    The final point Okin discusses is Will Kymlicka’s statement that multiculturalists 
and feminists should support each other since they fight similar struggles (Kymlicka, 
1999). Even though Okin’s response is very short, she mentions two rather important 
issues here. First of all she claims that a big difference between multiculturalism and 
feminism is that “the few special rights that women claim qua women do not give 
more powerful women the right to control less powerful women” (Okin, 1999b, p. 
131). This rather provocative statement touches the heart of the debate. Not least 
because some Muslim women might say that this is exactly what Okin does with her 
essay, for example by saying that older women from patriarchal societies are not 
capable of critically judging their own lives. She gives herself the power to decide 
what is best for those women. Secondly, Okin ends her reply by saying that we need a 
multiculturalism that effectively treats all persons as each other’s moral equals. She 
could have taken the criticism of her own work into account by also appealing for a 
similar kind of feminism.  
 
 
The Debate Revisited  
 
Several years after her famous essay was published, Okin wrote a new article on the 
relationship between feminism and multiculturalism. Evaluating the issue after an 
extended debate, she changed her argument considerably. In this article, 
Multiculturalism and Feminism: No Simple Questions, No Simple Answers, Okin 
responds to several important scholars who I have not yet mentioned. 
    Okin wrote Multiculturalism and Feminism: No Simple Questions, No Simple 
Answers in 2002 (for a conference), but it was only published in 2005, together with 
15 other articles about conflicts within minority groups in a multicultural society 
(Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev, 2005). Three years after publishing the highly 
contested Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? and the lively debate that followed, 
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she believed it was time to “revisit the subject” (Okin, 2005, p. 69). Okin claims there 
has been some recognition of her argument that there is a tension or conflict between 
multiculturalism and feminism, but much disagreement about the precise nature of 
this and/or what we should do about it. In Multiculturalism and Feminism: No Simple 
Questions, No Simple Answers she mainly pays attention to the latter and aims to 
evaluate two different kinds of solutions. The first focuses on liberal values, the 
second on democratic processes. The inclusion of democratic processes in her 
analysis is new. 
     The specific question Okin wants to answer in the paper is: 
 
“If a liberal state is discussing or negotiating with an internal cultural group, 
collective rights that seem to reinforce the inequality of the sexes within the 
group, if the women (including the younger women) of the group have been 
consulted and adequately represented during the course of the negotiations, 
and if they have stated in large enough numbers and in clear enough terms that 
they support their group’s illiberal norms and practices that seem oppressive 
of them, what should the state do?” (Okin, 2005, p. 86). 
 
 Democratic and liberal values clearly conflict in this case. Okin says that where 
democracy seems to require that: 
 
“the group rights claims not be hindered and, rather, strengthened, by such 
finding, (...) liberalism (...) would have no more need to consult with the 
women of such a group than it need consult with slaves before it insisted upon 
their emancipation or with workers before it insisted upon their protection 
from deadly workplace hazards” (Okin, 2005, p. 86).  
 
    Okin responds to this dilemma by making an interesting classification. She still 
favours the liberal response in the case of  “patriarchal religions that can make no 
good claims of past oppression” (Okin, 2005, p. 87). However, she changes her 
original view in the case of cultures that have recently suffered or still suffer from the 
oppression of colonial powers or of the larger society (Okin, 2005). In such a case, 
she now believes, women have many reasons to identify with their culture or religion 
and should therefore be consulted. I find this division rather peculiar. First of all, Okin 
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does not give any reasons why women from cultures that are not oppressed cannot or 
should not identify with their culture, neither does she go into the reasons why they 
would not like or deserve the same democratic power as women in (more) oppressed 
minorities. One might wonder in fact whether or not all minority cultures are not, in a 
way, oppressed by the larger society just because they are a minority. This would 
mean that all minority groups actually fit in the second category Okin mentions.  
    At the end of her conclusion Okin describes a rather interesting tension between on 
the one hand the democratic demands we expect minorities to meet, and on the other 
hand the democratic reality of the host society (Okin, 2005). How could for example 
the US congress, which consists of mostly senior, white males tell the leaders of a 
minority group that they should include women and other less powerful people from 
the community in decision making processes. Even though Okin recognizes this 
would be an awkward situation, she believes there are reasons to defend such actions: 
first of all, contrary to the traditional leaders, the congress men are elected; secondly, 
since the minority group wants to enforce new laws that differ from the norms in the 
wider society, they might be expected to provide more evidence. According to Okin 
this situation shows the challenges the democratic solution of the multicultural 
dilemma has to deal with. I would like to argue that this kind of conflict is, rather, a 
consequence of Okin’s one-sided ‘evaluation’ of minority cultures, whether from a 
liberal or a democratic perspective: in an open dialogue between cultural groups it 
would be possible to discuss the representation issue in both groups. 
 
 
To whom Okin was Responding 
 
Okin’s reconsidered view is mainly based on the articles/chapters of two authors: 
Monique Deveaux and Marilyn Friedman. She describes the work of both authors in 
detail, which gives a clear insight into how they have influenced her. I would like to 
discuss the arguments of both authors in order to show the different positions in this 
part of the discussions on multiculturalism and gender equality. I call it ‘a part of the 
discussion’ because all three authors seem to agree on the problems (to an extent) and 
only disagree on finding the right solution to these problems. 
    Marylin Friedman applies her theory of ‘liberal autonomy’ to solve the tension 
between multiculturalism and feminism. Her main aim is to find “common ground” 
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between liberal values and the values of cultural minorities (Okin, 2005). This way 
she hopes to avoid a situation in which liberal values are imposed on non-liberal 
cultures. According to Friedman there is no necessary conflict between liberalism and 
multiculturalism. In fact, many multiculturalists rely on liberal values such as 
individual autonomy, while many liberal societies have historically denied liberal 
values of equality and autonomy to various groups (Friedman, 2003).   
    The key word in Friedman’s work is autonomy (Friedman, 2003). Both liberals and 
multiculturalists use this concept in their arguments. According to Friedman, both 
liberal and nonliberal cultures defend social practices with arguments based on 
consent: 
 
“A crucial source of common ground between liberals and defenders of 
nonliberal cultural practices is thus revealed by the argument that cultural 
practices that violate women’s rights are nevertheless permissible if the 
women in question accept them” (Friedman, 2003, p. 188). 
 
Friedman mentions two conditions that have to be met here in order to have 
confidence in the women’s capability of making a good decision. First of all, they 
have to be able to choose “among a significant and morally acceptable array of 
alternatives” and be able to make their choices “relatively free of coercion, 
manipulation, and deception” (Friedman, 2003, p. 188). Secondly, women must have 
been able to “develop, earlier in life, the capacities needed to reflect on their 
situations and make decisions about them” (Friedman, 2003, p. 188).  
     Even though Okin is attracted to Friedman’s ideas, she also criticizes them (Okin, 
2005). Two connected points are most relevant here. First of all, Okin says, 
Friedman’s conditions are so stringent that it seems unlikely that many women (in 
any society) could meet them. The next problem is therefore: how to deal with those 
who do not meet these standards? According to Okin, Friedman’s theory fails to be 
democratic when one tries to answer these questions. Women who cannot meet her 
high standards of autonomy appear to be excluded from decision-making processes.   
    Deveaux’ theory is more democratically based. She argues that the best way to 
resolve tensions between: 
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“traditional cultural practices and liberal principles in socially plural, 
democratic states is to defend and strengthen deliberation and decision-making 
practices that reflect a radical principle of democratic legitimacy” (Deveaux, 
2005, p. 340). 
 
This means that female members of cultural groups should have: 
 
“a direct say in these matters, through the expansion of sites of democratic 
contestation and the inclusion of women in formal decision-making processes” 
(Deveaux, 2005, p. 341). 
 
According to Deveaux, such a democratic approach is a better way of dealing with 
cultural conflicts than the liberal one, because the latter lacks both legitimacy and the 
necessary grassroots structures for implementation. Furthermore the liberal approach 
does not give enough attention to the actual or lived forms of traditional practices 
(Deveaux, 2005). Her aim is therefore is to come up with a deliberative democratic 
approach which is less idealized and takes “interests and needs as its focus, rather 
than the normative and identity-based claims of cultural group members” (Deveaux, 
2005, p. 343).  
      According to Deveaux there are three ‘normative principles’ political deliberation 
has to be bound by in order to be successful: non-domination, political equality and 
revisability (Deveaux, 2005). The first means that traditional leaders or any other 
political elite must not be able to silence others. The second goes a little bit further 
and states that there should be real opportunities for all citizens to participate in 
decision-making processes. This also means that participation should not be 
influenced by access to power and other resources. The final principle refers to the 
fact that it should be possible to revisit decisions when there are good grounds to do 
so. This principle has at least two advantages according to Deveaux; first of all it will 
probably make it easier to reach compromises, and secondly it acknowledges the fact 
that cultures and cultural traditions change over time.  
 Okin is largely sympathetic to most of Deveaux’s arguments, which she shows by 
incorporating many of them in her own work. Her comments are therefore mostly 
practical: how to make sure that all three principles are met (Okin, 2005). 
Furthermore, she warns of certain problems or tensions this democratic approach has 
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to deal with: the situation of the US congress mentioned in the former section is one 
of these. However, none of Okin’s comments truly contests the idea of using 
deliberative democracy as a solution to the dilemmas between multiculturalism and 
gender equality.  
 
     
Some Remarks on the ‘Is Multiculturalism Bad For Women?’ Debate 
 
The ‘second debate’ that followed Okin’s reconsideration of her views on 
multiculturalism and gender equality was not only more nuanced, but also more 
specifically about the solutions (to already assumed tensions) and their connections to 
liberal and democratic values. However, in my view, the debate about 
multiculturalism and feminism, as initiated by Susan Moller Okin, is still limited and 
relies on very particular interpretations of the key concepts in this debate, mainly 
multiculturalism and feminism. In the following chapters, I will expand the discussion 
and reinvestigate both multiculturalism and feminist theories of difference. From 
there, I will broaden the perspective once more, by critically evaluating other 
important concepts in the debate, such as subjectivity and experience. But before 
moving on to these further theoretical debates on multiculturalism and feminism, I 
will change focus to the Netherlands.  
    This thesis aims to rethink the relationship between multiculturalism and feminism, 
by analysing different discourses on this subject. My empirical work is conducted in 
the Netherlands and should be placed in the specific Dutch context. For that reason, 
this chapter not only describes the debate about multiculturalism and feminism as 
initiated by Susan Moller Okin, but also introduces the public discourse in the 
Netherlands on this issue.  
 
 
Feminism versus Multiculturalism? 
 
A year after Okin published ‘Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?’, the Dutch 
sociologist Sawitri Saharso opposed Okin’s statements in an essay called Feminisme 
versus Multiculturalisme? (Feminism versus Multiculturalism?). This booklet is part 
of a series about politics, economy and culture in a multicultural society, published by 
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the Dutch organization FORUM (Instituut voor Multiculturele Ontwikkeling), which 
is an institute for multicultural development. Several opinion leaders in the 
Netherlands have written for this series. 
    Saharso claims that multiculturalism and feminism might not always be easily 
compatible, but that they are certainly not incompatible either (Saharso, 2000). They 
can be friends, she says, even though it is a friendship that needs to be worked on. 
According to Saharso there are two rather remarkable things about the (Dutch) 
debates on multiculturalism. First of all, very often, Dutch culture is set against ‘the’ 
cultures of foreigners. Secondly, most of the discussions on tolerance refer to gender 
relations. Saharso argues that in order to draw a line regarding tolerance towards 
others cultures, the defenders of Dutch culture often use ‘women’s issues’. She 
believes that cultures are too often described or seen as homogeneous groups. The 
reality however, is more complex: the majority is not as liberal and free as we think 
and the minority not as traditional. In both groups there are different voices. She cites 
a research project in Rotterdam that shows that there is no clear-cut conflict between 
cultures. Discussing themes like abortion and headscarves with younger people from 
several cultures, the differences within those groups appeared to be much larger than 
those between them (Saharso, 2000).  
    This does not mean however that Okin talks about a non-existing problem, Saharso 
argues. For example, there is a group of Turkish and Moroccan younger people that is 
against free choice of partners, furthermore, almost half of the autochtonous3 Dutch 
population believes that ‘foreigners’ shouldn’t be allowed to practice their culture and 
religion in the public sphere (Saharso, 2000). Therefore Saharso proposes a solution 
that acknowledges the differences, but does not reduce these to a ‘clash of 
civilizations’. Saharso claims that most discussions are not about conflicts between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Saharso uses this term ‘autochtonous’ here. It literally means people originally ‘from here’. I would 
like to note though that this term is usually used to refer to white Dutch people and hence has an 
implicit racial aspect. Wekker and Lutz argue that these terms are not only problematic because of 
these different meanings, but also note that the categories ‘allochtonous' and 'autochtonous' are social 
constructions that define who is part of the nation and who is not, based on the construction of 
ethnic/racial differences. For more information on the use and connotations of these terms, see for 
instance: Wekker, G. and H. Lutz. 2001. ‘Een hoogvlakte met koude winden. De geschiedenis van het 
gender- en etniciteitsdenken in Nederland’. in: M. Botman, N. Jouwe and G. Wekker (ed.). 
Caleidoscopische Visies. De zwarte, migranten- en vluchtelingenvrouwenbeweging in Nederland. 
Amsterdam: Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen. pp. 27-28 
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traditional and liberal values; indeed very often they deal with tensions within the 
liberal ideology (e.g. autonomy and non-discrimination or equality). Opinion leaders 
can say that ‘our liberal values are non- negotiable’, but in reality they do not give us 
a clear-cut answer, she says. Saharso therefore believes that dialogue is the only 
option we have in solving the problems that arise in a multicultural society. This 
means reinterpretation of both majority and minority cultures and discussion about 
how to deal with conflicting values.  
    Saharso’s essay was not just an answer to Susan Moller Okin; it also forms part of 
a broader debate in the Netherlands about multiculturalism. A rather provocative 
article written by the right-wing liberal Frits Bolkestein is generally seen as ‘the start’ 
of this discussion (Prins, 2002; Ghorashi, 2003). 
 
 
Beyond Innocence: Neo-Realism in the Dutch Discourse on Multiculturalism 
 
I would like to focus briefly here on the style of this debate. In Voorbij de Onschuld 
(Beyond Innocence) Baukje Prins argues that the harsh discussions about 
multiculturalism and Islam in the Netherlands show that since the 90s a new public 
discourse has arisen (Prins, 2004). According to Prins, this ‘neo-realist’ genre can be 
recognized by four main characteristics (Prins, 2002). First of all, authors or speakers 
in this discourse present themselves as persons ‘who dare to face the facts’ and openly 
discuss what is really happening. While they bravely choose to tell the truth, idealists 
only talk about what they want to happen. Secondly, neo-realists believe themselves 
to be representing ‘normal people’; they say that, contrary to other politicians, they do 
not ignore the complaints and opinions of ‘The Dutch’. Neo-realists claim we should 
listen to those people living in poor neighbourhoods in big cities, since they truly 
experience the problems with the multicultural society and are not “blinded by 
politically correct thinking” (Prins, 2002, p 6). A third characteristic of the genre is 
the belief that having ‘a sense of reality’ is an important part of the Dutch national 
identity. Being Dutch means you are open, straightforward and realistic. Finally, neo-
realists can be recognized in their aversion for the political left. Authors in the genre 
regularly argue that it is time to end the power of left-wing elites that try to obscure 
the problems with migrants and Islam. With their politically correct and relativist 
ideas about cultures left-wing elites are supposed to have censured all discussions of 
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multiculturalism. 
    An essential element of the neo-realist discourse is the importance of emancipation 
in these debates. Even though none of the neo-realists seem to have shown any 
interest in feminism or women’s rights before, they now use gender relations to define 
their own identity as opposite to the ‘Other’. Prins shows that this strategy is older 
than we might expect; indeed it dates back to the nineteenth century (Prins, 2004). 
Europeans defended their dominant position in the colonies by referring to the 
dependence of ‘indigenous’ women as proof of the backwardness of the ‘other’ 
culture. It is interesting to mention here that European feminists also used this 
argument to defend their struggles for emancipation (see e.g. Burton, 1994; Grever 
and Waaldijk, 1998). This ‘white (wo)man’s burden’ seems to have moved away 
from the colonies and to Western nations, but the reasoning of the neo-realists is very 
similar to the colonialists’ arguments in the nineteenth century.  
    Besides the emancipation of women, gender in general is a very important element 
in the neo-realist debates. Not only are most of the discussions on issues that directly 
involve the lives and bodies of women, many arguments used also refer to gender 
relations. Prins states that most neo-realists aim their statements at male migrants; 
they have to change and live their lives according to Dutch norms and values. Women 
on the other hand are not talked to but about. They are presented as victims of their 
culture and / or religion. Neo-realists often claim to rescue or save these women from 
their traditional lives and conservative men. This way, male migrants are presented as 
troublemakers and female migrants as people in trouble (Prins, 2004). 
  
 
Neo-realism in Practice: Beginning to Challenge Multiculturalism 
 
Despite the long history of immigration, which was closely linked to colonisation, 
most accounts of Dutch migration history start with the arrival of the so called ‘guest 
workers’ in the 1950s (Ghorashi, 2003). These people, mostly from Turkey and 
Morocco, were seen as temporary migrants who came to the Netherlands to work for 
a few years. When the government realized that most of these people would not go 
back to their country of birth, integration policies became an issue. However, this was 
not until the 1980s, when many migrants had already lived in the country for several 
decades. In these years, policy was mostly based on the idea that migrants should 
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integrate into Dutch society, while maintaining their own identities: ‘integratie met 
behoud van eigen identiteit’ (Ghorashi, 2003). The beginning of the ‘neo-realist’ 
discourse can be connected to the first statements against this approach towards 
migrants and other cultures (Prins, 2002).  
    As mentioned before, the article written by Frits Bolkestein is generally considered 
to be the start of a long range of debates about minorities in the Netherlands. Even 
though many already believed that more attention should be given to the integration 
of migrants, the words of Bolkestein shocked the country (Prins, 2002). His main 
thesis in Integratie van minderheden moet met lef worden aangepakt (‘Integretation of 
minorities should be handled with guts’) is that multiculturalism should be limited 
(Bolkestein, 1991). Western principles like freedom and equality are to be protected 
by all means, in his view. Furthermore, he argues that more attention should be paid 
to the integration of minorities: because it is such a difficult problem, we have to deal 
with it with courage and creativity. There is no room for taboos or easy way outs 
(Bolkestein, 1991, p. 188). According to Prins, Bolkestein didn’t criticize the goal of 
the Dutch government (emancipation of immigrants), but their approach. He argued 
that the current isolation of migrants in the Netherlands was caused by overprotection 
(Prins, 2002).  
    Bolkestein’s article probably received so much attention because it touched on 
issues that used to belong to the extreme right or the Centre Democratic Party (CD) in 
the Netherlands (Ghorashi, 2003). He wanted to ‘leave politically correct thinking 
behind’ and proposed an approach of complete integration of migrants. These ideas 
strongly resembled those of the CD, but Bolkestein presented them more carefully 
and reached a lot more people. Another possible reason for the popularity of his 
argument is that he challenged the previously dominant “toleration of differences” 
discourse by arguing that Islamic and Western values are incompatible and that 
Islamic migrants could endanger Western achievements, (Ghorashi, 2003).  
 
 
A New Phase: Multiculturalism, both Drama and Illusion 
 
A second article that deeply influenced the Dutch debates on multiculturalism, 
migrants and Islam was written almost ten years after Bolkestein’s. In 1999, the 
director of the Dutch Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (SCP; an independent scientific 
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institute that conducts research and advises the government) published an essay called 
De Multiculturele Illusie (The Multicultural Illusion). Schnabel’s article is mainly 
based on the results of an SCP research project and his main theses are that the 
Netherlands are not multicultural and cannot, will not and should not be so (Schnabel, 
1999). ‘Multiculturality’ (Multiculturaliteit) is neither a realistic nor a desirable 
option, he says (Schnabel, 1999, p. 8). His claims are rather ambiguous, since he both 
tries to argue that any development towards a ‘mixed culture’ is undesirable, but also 
believes that it is not likely to happen for several reasons (Gowricharn, 1999). He 
starts from the same thesis as Bolkestein (Western and Islamic values are 
incompatible) but he takes his argument a bit further.  
    De Multiculturele Illusie not only describes what Schnabel considers to be the 
proper approach to the integration of migrants into Dutch society, but also aims to 
start a normative discussion on the value of different cultures. Schnabel describes 
Dutch or Western culture as modern, secular, individualized and accommodating 
when it comes to giving space to minorities (Schnabel, 1999, p. 10). “New-comers” 
on the other hand are not always positive about Dutch culture (Schnabel, 1999, p. 10), 
nor is their culture as accommodating (Schnabel, 1999, p. 10) as the Dutch. Finally, 
Schnabel believes that the cultures that migrants bring to the Netherlands have 
probably no meaning or importance to others (outside their own cultural group), 
except when it comes to music or food (Schnabel, 1999, p. 11).  
    According to Schnabel, the solution to these issues lies in a political/cultural 
system with three layers. The first layer consists of the general public culture; basic 
political and cultural values in this area are not negotiable. This layer should therefore 
be monocultural, according to Schnabel. The second layer occupies school, work and 
other forms of participation in society. This section can be multicultural in a strictly 
limited way: people can choose the school they send their children to, but not whether 
they send their children to school or not. The last area is more private and deals with 
issues such as relationships, sexuality, music, clothing etc. This layer can be 
multicultural as long as choices do not influence the functioning of the first or second 
layer (Schnabel, 1999). Briefly summarized, this means that (except for a few 
exceptions in the second layer) people can only live according to their cultural values 
in the private sphere. As will become clear in the next chapter, such an approach, in 
which minority cultures are not recognised in society, can deeply influence the lives 
and self-image of individual members of these groups. Furthermore, it would far from 
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solve Okin’s points about gender equality, since people can still hold on to certain 
patriarchal values, albeit in the private sphere.  
    Shortly after Paul Schnabel published Multiculturele Illusie, a more left-wing 
oriented journalist and commentator wrote another much-talked-about article, called 
Het Multiculturele Drama (The Multicultural Drama). Paul Scheffer approaches the 
‘multicultural problems’ differently from the two right-wing liberal authors that I 
mentioned before. His main concern lies with the mostly left-wing elite who seem to 
ignore the growing socio-economic gap between the born-Dutch and immigrants 
(Prins, 2002). During the twentieth century the Netherlands have done a lot to end 
social inequality, which makes it very difficult to understand that no one seems to be 
concerned about the ‘ethnic lower class’ (etnische onderklasse) that is coming up, 
Scheffer says (Scheffer, 2000). Unemployment, poverty, dropping out of school and 
crime are huge problems among minority groups in the Netherlands and will be a 
growing burden on Dutch society, he argues further. He continues his analysis by 
asking how it is possible that it has come to this, and how we could change the 
situation. In this part of the article his ideas come closest to those of the previous 
authors. 
    Scheffer argues that the Dutch system of pillarization4 cannot help the 
emancipation and integration of migrants. There are too many differences, he says 
(Scheffer, 2000). Many people in the Netherlands expected that integration would just 
be a matter of time, but the opposite is happening according to Scheffer: “We are now 
living with the third generation of migrants and the problems keep growing” 
(Scheffer, 2000). Another problem that Scheffer mentions is the lack of national 
identity in the Netherlands, which makes integration for migrants even more difficult: 
 
“We don’t say anything about our borders, we do not treasure our past and use 
our language without care. (...) A society that disavows itself has nothing to 
offer to migrants. (...) And someone who does not know what is being taken, 
has got nothing to give” (Scheffer, 2000).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Briefly summarized this means that the political and social spheres were organized through vertical 
pillars (Peters, 2006). The different pillars (Catholic, Calvinist, Socialist, and Liberal) were clearly 
divided and identifiable segments: there were Catholic, Protestant and Public schools, Protestant, 
Catholic, socialist and liberal broadcasting companies, sport clubs, newspapers and labour unions. See 
chapter 2 for a more elaborate description of the Dutch pillarization system.  
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Scheffer concludes by saying that ‘we’ need to rethink our integration and 
immigration policies, as the current ones enhance inequality and cause alienation.  
    According to Baukje Prins, Paul Scheffer’s article is a perfect example of the neo-
realist genre. Just like Bolkestein, Scheffer was praised for his brave analysis of the 
problems with Dutch multicultural society. Furthermore, he too focuses on national 
identity as a possible solution to these problems. Thirdly, Scheffer criticizes the left-
wing elite for not dealing with the problems and being too nonchalant about it. 
Finally, he refers to the fact that the ideas and experiences of ‘normal people’ were 
often ignored. However, even though we can recognize all the characteristics of neo-
realism in Scheffer’s articles, there are differences too. For example, his main aim is 
the social-economic emancipation of immigrants; while others, such as Bolkestein 
and Schnabel are mostly concerned with cultural integration. Prins therefore argues 
that Scheffer’s article can be described as more politically correct; he is a ‘neo-realist 
with a social edge’ (Prins, 2002). 
 
 
A Feminist enters the Debate 
 
Even though all of the above-mentioned authors referred to gender (in)equality as one 
of the problems with multiculturalism/Islam/minority cultures, none of them saw this 
as the main issue. In 2001 however, one of the Netherlands well known feminists 
spoke out. In an interview with a national newspaper on International Women’s Day, 
Ciska Dresselhuys (at that time chief editor of the popular feminist magazine Opzij)5 
says that women who wear headscarves cannot work for her: 
 
“In a coffee shop I do not endure sexism, circumcision is a taboo for me and 
editors with a headscarf can not work for Opzij” (Dresselhuys, 2001). 
 
Dresselhuys’ words led to a serious discussion in the Netherlands, mainly because it 
was illegal for her, as an employer, to judge possible employees on their appearance, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See chapter 5 for a more detailed description of Opzij magazine and chief editor Cisca Dresselhuys 
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but also, because her claims pointed out an essential issue in current feminist thought: 
the relationship between religion and feminism.  
    Baukje Prins and Sawitri Saharso responded to Dresselhuys a week later, in the 
same newspaper. They argue that the editor of Opzij tells Muslim women to choose 
their own lifestyle, as long as it is the same as Dresselhuys’ (Prins and Saharso, 
2001). In the interview Dresselhuys claims that feminism is not culturally bounded, 
but according to Prins and Saharso she prooves exactly the opposite with her 
statements. Dresselhuys believes that the headscarf is a sign of women’s oppression; 
any woman wearing one cannot therefore be a feminist. Even when women claim to 
wear the piece of clothing because of religious beliefs, they can’t persuade 
Dresselhuys. She strongly believes that her view on the headscarf is the only right one 
(Prins and Saharso, 2001). Prins and Saharso argue that feminists should recognize 
the fact that there is an internal tension within feminism between the struggle for 
equality and autonomy. We should respect both concepts and when a conflict arises 
we should discuss it (Prins and Saharso, 2001). 
 
 
From September 11, to Pim Fortuyn 
 
After September 11 2001, Islam and Muslims become even more important subjects 
of discussion than before. The discourse on multiculturalism hardens, in the 
Netherlands as elsewhere. On September 29th, Sylvain Ephimenco published ‘a letter 
to all Muslims in the Netherlands’ in a national newspaper. The Dutch-French 
publicist asks Muslims to move away from their voluntary isolation (zelfgekozen 
isolement) and to stop acting like victims (Ephimenco, 2001). He fears that what is 
open to discussion now might not be so tomorrow: “I am afraid that as more incidents 
will happen, your willingness to listen to opposing voices will decrease” (Ephimenco, 
2001, p. 12). He often refers to Muslims’ so called sensitivity and pride. Ephimenco 
proceeds by saying that Muslims should recognize the fact that a group of 
fundamentalist Muslim fighters has arisen and that it can be difficult for outsiders to 
distinguish those from the “peaceful Muslims”. Therefore, he wants Muslims to 
acknowledge this ‘malicious tumour’: “no one has ever gone better by denying the 
syndromes of its disease” (Ephimenco, 2001, p. 14). It is both surprising and 
dangerous, he says, that Muslims are “hardly introspective”. He ends his ‘letter’ by 
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saying that he feels that having an open discussion about problems within Islam is 
often seen as xenophobic. He, however, believes that we are in a ‘state of emergency’ 
and that direct action is required (Ephimenco, 2001).  
    One of the most remarkable and influential happenings in the Netherlands after 
September 11, however, was the election of Pim Fortuyn for the right-wing populist 
party Leefbaar Nederland (LN: Liveable Netherlands). Fortuyn, an ex-Marxist 
sociologist, was mostly known for his columns in the news magazine Elsevier, where 
he discussed things like the welfare state, Islam, the European Union and immigration 
policies (Prins, 2002). Prins describes Fortuyn as the champion of neo-realism; his 
work has all the characteristics of it. Furthermore, she argues, he radicalized the genre 
in the Netherlands, which resulted in a more extreme form of it: hyper neo-realism 
(Prins, 2002).   
    Just like other neo-realists, Fortuyn claimed to understand the experiences of 
‘normal people’. And just like the others, his attitude towards these people was 
ambiguous: on the one hand he wanted them to be taken seriously because he 
believed that they knew what was going on, but on the other hand he also claimed that 
these people needed a strong leader, someone who could be both a father and a 
mother to them (Prins, 2002). Another element of neo-realism (the importance of 
national identity) comes across in his statements about the growing influence of the 
European Union, his ‘warnings’ against the ‘Islamization’ of the Dutch culture and 
his pleas against migrants (Prins, 2002). Thirdly, in much of Fortuyn’s writing one 
can recognize his hatred of the ‘progressive elite’.  The book De puinhopen van acht 
jaar paars (‘The ravages after eight years ‘Paars’ government’) is a clear example of 
this. In this work he describes and analyzes the problems in the Netherlands and 
concludes they are a direct result of the liberal-social democratic government (Paars). 
Waiting lists for healthcare and safety issues are examples of  ‘the ravages’ he 
describes (Fortuyn, 2002). 
    Fortuyn truly radicalized the neo-realist genre by constantly breaking taboos. This 
aspect of neo-realism was very important to his style. Fortuyn for example always 
told people that they could trust him because he ‘said what he thought and did what 
he said’ (Prins, 2002). In a famous interview he shocked the country by saying that 
the first section of the constitution (which forbids discrimination) ought to be deleted 
(Prins, 2002). This statement clearly crossed a line that had not been crossed before. 
While other neo-realists ‘only’ wrote about problems with Islam, migrants and 
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multiculturalism, Fortuyn also made ‘equality’ subject of the neo-realist struggle 
against political correctness. After this interview, in which he also said that the 
Netherlands are ‘full’ and that Islam is a backwards culture, Fortuyn was dismissed 
from the party LN (Prins, 2002). He founded a new party to participate in the 
elections, but on May 6th 2002, a little more than a week before the national elections, 
the right-wing politician was murdered after giving a radio interview. The perpetrator 
was an animal rights activist and the murder does not seem to have been directly 
motivated by Fortuyns’ view on Islam.  
 
     
Ayaan Hirsi Ali: Debating the Relationship between Gender Equality and Islam 
 
 In November of 2004, the Netherlands was struck by another murder when the 
controversial film director Theo van Gogh was killed in the centre of Amsterdam. The 
film ‘Submission’ which he had just made with the Dutch-Somalian politician Ayaan 
Hirsi Ali is generally seen as the direct reason for this political murder. A letter was 
left on the body of Van Gogh, announcing a Jihad in the Netherlands against enemies 
of Islam. It also mentioned that several Dutch politicians would be ‘next on the list’, 
Ayaan Hirsi Ali being one of them. These events made Hirsi Ali world famous, and 
by now she is well known for her critical views on Islam, especially concerning 
women’s rights. I would like to discuss the work of Ayaan Hirsi Ali more extensively, 
because her work brings many of the characteristics of the neo-realist genre together 
in a rather interesting (and maybe unexpected) way. Furthermore, I believe she is one 
of the most important opinion leaders in the Netherlands on the subject of Islam and 
gender equality. These two aspects together make her work essential for an analysis 
of the debates on multiculturalism and feminism in the Netherlands.  
    Ayaan Hirsi Ali came to the Netherlands as a refugee in 1992. She studied political 
science at the University of Leiden, and soon after her studies started working for the 
study bureau of the Social Democrats (PvdA) (Bracke, 2004). In 2002, she left the 
PvdA, with lots of media attention, to become a Member of Parliament for the right-
liberal party (VVD). According to Ali, the social democrats were only paying lip 
service to women's rights, particularly when it came to rights for women in immigrant 
and Muslim communities (Ali, 2002b). During this period Ayaan Hirsi Ali started to 
publish her ideas on Islam, women rights and multiculturalism in the Netherlands. In 
 	   47 
May 2006, Ali reached world headlines again because of a scandal about her asylum. 
A Dutch television documentary showed that she had lied about her name, age and 
her escape to the Netherlands. The minister of Integration and Immigration soon 
announced that these lies made Ali’s passport invalid. A month later, the minister 
changed her decision and said that Ali could keep her passport, because apparently 
she was allowed to use the name Ali according to Somalian law. A few days later the 
government collapsed because one of the coalition’s parties withdrew its support 
following these events. Ayaan Hirsi Ali left the country anyhow, to start a new career 
in Washington. 
 
  
An Alternative Voice? 
 
At first sight Ayaan Hirsi Ali is not likely to fit within the framework of neo-realist 
debates that Prins describes (Prins, 2002; Prins, 2004). Most importantly this is 
because neo-realists are usually white men who claim to represent the lower classes 
by ‘acknowledging’ the problems of the Dutch multicultural society. Ali on the other 
hand, is a black, female refugee who criticizes the religion and culture she grew up in. 
However, if we do not look at the author, but at the texts she produces, we can clearly 
recognize elements of neo-realism in her arguments and statements.  
    In a speech Ayaan Hirsi Ali gave in Berlin (The right to offend), immediately after 
the Danish ‘Cartoon Affaire’6, one can clearly recognize neo-realist elements. First of 
all she frames the discussion around the cartoons as a disagreement between cowards 
and people with ‘guts’. According to Ali, the Prime Minister of Denmark acted 
correctly when he refused to meet with representatives of the ‘Islamic regimes’, and 
she wished her own prime minister had such guts (Ali, 2006). We should defend our 
freedom, and therefore defend “our right to offend”, she claims. Others, who do not 
agree with this and do not want to be associated with the cartoons, are cowards in her 
opinion. In other words, different opinions on the affair are not accepted as a 
disagreement, but put down as a fearful response.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 In September 2005, A Danish newspaper published 12 editorial cartoons, most of which depicted the 
prophet Muhammed. This led to a series of protests around the world, some of which ended in 
violence. For more information on the background and consequences see for example: Bolette 
Blaagaard. 2007. ‘Gender or Discrimination. Rethinking the Cartoon Controversy’. Historica. 30, 2 
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    The second element of Ali’s speech that can be defined as neo-realist is the way she 
justifies her statement of ‘the right to offend’. Baukje Prins called the first chapter of 
her dissertation, ‘New Realism: I take them seriously, so I quarrel’ (Prins, 1997). 
According to Prins neo-realists associate respect for the other party with manly, brave 
behaviour: having the nerves to break taboos. Freedom of speech is very important in 
this context. Very often neo-realists claim to have been silenced for years by left-wing 
elites that did not allow any critique of other cultures. Ali’s mission to defend “the 
right to offend” is directly connected to this idea that ‘we’ need to defend freedom of 
speech and even the right to offend others. Whether these quarrels and offences hurt 
other people does not seem to matter.  
 
 
Struggling on Behalf of Muslim Women 
 
Ayaan Hirsi Ali is one of few authors in this debate for whom gender is actually a key 
issue. Her main argument is that Islam is a potential threat to the emancipation of 
(Muslim) women. For this reason liberal democracies should not accept possibly 
harmful traditions out of respect for other cultures or religions.  
    Ali usually talks about one specific group: Muslim women (or Moslima’s, as they 
are often called in the Netherlands). When Ali talks about these women, she often 
refers to them as victims; they are women who need help and support. Forced 
marriages, circumcision and headscarves are signs of the backward position of 
women in Islam that Ali writes about. In ‘Hoezo uiting van trots?’ (What do you 
mean expression of pride?) she discusses the ‘headscarves debate(s)’. According to 
Ali, wearing a headscarf can never be an expression of one’s identity; on the contrary, 
she says, it is always a manifestation of submission to men (Ali, 2004b). She 
describes how Muslim women claim that they wear a scarf to show who they are, or 
to be able to go to work, but argues that women are fooling themselves with these 
reasons.  
    The ‘headscarves article’ is one of the many in which Ali claims that Muslim 
women suffer from such ‘false consciousness’. In ‘De Maagdenkooi’ (The Caged 
Virgin), she argues that there are three categories of Muslims in the West (Ali, 
2004a). First of all, there is a silent minority that is not very religious anymore and 
knows that Islam has no future, but does not really do anything about it. The second 
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group is described by Ali as ‘hurt’; people in this group feel upset about the attacks on 
their religion and believe that the problems in their lives lie outside Islam. The last 
group consists of progressive Muslims who want change. According to Ali, relativists 
who tell them not to offend other people hinder this group. This categorization is 
mainly interesting because it shows Ali’s views on Muslims: there is no category of 
Muslims who are voluntarily and consciously religious. For Ali, Muslims fight their 
religion, either actively or silently, or they are naïve, hurt people that still think that 
their problems have nothing to do with Islam.  
    Ali follows this categorization by arguing that she herself used to be in the silent 
group. She accepted the life she was living, and did not believe she could change 
anything. Now she knows she can, and she wants to show other women that they can 
too. Women who say that they believe in Allah and want to wear a headscarf just do 
not know any better, according to Ali. They have made oppression a part of their lives 
and have accepted it as such (Ali, 2004a). She compares this attitude with slaves who 
chose to stay in slavery when they had the choice of leaving. It seems from this 
remark that Ali does not see religious Muslim women as conscious subjects; if they 
believe in Allah and want to live their lives as Muslims, they only do so because they 
do not know any better.  
 
 
Islam versus the West 
 
Another important element of Ali’s work that I would like to address here is the 
division she makes between the ‘secular and Enlightened’ West on one side and a 
‘backwards’ Islam on the other. This ‘us’ versus ‘them’ thinking is an important 
element of neo-realism (Prins, 2004). Terms like secularism, progress, justice and 
freedom are associated with the West while things like gender inequality, religious 
fundamentalism, backwardness and abuse of power are connected to Islam and 
Islamic countries. Neo-realists are often afraid that Muslim migrants will bring these 
concepts back to the West. The word ‘back’ is important because it implies a linear 
development in history. Among others, Ayaan Hirsi Ali argues that Muslims should 
start looking at their religion more critically and work on issues that the West has 
already dealt with a long time ago.       
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    Ayaan Hirsi Ali often claims that Islam and Muslims are behind. They need to 
catch up with the changes the West has gone through in the last few centuries, 
especially after the Enlightenment. This is the main theme of ‘De Maagdenkooi’ (The 
Caged Virgin). Questions Ali wants to answer are: “what stops Muslims from 
progression?”, “why can they not catch up with the West?” and “why can they not 
just participate in Western societies?” (Ali, 2004a, p 8). According to Ali, the answer 
to these questions lies in Islamic sexual morality. This keeps men, women and 
children in a maagdenkooi (virgin cage). For this reason, Ali argues, Islam needs 
Enlightenment; the religion must change and adapt Western values like individualism 
and freedom.  
   Both men and women are victims of traditional values in Islam, but women are truly 
oppressed and need to be helped by the West, Ali claims. In ‘Moslima’s, eis je 
rechten op!’ (Muslim women, stand up for your rights!), Ali explains why she is so 
critical of her former religion (Ali, 2002a). First of all, she wants to stop the inhumane 
treatment of women and girls in Islam. Secondly, she believes that without 
improvement of the position of women, Muslims will remain in a backwards position 
in society. Here we can recognise previously described arguments: Islam is 
backwards - most importantly because Muslim women are not being treated equally - 
and needs to change. In order to achieve this, Muslims should follow the course that 
the West has already taken.  
    In these debates about the division between the Enlightened West and backward 
Islam, Western culture remains invisible (Prins, 1997). Only the Other culture needs 
to change. This unmarked position of white culture or people is also referred to as 
‘whiteness’. White is seen as the norm and white people as ‘raceless’ (Frankenberg, 
1993). According to Ruth Frankenberg, it is important to recognise that both white 
people and people of colour live racially structured lives, and that white people are 
‘raced’, just as men are ‘gendered’. In her articles, Ayaan Hirsi Ali clearly focuses on 
Islam and Islamic culture. White, or in this case Dutch, culture is considered normal, 
or the norm. Baukje Prins shows that this kind of analysis creates a hierarchy between 
a modern, civilised culture (which acknowledges ‘universal’ norms) and a traditional 
culture with particular traditions and values. This way, discussions about multicultural 
society are defined in terms of ‘limits of tolerance’: how far can we go in allowing 
minorities to hold on to their beliefs? Such thinking makes an equal intercultural 
dialogue difficult.  
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Doomed to Vulnerability: Critique of the Dutch Debate on Multiculturalism  
 
Three months after the murder of Theo van Gogh, the Dutch historian Geert Mak 
published a political/historical leaflet about the days after the death of the 
controversial publicist and filmmaker (Mak, 2005a). In this work he analyzes the 
reaction of politicians, opinion makers and journalists, but also reports on what 
happened on the streets. Comparing the situation with other historical periods, he 
argues that the Dutch intellectual and political elite responded to the situation with 
complete panic: fear and other emotions dominated the debates. For example, a few 
days after the murder the national news started with headlines like “Nederland 
Brandt!” (Holland is on fire!), and the vice prime minister even said that country was 
in a state of ‘war’ (Mak, 2005a).  
    Of course this was not reality. According to Mak most Dutch people were indeed 
shocked by what had happened, but it was mostly the political and journalistic world 
that was on fire. He argues that usually in such situations of crisis, the intellectual 
elites try to stabilize the situation. He used Spain as example, where (eight months 
earlier) terrorists had killed 200 people. The media there remained civilized when it 
came to Muslims and purposely did not blame Islam. In the Netherlands on the other 
hand, the murder of Van Gogh resulted in extreme xenophobia, stirred up by 
journalists and politicians, Mak says.  
    On television and in newspapers, the debates about the multicultural society 
radicalized: people asked whether this was just an isolated incident or whether there 
was something more structurally wrong (Mak, 2005a). Many politicians were 
convinced it was the latter: Holland had a problem with immigration, integration and 
Islam. According to Mak the murder brought three things together: extreme religious 
violence, a politically complicated publicist and a controversial film. Many politicians 
however, only discussed the first question and framed it as ‘a problem with Islam’. 
Both the film and the ideological background of Van Gogh were kept out of the 
debates; sometimes it was even taboo to mention them. Furthermore, none of the 
debates about Islam responded to a ‘real danger’, Mak argues. There were hardly any 
practical discussions about how to deal with terrorism or fundamentalist Muslims 
(Mak, 2005a). The low budget of the security serviced or the poor cooperation 
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between the police and the security services were barely an issue. Fear was the only 
thing that seemed to matter: how many Muslims are possible terrorists and how can 
we catch them in an early stage, were the subjects of these days, according to Mak.  
    Foreign journalists could not believe what was happening. Many of them argued 
that Dutch papers published articles that could have never been published in Britain or 
the US, Mak says. A Danish newspaper warned of a scenario comparable to Kristall 
nacht in 1938; the Belgian prime minister spoke about an imminent civil war in the 
Netherlands; the army in the US labelled the country as “dangerous area”, and the 
Russian government asked the Dutch government for clarification (Mak, 2005a). 
According to Mak the Dutch elite had lost their minds, and the inability of foreigners 
to understand what was going on shows how bad the situation was. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In 1999, Susan Moller Okin wrote the rather provocative article Is Multiculturalism 
Bad for Women? According to Okin, there is a “considerable likelihood of conflict 
between feminism and group rights for minority cultures”, even when the latter are 
based on liberal grounds. Her statements were (and still are) much debated, both in 
academia and in the popular media. Some authors agree with her, others think she was 
too harsh. Most criticism has been aimed at her limited definition of feminism, or 
referred to the cultural imperialism implied in her argument. Several years after she 
wrote the essay, which started the debate, Okin revisited the subject and significantly 
changed her argument. Instead of taking just liberal values into account, she now 
stated that democratic values are important as well. This second article has led to a 
considerably different discussion than the first. Where the original article mainly dealt 
with defining the possible problems and tensions, Okin is now mostly interested in 
finding the right solutions. Even though this practical approach might be useful, it has 
considerably narrowed the debate. 
    In the Netherlands, the subject is very often discussed within a larger frame of 
migration, Islam and integration issues. Baukje Prins describes the media discourse 
on multiculturalism as ‘neo-realist’. Breaking taboos, representing the ‘normal Dutch 
people’, and criticizing ‘the’ left-wing elite are essential characteristics of this genre. 
The first article that could be described as neo-realist was written by the right-wing 
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liberal Frits Bolkestein, who argued that migrants ought to integrate into Dutch 
society. After Bolkestein, other opinion leaders discussed the integration of migrants 
as well and expanded the debate around the so-called incompatibility of ‘Muslim’ and 
‘Western’ values. Ayaan Hirsi Ali could be seen as one of the last ‘heroes’ of this 
neo-realist discourse. Even though her background makes her very different from all 
the other neo-realists, her work includes almost all of its significant elements.  
    Much of the critique of Okin has been related to her interpretations of feminism 
and multiculturalism, furthermore the lack of attention to the experiences and 
opinions of the women she writes about has also been attacked. In the following 
chapters, I will theorise the relationship between multiculturalism and feminism 
further, by critically evaluating the key concepts in this debate. This will both make it 
possible to broaden the debate as started by Okin, but will also give more insights into 
the specific framing of the public discussions in the Netherlands.  
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Chapter 2 Conceptualising Multiculturalism, Culture, Religion and the 
Acknowledgement of Difference  
 
 
Introduction 
 
“Most cultures are suffused with practices and ideologies concerning gender. (…) 
Suppose (…) that there are fairly clear disparities in power between the sexes, such 
that the more powerful, male members are those who are generally in a position to 
determine and articulate the group’s beliefs, practices and interests. Under such 
conditions, group rights are potentially, and in many cases actually, antifeminist. 
They substantially limit the capacities of women and girls of that culture to live with 
human dignity equal to that of men and boys, and to live as freely chosen lives as 
they can” (Okin, 1999a, p 12). 
 
Susan Moller Okin argues that everyone who endorses equality between men and 
women should at least be sceptical about special group rights for minority cultures (in 
Western liberal societies). Unless (young) women are fully represented in the 
negotiations about these rights, “their interests may be harmed rather than promoted 
by the granting of such rights” (Okin, 1999a, p 24). Susan Moller Okin is not the only 
one who believes that special rights for minority cultures specifically, and 
multiculturalism in general, might be harmful to women. The Dutch-Somalian Ayaan 
Hirsi Ali, for instance, follows a similar argument in her work, though she focuses on 
Islam specifically. As described in the previous chapter, she claims that Muslim 
women are caught in a virgin cage, mostly because of Islamic sexual morality (Ali, 
2004a, p 9). Granting Muslims special rights would only make things worse for 
Muslim women, Ali argues.  
    Both authors point out serious issues related to culture and/or religion. Practices 
such as circumcision or forced marriage are problematical, especially in relation to 
(the struggle for) gender equality. However, there is also a growing group of women 
who believe that culture and religion are important parts of people’s lives, and should 
not be rejected as a whole because of these problems. Furthermore, some women 
argue that gender alone is not enough to explain women’s oppression, and that 
ethnicity, sexuality and class are also important factors in this. In this chapter I will 
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explore the concept of multiculturalism. What is multiculturalism? How has it been 
conceptualised? And what is its connection to cultural and religious differences? 
These are the main questions that will structure this chapter. The chapter begins with 
a basic description of the main characteristics of multiculturalism and finally outlines 
the complexities and practical issues connected to the concept. The main aim of this 
chapter is to provide more clarity and create a more thorough understanding of this 
concept in order to broaden our perspective on the relationship between 
multiculturalism and feminism.  
 
 
Conceptualising Multiculturalism 
 
In general the term multiculturalism is used to describe the ideology that values the 
existence of different cultures in a certain society and aims to protect these by, for 
instance, proposing laws to safeguard their languages or traditions. However, 
multiculturalism is defined in various ways, and can refer to various interpretations, 
depending on context, time or place. In the next section I shall outline different forms 
and the important issues related to this concept, but first I will present a number of 
general points we need to take into account when we theorize multiculturalism. First 
of all, it is important to recognise the difference between multicultural societies and 
multiculturalism (Parekh, 2006, p 6). The first term is descriptive and refers to 
societies that include two or more cultural communities. The second term is 
normative and refers to the response to the existence of different communities by 
welcoming the different cultures and making them part of society. In this sense, both 
France and Britain can be called multicultural, but whether they are also 
‘multiculturalist’ is open to discussion. Hence, multiculturalism is about the 
ideological reaction to the empirical situation.  
    David Goldberg describes multiculturalism as a response to monocultural politics 
and policies: “Broadly conceived, multiculturalism is critical of and resistant to the 
necessarily reductive imperatives of monocultural assimilation” (Goldberg, 1994, p 
7). Therefore, he argues, we first have to look at the history of monoculturalism, if we 
want to get a better understanding of current forms of multiculturalism (Goldberg, 
1994, p 11). Focusing on the history of universities in the United States, he describes 
how in the nineteenth century a discourse of universality arose. Combined with an 
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immigration policy that aimed to “Keep America White”, this led to a monocultural 
ideal that became institutional practice: “it was virtually impossible without extreme 
marginalization to think and do other than in and through its terms”, Goldberg (1994, 
p 4) argues. Multicultural policies should be seen as a counter force to these 
monocultural developments.  
    Finally, I would like to emphasise the importance of recognising the different 
forms of (dealing with) cultural pluralism. How a society deals with minority groups 
(who demand recognition of their identity and accommodation of cultural differences) 
is the ‘multicultural challenge’, according to Will Kymlicka (Kymlicka, 1995, p 10). 
A society is multicultural, he argues, if: 
 
 “its members either belong to different nations (a multination state), or have 
emigrated from different nations (a poly-ethnic state), and if this fact is an 
important aspect of personal identity and political life” (Kymlicka, 1995, p 18).  
 
Hence, depending on the history of the ‘host’ country, and the demands and wishes of 
minority groups, societies respond very differently to the ‘multicultural challenge’. 
  
 
Multiculturalism: the Politics of Recognition 
 
Before I elaborate further on the different interpretations of multiculturalism, I want 
to put forward another important characteristic of multiculturalism: the politics of 
recognition. This concept has become so important for multiculturalism that it is often 
confused with it. In the introduction to the previous section, I mentioned that 
multiculturalism is generally described as an ideology that aims to protect various 
cultures in one society. According to Charles Taylor, the demand for recognition is 
the basis for multicultural politics. Recognition, he argues further, is essential to the 
happiness of human beings. 
    The assumption behind this argument is that identity and recognition are closely 
connected and that: 
 
“our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, (...) and so a person 
or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or 
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society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or 
contemptible picture of themselves” (Taylor, 1994, p 75). 
 
According to Taylor, recognition is not just about respecting others; a courtesy we 
owe people. Mis-recognition can cause deep wounds and self-hatred. For this reason, 
Taylor says, recognition is a vital human need. Furthermore, it is seen as an 
“appropriate mode” for a healthy democratic society, e.g. because withholding 
recognition can be interpreted as a form of oppression (Taylor, 1994, p 81). 
    According to Taylor, two principles are at the basis of the politics of recognition 
(Taylor, 1994, p 82). Firstly, the ‘equal dignity of all citizens’. There are enormous 
differences in the interpretation of this idea of universal equality: in some cases it 
only includes civil and voting rights; in others also socio-economic ones. However, in 
general, the principle of equal citizenship has been largely accepted throughout the 
West, Taylor argues. The second principle connected to recognition has to do with 
politics of difference: we have to recognise the unique identity of every single group. 
These two principles could sometimes come into conflict:  
 
“Where the politics of universal dignity fought for forms of non-
discrimination that were quite ‘blind’ to the ways in which citizens differ, the 
politics of difference often redefines non-discrimination as requiring that we 
make distinctions on the basis of differential treatment” (Taylor, 1994, p 83).  
 
Thus, contrary to the first premise; the second argues that respecting equality might 
sometimes involve treating people differently.  
    The challenge of multiculturalism, according to Taylor, is to deal with the 
marginalization of minorities without giving up the basic political principles of the 
majority. How do we want to approach others? And, on what grounds? According to 
Taylor we need to open up to comparative cultural studies of the kind “that displace 
our horizons in the resulting fusions” (Taylor, 1994, p 102). With this he means that 
the majority should be open to being influenced by other cultures, when appropriate.  
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Different Forms of Multiculturalism  
 
In the previous section I have touched upon various important aspects of 
multiculturalism. Yet a clear description of the term is not given. This section will 
provide more clarity on the possible meanings of the concept in different contexts. I 
believe that because multiculturalism refers to such a multilayered and complex term, 
it is important to distinguish its different forms and manifestations. Only when we 
recognise the various interpretations of multiculturalism can we start a debate about 
the value or importance of this concept.  
    Peter McLaren recognises four types of multiculturalism: conservative, liberal, left-
liberal and critical multiculturalism (McLaren, 1994, p 47). This specific 
categorisation is useful for this chapter, for it emphasises the role of sameness and 
difference in the various forms of multiculturalism. These concepts are also highly 
important for this thesis because they are closely related to discussions about the 
relationship between multiculturalism and feminism. Later in this chapter I will return 
to the (history of) the relationship between difference and sameness in relation to 
equality, but first I want to elaborate on the different interpretations of 
multiculturalism, starting from the categorisation of McLaren.   
    Conservative multiculturalists deal with the integration of minorities by putting 
forward a common culture to which all groups can be added on. This approach, which 
is mainly associated with the work of Charles Taylor, is highly criticised by McLaren. 
He believes that for conservative multiculturalists, minority groups are nothing more 
than ‘add-ons’ to the dominant culture: 
 
“before you can be ‘added on’ to the dominant United States culture you must 
first adopt a consensual view of culture and learn to accept the essentially 
Euro-American patriarchal norms of the ‘host’ country” (McLaren, 1994, p 
47-51). 
 
However, if we want to understand the logic behind this interpretation of 
multiculturalism, we have to develop a better understanding of it and clearly define its 
starting points. The main argument of conservative multiculturalists such as Charles 
Taylor is that societies should develop one overlapping culture, based on the norms 
and values that the groups in such a society share (Taylor, 1988). Thus, instead of 
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allowing for differences within a society, the focus in this approach lies on finding 
similarities. According to critics such as McLaren however, in practice conservative 
multiculturalism means that people from minority cultures have to assimilate to the 
dominant culture. This is first of all related to the fact that conservative 
multiculturalists usually do not recognise their own colour as an ethnicity and thus 
posit white as the invisible norm (McLaren, 1994).  
    The second form of multiculturalism that McLaren defines is liberal 
multiculturalism. The starting point for this interpretation is the belief that all cultures 
are equal. Supporters of this view argue that inequality between cultural communities 
is (mainly) caused by social and educational opportunities, not cultural difference. To 
achieve a higher level of equality; cultural, social and economic restraints should be 
modified. Thus, liberals believe that all cultures are equal. However, they often do not 
see the need to provide special rights for minorities, because in their view the 
autonomy of the individual is most important. Kymlicka, who is considered the most 
important representative of this position, argues that minority rights should be 
integrated as much as possible into the national culture (Vasta, 2006, p 7). Thus, a 
liberal state has no obligation to preserve cultures, unless this is necessary for 
integration and participation of individual minorities.  
   According to Ellie Vasta, the main problem with liberal/universalist 
multiculturalism is that it privileges majority cultures. Following Tempelman, she 
argues that even though there is room for negotiation in this position, in general 
liberal ideas are considered as sacred. Anyone who refuses to convert to these 
principles is condemned. McLaren agrees with this and mentions a related problem 
with the liberal approach to multiculturalism: it often results in ethnocentric and 
universalistic policies, based on the norms and values of Anglo-American political 
and cultural communities (McLaren, 1994, p 51). To sum up, liberal multiculturalism 
approaches all cultures as equal and believes that minorities should be protected. 
However, liberals prioritise individual autonomy over group interests. This means that 
special rights can be acknowledged, but only when they help individuals to participate 
in a national culture. Liberals are open to dialogue, but certain values (especially the 
autonomy of individuals) are non-negotiable.  If we compare the liberal and 
conservative approaches, we can recognise both similarities and differences. The 
main differences are that (contrary to conservatives) liberals explicitly start from the 
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equality of all cultures and that they treat people mainly as individuals, instead of as 
members of a group.  
    The third approach to multiculturalism that McLaren distinguishes is the ‘left-
liberal’ approach. While ‘liberals’ strongly believe in equality of cultures in the sense 
of ‘sameness’, ‘left-liberals’ emphasise ‘cultural difference’. Thus contrary to liberals, 
they believe that cultural differences are important and that people cannot be solely 
regarded as individuals. Furthermore, they start from the belief that differences 
between cultures are responsible for different behaviours, values, attitudes and social 
practices and are not receiving enough attention from other approaches (McLaren, 
1994, p 51). The value of personal experience is central to this approach. The position 
assumes that people speak and think from certain perspectives and that cultural 
background is an essential factor in a person’s standpoint. Thus, for example, women 
know how to deal with issues like abortion, and African-Americans have a better 
understanding of racism because they experience it themselves.  
    The problem with this left-liberal approach is that it starts from a rather essentialist 
view on culture and marginalized positions. Or, to use the words of McLaren; it 
exoticizes ‘Otherness’. By essentialising cultural differences left-liberals ignore the 
historical and social or political ‘situatedness’ of these differences (McLaren, 1994, p 
52). The assumption is that an oppressed person can (automatically) offer a special 
authority from which to speak. According to McLaren however, we should investigate 
how identity and experience are constantly being produced by “shifting and 
conflicting discursive and ideological relations, formations and articulations” 
(McLaren, 1994, p 52). In other words, we have to recognise the fact that these 
identities are not fixed, but changeable and that politics of location do not guarantee 
‘political correctness’. I will return to this issue in more detail in chapter 4.  
    According to McLaren, liberal and left-liberal multicultural approaches do not do 
enough to achieve social transformations. They either focus too much on cultural 
difference (and let go of the struggle for equality) or on equality (and neglect 
differences between people). Therefore, he proposes a more critical multiculturalism 
based on resistance (McLaren, 1994, p 53). The starting point for this position is the 
idea that representations of race, class or gender are the result of larger social 
struggles over signs and meanings. These signs are, McLaren argues: 
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“essentially unstable and shifting and can only be temporarily fixed, 
depending on how they are articulated within particular discursive and 
historical struggles” (McLaren, 1994, p 53).  
 
Critical multiculturalism does not see diversity as an end goal, but argues that it 
should be affirmed within a commitment to social justice. Both difference and 
identity should be approached as products of history, culture, power and ideology and 
not from essentialist logic.   
    Bhikhu Parekh could be considered as one of the primary representatives of 
McLaren’s critical multiculturalism (Vasta, 2006). The interesting thing about his 
work is that he argues for the recognition of cultural diversity in various areas of 
society (political, educational, legal etc), but at the same time defines cultures as 
dynamic and changeable. Dialogue and negotiation are central to his approach. 
 
 
Equality: Sameness or Difference? 
 
As became clear in the previous section, interpretations of (the boundaries of) 
sameness and difference in relation to equality are essential when we think about 
multiculturalism in general, and the relationship between multiculturalism and 
feminism specifically. Does equality mean that we all have the same rights, or should 
we all have the right to be different? And, if we have the right to be different, how do 
we transform differences between groups into a ‘politics of difference’? Since the 
1980s, feminist discourse has been considerably shaped by longstanding debates on 
the concepts of equality and difference: these discussions have opened feminism to 
new levels of analysis and reflection about the role and significance of feminism in 
our societies at large (Bock and James, 1992). 
    If we look at the history of the ‘difference and equality debates’ among feminists 
we can recognise two main positions (Bock and James, 1992). First of all, feminists 
have struggled for the right to be equal. Women fought for equal treatment and equal 
rights and wanted gender differences to be erased. Other feminists criticised this 
approach towards a ‘gender-neutral society’ and emphasised that women should not 
have to assimilate to a society in which values were based on male norms. Instead, 
they argued, there should be more room for ‘female approaches’. Furthermore, some 
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feminists criticised the dichotomous relations between difference and equality in 
certain feminist analyses. One of the aspects of this critique is the idea that there are 
many differences; gender is only one of many other components that structure 
subjectivity (Violi, 1992). Hence, the debates about difference and equality were not 
only about the relationship between men and women, but also about sameness and 
difference between women.  
    These discussions about sameness and difference are also very important in the 
field of multiculturalism and essential to the debates about feminism and 
multiculturalism. In this section I will present four main arguments about difference 
and sameness, as described by some of the most influential theorists on 
multiculturalism: Bhikhu Parekh, Will Kymlicka, David Goldberg and Brian Barry. I 
selected these authors because they represent important positions in the debate. The 
first two are in favour of a ‘politics of difference’, while the last two criticise the 
concept.  
 
 
Towards the Recognition of Difference 
 
Bhikhu Parekh is a true advocate of the ‘politics of difference’. He argues that people 
are culturally embedded:  
 
“they grow up and live within a culturally structured world, organise their 
lives and social relations in terms of its system of meaning and significance, 
and place considerable value on their cultural identity” (Parekh, 2006, p 336). 
 
Parekh also mentions less individualistic arguments for the politics of difference. For 
instance, since there are many cultures with their own system of meaning, all of them 
are “inherently limited” (Parekh, 2006, p 337). This makes dialogues between 
cultures about their differences “mutually beneficial” (Parekh, 2006, p 337). Finally, 
he argues that cultures are internally plural. For this reason, dialogues can help them 
to define their own identities (Parekh, 2006, p 337). 
    If we think about equality, Parekh argues, we have to recognise that people are both 
similar and different: they share a common human identity, but in a culturally 
mediated way (Parekh, 2006, p 239). This means that if we treat people the same we 
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grant them "equality at the level of their shared human nature” (Parekh, 2006, p 240), 
but “deny it at the equally important cultural level” (Parekh, 2006, p 240). Equality 
for Parekh implies equal freedom and equal opportunities to be different. Thus, when 
the differences are irrelevant, people should be treated the same, but if the differences 
matter, they should be fully recognised (Parekh, 2006, p 240). However Parekh is not 
very clear on who can decide (and when) which differences are relevant and which 
are not.  
    According to Parekh, we can divide equality into three main elements; sensitivity 
to difference is important for all of them. The most basic one is respect. Respecting a 
person involves respecting the way he/she gives meaning to his/her life. This 
involves, Parekh argues, locating and contextualising a person’s background and 
“interpreting his conduct in terms of its system of meaning” (Parekh, 2006, p 241). 
The second element Parekh describes is equal opportunity. To show how different 
treatment could be required in order to have equal opportunities Parekh uses the 
example of religious schools. “A Sikh is free to send his son to a school that bans 
turbans, but for all practical purposes it is closed to him” (Parekh, 2006, p 241). 
Hence, even though this restriction doesn’t officially stop Sikh children from joining 
the school, in practice it does. Thus, in certain cases, general restrictions can influence 
the opportunities of particular groups. Finally, Parekh examines equality of power: 
equality before the law and equal protection of the law need to be interpreted in a 
culturally sensitive manner. As an example for this he mentions the relatively harsh 
punishment in Germany for people who deny the Holocaust. In this case, specific 
laws are developed in order to protect the Jews against anti-Semitism (Parekh, 2006, p 
242). 
     
Like Bhikhu Parekh, Will Kymlicka is also in favour of a politics of difference, but he 
looks at the issue from a liberal perspective. In Multicultural Citizenship he argues 
that many of the demands of cultural minorities are consistent with liberal principles 
such as individual freedom and social justice (Kymlicka 1995, p 193). Even though 
he understands that some liberals would prefer to focus on individual rights or the 
connection between all human beings, he does recognise the importance of ‘politics of 
difference’. According to Kymlicka, we should be aware of the influence of national 
politics on the lives of individual members and how some people can feel 
disadvantaged or alienated because these politics do not take cultural differences into 
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account. Therefore, he believes that minorities should be granted special rights, 
without these, he argues: “talk of treating people as individuals is itself just a cover 
for ethnic and national injustice” (Kymlicka, 1995, p 194). In other words, we cannot 
strive for equality without taking differences into account. 
    Besides the importance of minority rights to minority groups, Kymlicka also 
mentions another reason why liberalism should take a stand on this issue. He argues 
that minorities will play a valuable role in the development of theories of justice and 
believes that liberalism must find answers to their questions if it wants to survive 
(Kymlicka, 1995, p 194). In the new democracies in Eastern Europe, Kymlicka 
argues, minority issues cause major political discussions. At the moment only 
xenophobic nationalists and religious extremists seem to come up with answers and 
solutions, while liberals and liberal theory “offers confused and contradictory advice 
on this question” (Kymlicka, 1995, p 194-5). Hence, according to Kymlicka, a liberal 
answer to the issue of minority rights is necessary and liberals should prioritise the 
development of such an answer. Even though this is a rather strategic argument for 
accommodating ‘cultural difference’, it does show how important the issue is (world-
wide) according to this author.   
    Kymlicka tries to give some of the answers to the problems himself in 
Multicultural Citizenship. In order to overcome the tension between the rights of 
individuals and groups, he clearly describes which conditions minority rights should 
meet: “minority rights should not allow one group to dominate other groups; and they 
should not enable a group to oppress its own members”. He argues further that 
liberals should “seek to ensure equality between groups, and freedom and equality 
within groups.” (Kymlicka, 1995, p 194). Therefore, he concludes that we should not 
allow ‘internal restrictions’ (e.g. civil laws) as group rights, since their aim is to 
restrict the freedom of individuals within a group, but ‘external protection’ (e.g. 
language rights) is a group right that is compatible with liberal values (Kymlicka, 
1999, p 32).  
 
 
Critics of the Politics of Difference 
 
Contrary to Parekh and Kymlicka, David Goldberg and Brian Berry both criticise the 
politics of difference. In Culture and Equality, Brian Barry discusses multiculturalism 
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from an egalitarian perspective (Barry, 2001). He argues that multiculturalism is not 
the answer to the problems of minorities, indeed it might make things worse: “the 
whole thrust of the ‘politics of difference’ (…) is that it seeks to withdraw from 
individual members of minority groups the protections that are normally offered by 
liberal states” (Barry, 2001, p 326). Furthermore, according to Barry, multiculturalism 
does nothing to change structures of unequal opportunities and outcomes, “it actually 
entrenches it by embroiling those in the lower reaches of the distribution in 
internecine warfare” (Barry, 2001, p 326). In other words, Barry has two problems 
with multiculturalism and its politics of difference; firstly they go against liberal 
values of equality and freedom of citizens and secondly, politics of difference do not 
help to overcome the socio-economic problems of minorities, which are, according to 
him, these groups’ biggest problem. 
    The claim that liberalism is ‘difference blind’ is a virtue according to Brian Berry. 
Thus, contrary to Will Kymlicka he argues that liberalism and politics of difference 
do not match. Ethnic or cultural identities, according to Barry, do not: 
 
“give rise to valid claims for special treatment, because within a liberal state 
all groups are free to deploy their energies and resources in pursuit of 
culturally derived objectives on the same terms” (Barry, 2001, p 318). 
 
Citizens in liberal states are in general free to live their lives the way they want; 
certain things are not allowed, but for good reasons, Barry argues. For instance, 
people have to wear helmets when they ride on a motorcycle to protect themselves, 
and changing this rule for certain cultural groups means that those groups will be less 
protected than others, with the permission of the state. Furthermore, in some cases 
special rights disadvantage certain groups within the minority (e.g. women, elderly, 
and gays) therefore, according to Barry, diversity politics between groups might 
endanger the diversity within groups (Barry, 2001, p 327). 
    Finally, Barry believes that multiculturalism will not really improve the lives of 
people of minority groups. Indeed, he says, it directs attention away from more 
important problems (Barry, 2001, p 321). Most integration problems are caused by 
socio-economic factors; focusing on culture might lead to misdiagnosis of the 
problems and even “destroy the conditions for putting together a coalition in favour of 
across-the-board equalisation of opportunities and resources” (Barry, 2001, p 325). 
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For example, when minorities focus on getting their ‘own’ schools publicly funded, 
they will weaken their position to negotiate more general issues such as redistribution 
of income or improvement of the quality of public schools (Barry, 2001, p 325).   
     
David Goldberg criticises politics of difference on rather different grounds from 
Barry. He argues that even though identity and difference politics can help to 
emancipate certain groups in society, they can also be ‘deathly exclusive’, he says 
(Goldberg, 1994, p 13). 
    Thus, Goldberg recognises the value of identity and difference but also warns of 
the dangers. First of all, he argues that even though the politics of difference might 
have created more space for different identities, they are implicitly based on the 
standard of integration. Whiteness remains the norm, and the Other can often only 
integrate. A fusion of the various cultures is usually no option in this framework. 
Secondly, there is the danger of ‘culturalism’. Political economy has almost entirely 
disappeared from analyses concerning multiculturalism. Attention for cultural 
identities is important, Goldberg argues, but it should not result in covering up 
political and economic factors in the marginalization of certain groups. Finally, 
Goldberg believes that the identity/difference approach has developed a very 
thorough critique of universalism, but fails to analyse “the relativistic implications of 
a non foundational and non-essentialising multicultural commitment” (Goldberg, 
1994, p 15).  
    Taking these problems into account Goldberg proposes a different argument for 
multiculturalism, based on the principles of ‘heterogeneity’ and ‘incorporation’. 
Generally, homogeneity is claimed to be necessary for every community: to keep the 
group together a set of homogenising values is required. However, Goldberg argues 
that homogeneity is not as naturally or socially important as is often claimed. On the 
contrary, “the social condition of the Homo sapiens is prevailingly migratory” 
(Goldberg, 1994, p 21). Goldberg goes further by saying that in order to establish a 
homogenous society, heterogeneity needs to be repressed. Furthermore, homogeneity 
assumes that communities are static. At a certain point in time it is decided that a 
group needs to be protected, without taking the heterogeneous and complex history of 
that group into account. This, according to Goldberg, results not in heterogeneity, but 
in homogeneity. In order to facilitate heterogeneity, we need hybrid interaction, 
Goldberg argues. This involves: 
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“dual transformations that take place in the dominant values and in those of 
the insurgent group as the latter insists on more complete incorporations into 
the body politic and the former grudgingly gives way. Incorporation 
determines the grounds of integration and marginalization for it empowers 
those once marginalized in relations to the dominant (…). It extends 
transformative power (…) not simply to appropriate cultural expressions of 
the Other into the canon while holding the Other at a nonthreatening distance. 
Rather, it seeks to undermine and alter from within the dominant” (Goldberg, 
1994, p 9). 
 
Hence, Goldberg proposes an approach which focuses on power relations, and aims to 
empower the marginalised by taking into account both cultural differences and socio-
economic differences. This latter interpretation of multiculturalism connects closely 
to the resistance or critical multiculturalism that I discussed in the previous section. I 
would argue that this more complex approach towards multiculturalism would also 
make it possible to develop a nuanced vision on the relationship between 
multiculturalism and feminism. But the main aim of this chapter is not to 
reconceptualise multiculturalism. First the various dynamics, assumptions and 
concepts that are related to (the discourses about) multiculturalism need to be brought 
to the fore. This knowledge will then function as an important analytical tool in the 
chapters discussing my empirical research, upon which the relationship between 
multiculturalism and feminism is reconceptualised in the final chapter. 
 
 
Defining Culture within Multiculturalism 
 
In the previous sections, I have outlined the basis characteristics and interpretations of 
multiculturalism. Here, I would like to change the perspective and concentrate on the 
concepts of culture and religion and their relationship to multiculturalism. What is the 
place of culture and religion in multiculturalism and do we need the notion of culture 
in order to develop multicultural politics? In order to produce a nuanced perspective 
on the relationship between multiculturalism and feminism, these questions need to be 
answered.  
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    As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, multiculturalism is generally 
considered to be an approach that responds to the fact that people from various 
cultures live in one country. This response takes many different forms, and starts from 
different assumptions about the meaning of equality, cultural difference and the 
relation of individuals to a (cultural) group. In some of the interpretations I have 
described above, culture plays an essential role; in others it seems less important. 
Furthermore, some authors have a rather fixed and essentialist perspective on culture, 
while others consider it to be much more flexible and dynamic. But how can we talk 
about multiculturalism without having culture at the centre of these debates?  
    Gerd Bauman argues that multiculturalism is about redefining culture. Instead of 
approaching culture as something we have and are members of, we should see it as 
something we make and are shapers of (Bauman, 1999). He prefers a discursive and 
‘processual’ approach to culture and a theory of culture that sees differences as 
relational, rather than absolute. Tariq Modood takes this approach further and argues 
that we should found multiculturalism on the basis of ‘difference’, rather than 
‘culture’. The accommodation and recognition of differences, rather than cultures has 
various advantages (Modood, 2007). First of all, it makes it possible to take into 
account that differences are not just constructed from the ‘inside’ of a minority group 
itself, but also from the ‘outside’, by the treatment and representation of this group. 
According to Modood, minority groups have been and are being treated and perceived 
as different. From that perspective it is important to note that people are collectively 
targeted and should hence respond as a collective as well. Or to put it differently, 
Modood replaces the concept of culture with difference and acknowledges that there 
are two forms of difference at play in multicultural societies: positive difference (the 
sense that groups have of themselves) and negative difference (stigmatization of or 
discrimination against groups). Hence, if we want to develop a productive 
interpretation of multiculturalism, we have to recognise that there is: 
 
“a sense of groupness at play, a mode of being, but also a subordination or 
marginality, a mode of oppression, and the two interact in creating an unequal 
‘us-them’ relationship (Modood, 2007, p 37). 
  
    Anne Phillips also proposes an interpretation of ’multiculturalism without culture’ 
(Phillips, 2007), but she takes a different approach from Modood. Where Modood 
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proposes to move the attention from culture to difference, Phillips aims to reclaim the 
concept of culture. So even though her book is called Multiculturalism without 
Culture, her approach is more about multiculturalism with a different view of culture: 
 
“There has been too speedy a move from a problematic multiculturalism to a 
transnational cosmopolitanism; I see the latter as inadequate, even with the 
additions that turn into a ‘rooted’, ‘vernacular’, or ‘critical’ cosmopolitanism. 
Culture matters, as part of the way we give meaning to our world, as an 
important element in self-ascribed identity, and as one of the mechanisms 
through which social hierarchies are sustained.” (Phillips, 2007, p 15) 
 
In short, Phillips argues that multiculturalism can still play an important role in the 
struggle for more equality, but has to develop a much more dynamic interpretation of 
culture, in order to prevent other injustices, such as gender inequality. This means that 
cultures are important for multicultural politics, but only because they influence the 
lives and experiences of individuals. Phillips wants to protect individuals, not group, 
and hence only gives attention to culture in relation to the experiences of individuals, 
rather than because her goal is to protect culture itself.  
    By explaining these authors’ views on the relationship between multiculturalism 
and culture, I want to demonstrate that the straightforward definition of 
multiculturalism is difficult to uphold when we examine the broad range of 
scholarship on this issue. Not only are there many different forms of multiculturalism, 
but there are competing interpretations of culture at play, and more importantly, the 
relationship between culture and multiculturalism itself is rather contested. I would 
argue that a more critical perspective on culture and a broader focus (on difference, 
rather than culture alone) could provide more nuanced views on what 
multiculturalism is, and can do, and how it relates to feminism. In other words, by 
critically evaluating the notion of multiculturalism in this way, we develop a better 
understanding of the complexities of the relationship between multiculturalism and 
feminism.  
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Defining Religion within Multiculturalism 
 
The relationship between multiculturalism and religion is highly complex. First of all, 
the connection between religion and culture is difficult to define, and secondly, the 
debates about multiculturalism in Western Europe have almost completely 
transformed into discussions about Islam and Muslims. In the previous sections, I 
already described the multicultural approach of, for example, Tariq Modood, who 
founds his multiculturalism on the basis of difference, rather than culture. Such an 
interpretation of multiculturalism makes it possible to incorporate other axes of 
difference in addition to culture alone. This is very important, because as I have 
argued above, many public debates on multiculturalism are very often actually about 
religion or religious groups.  
    Two important issues connected to this are: (1) a transformation in the discourse 
about migrants: from guest workers to Muslims and (2) a (re)new(ed) definition of 
national identities, very much related to secularism.7 If we analyse these 
developments from a Dutch perspective, we see that both emerged after the 
depillarization8 process in the Netherlands and resulted in the fact that discussing 
cultural recognition and integration actually meant discussing Islam (Peters, 2006). 
The “Islamization of migrants” can be connected to many factors, for instance the rise 
of political Islam in Muslim countries, but also the growing visibility of Islam in 
Europe in general and in the Netherlands specifically (traditional clothing of Muslim 
women, mosques etc): 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The following articles contain interesting analyses of the changing discourse in the Netherlands: R. 
Peters. 2006. ‘‘A dangerous book’: Dutch Public Intellectuals and the Koran’. RSCAS Working Paper 
No 2006/39. European University Institute. Also online available: 
http://home.medewerker.uva.nl/r.peters/bestanden/Dangerous%20book.pdf and M. Bruinessen. 2006. 
‘After van Gogh: Roots of Anti-Muslim Rage’. Paper Presented at the seventh Mediterranean Social 
and Political Research Meeting, Florence, Italy. Also online available: 
http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/ws10-2006MM-van-Bruinessen.pdf 
8 Until the 1960s, the Netherlands was a pillarized society. Briefly summarized this means that the 
political and social were both organized through vertical pillars (Peters, 2006). The different pillars 
(Catholic, Calvinist, Socialist, and Liberal) were clearly divided and identifiable segments: “there were 
Catholic, Protestant and Public schools, Protestant, Catholic, socialist and liberal broadcasting 
companies, sport clubs, newspapers and labour unions” (Prins, 1997, p 112). There was hardly any 
contact between people from the different pillars, only the political elites worked together. The idea 
behind this was that the differences between religious and ideological groups in the Netherlands could 
be respected without jeopardizing the political system (Lijphart, 1984). 
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“all these factors contributed not only to the sudden realization of the Dutch 
that their country now hosted a substantial number of Muslims, but also to the 
identification of these migrants in religious, rather than ethnic terms. As a 
result, their culture was also understood and defined as essentially Islamic” 
(Peters, 2006, p 3). 
 
Peters also argues that the Islamization of migration made it possible to express 
xenophobia in a socially more acceptable way: criticism of the influence of religion. 
In this context, Dutch culture is often described as liberal, tolerant and secular and as 
under threat from a backward and intolerant (for instance towards women or gays) 
religion. Both of these developments suggest that an analysis of multiculturalism in 
the Netherlands should not only focus on cultural issues in general, but also (and 
maybe especially) on religion (specifically Islam). 
    According to Tariq Modood, the appropriate response to the challenges Western 
societies face due to the presence of and discrimination against Muslims, should be as 
follows:  
 
 “1. The extension of a politics of difference to include appropriate religious 
 identities and organizations. 
     2. A reconceptualization of secularism from the concepts of neutrality and the 
 strict public/private divide to a moderate and evolutionary secularism (…). 
3. A pragmatic, case by case, negotiated approach to dealing with controversy 
and conflict (…).” (Modood, 2007, p 78-79) 
 
Modood argues that the inclusion of the demands of religious groups might encounter 
specific problems; first of all the fact that these demands can be considered to be an 
attack on secularism. However, as Modood rightly demonstrates, secularism as a 
clear-cut ideology does not exist in practice; if we look at the application of 
secularism in different Western countries, we see a broad range of interpretations of 
this concept, especially when it comes to the public/private divide in relation to 
religion. According to Modood, if we let go of the strict version of secularism 
(according to which religion and faith should be kept outside of the public sphere) and 
think through a more pragmatic understanding (as it is already applied in many 
countries), we should be able to combine multicultural politics and secularism.. 
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Hence, according to Modood, the meaning of secularism in our societies should be 
rethought and theorized and needs to be taken into account when we think about 
multiculturalism.  
    I agree with Modood that if we want to develop an interpretation of 
multiculturalism which is not based on essentialist views of culture, but on difference, 
and hence incorporates religious differences, we need to rethink and theorize the 
concept of secularism. I will return to this discussion in the final chapter and rethink 
multiculturalism further in relation to the recent scholarship on secularism, and the 
‘postsecular turn’.  
 
     
Beyond Multiculturalism  
 
In the previous sections I have shown that different forms of multiculturalism start 
from different concepts of culture, difference and equality. I have also demonstrated 
that certain multiculturalist theorists developed interpretations of multiculturalism 
without culture. Starting multicultural politics from the concept of difference can give 
us the opportunity to pay more attention to other differences besides culture as well as 
to take into account the differences between groups. One of the axes of difference that 
has become increasingly important in recent years is religion, and hence the concept 
of secularism. I would like to take this a bit further and discuss how we can theorise 
beyond multiculturalism. Let me start by saying though that according to some 
multiculturalist thinkers, there has been “too speedy a move between a problematic 
multiculturalism and a transnational cosmopolitanism” (Phillips, 2007 p 15). Phillips 
argues that culture remains important in the struggle for justice; even if individuals do 
not have any interest in defining themselves culturally, they cannot escape the 
discrimination visited on ‘their group’. It goes beyond the scope of this thesis to 
further describe the debates about cosmopolitanism and its different interpretations 
and views on achieving more equality. However I do want to defend one particular 
interpretation of (what is at least related to) cosmopolitan approaches that aim to 
move away from cultural differences. Paul Gilroy’s concept of  ‘conviviality’ stays 
close enough to the concept of multiculturalism to have an influence on this thesis’ 
conception of this term and is at the same time distanced enough to supply various 
important critical notes.  
 	   73 
    With his concept of ‘conviviality’, Gilroy aims to begin, where, in his view, 
multiculturalism has broken down (Gilroy, 2004). He describes this concept as: 
 
“the processes of cohabitation and interaction that have made multiculture and 
ordinary feature of social life in Britain’s urban areas and in postcolonial cities 
elsewhere” (Gilroy, 2004, p XI). 
 
This way, he tries to move away from the term ‘identity’, which, he argues, “has 
proved to be such an ambiguous resource in the analysis of race, ethnicity and 
politics” (Gilroy, 2004, p XI). It might be argued that a focus on cohabitation is a 
rather limited perspective on how we want to deal with our multicultural societies. 
However, in a time in which the idea of the crash of civilizations seems to prevail, it 
can also shed new light on the issues at stake.  
    Starting from the idea of  ‘convivial culture’ gives us the opportunity to develop a 
response to multiculturality at a local level; to start from below, instead of above and 
to take various differences and power relations into account. The key for Gilroy lies in 
the recognition that European culture is not the same as ‘white culture’. We need to 
be able to see, he argues, how migrants and the dynamics of European history have 
together shaped cultural and political habits and institutions in Europe (Gilroy, 2004). 
Such a counter-history can, according to Gilroy, not only help to produce a new 
understanding of multicultural Europe, but also help to discover the emancipatory 
possibilities of convivial culture. Furthermore, we should make a thorough and 
critical analysis of racism in Europe and acknowledge its influence in our societies: 
 
“it was racism and not diversity that made their arrival into a problem” 
(Gilroy, 2004, p 166).  
 
    Even though Gilroy himself claims to move away from the concept of 
multiculturalism, I would argue that his views on ‘conviviality’ are an excellent 
inspiration in the development of a more dynamic, critical and at the same time 
applicable interpretation of multiculturalism. Its value to multiculturalist theory, I 
believe, lies first of all in its thinking from below (contrary to many multiculturalist 
theories that start from a governmental level). This makes it possible to recognise 
what multiculturality means on a daily basis; how people actually deal with 
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difference; what role migrants have in our societies, and how racism influences all of 
these. This combined approach of looking at daily interactions and making a critical 
analysis of racism, might also be an appropriate response to populist right wing 
politicians who claim their racist politics defend the people who live in multicultural 
neighbourhoods.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Susan Moller Okin argues that all cultures facilitate control over women in various 
ways and hence are a possible danger to gender equality. She concludes therefore that 
there is a tension between multiculturalism and feminism. Such a statement suggests a 
particular understanding of what multiculturalism and feminism are. In this chapter I 
have discussed several possible meanings and interpretations of multiculturalism.  
    Multiculturalism can generally be considered as a normative response to a 
multicultural society. This response can take many different forms and starts from 
various ideological backgrounds. Take for instance the conservative, liberal, left-
liberal and critical forms of multiculturalism, as categorised by McLaren. These 
multiculturalisms all have different ideas of what culture is and how it determines 
people’s lives and what equality means and how it should be achieved. Certain 
theoreticians argue for an equality based on sameness. They believe that all citizens 
are equal and should have the same rights and opportunities. Others emphasise the 
differences between people and defend a politics of difference in order to achieve 
equality, believing that sometimes people need to be treated differently to be equal.  
    After investigating these different forms of multiculturalism, I further analysed the 
connections between multiculturalism and other important concepts, such as culture, 
religion and secularism. It appeared that multiculturalism does not only take different 
forms that start from different interpretations of culture, but also exists without culture 
as its main starting point. Anne Phillips grounds her multiculturalism on the rights of 
individuals, while Tariq Modood proposes to start from the concept of difference 
rather than culture. Such theories of multiculturalism make it possible to develop 
more nuanced and dynamic understandings that include protecting the rights of 
minorities within minority groups. The work of Paul Gilroy, with his concept of 
‘conviviality’, moves the attention of multiculturalists even further away from culture 
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and rights, and into daily interactions between people. I would argue that if we want 
to rethink the relationship between multiculturalism and feminism, these theories 
form the starting point. Multiculturalism is a fluid concept, defined in many different 
ways depending on the context of a debate and the perspective of the author.  In the 
next chapter, the concept of feminism will be further analysed: what is feminism, 
what are the main aims of feminist struggles and how can we connect it to 
multiculturalism and the recognition of difference?  
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Chapter 3 Feminism and its Different Axes of Analysis: From Sexual 
Difference to Intersectionality  
   
Introduction 
 
“While virtually all of the world’s cultures have distinctly patriarchal pasts, some – 
mostly, though by no means exclusively, Western liberal cultures – have departed far 
further from them than others. Western cultures, of course, still practice many forms 
of sex discrimination. (…) But women in more liberal cultures are, at the same time, 
legally guaranteed many of the same freedoms and opportunities as men. (…) This 
situation, as we have seen, is quite different from that of women in many of the 
world’s other cultures, including of those from which immigrants to Europe and 
North America come.” (Okin, 1999a, p 16-17) 
  
Because most non-Western cultures are more patriarchal than Western ones, Okin 
argues, granting rights to minority groups will tend to harm the interests of women 
rather than promote them. In the previous chapter, I investigated the concept of 
multiculturalism and its possible interpretations; here I focus on feminism. If Okin 
argues that minority group rights might harm the interests of minority women, what 
then are these women’s interests? And what is the interpretation of feminism that lies 
beneath this statement? In Okin’s view, feminism refers to: 
 
“the belief that women should not be disadvantaged by their sex, that they 
should be recognized as having human dignity equal to that of men, and that 
they should have the opportunity to live as fulfilling and as freely chosen lives 
as men can.” (Okin, 1999a, p 10)  
 
    Like multiculturalism, the meaning of feminism is anything but easy to define. 
Feminism has meant, and still does mean, different things to different women 
throughout the world and over different periods of time. Generally, we could say that 
feminists give characteristic meaning to ‘sexual difference’. Often, the different 
responses of feminists to sexual difference have been divided into three categories: 
‘equality’, ‘difference’ and ‘deconstructionist’ perspectives (Buikema and Smelik, 
1993). The ‘equality approach’ aims to end all social and cultural inequality between 
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men and women and to have equal rights for men and women. The ‘difference 
approach’ on the other hand, focuses on the differences between men and women. 
Feminists who think from this perspective do not want to make women equal to men 
by integrating them into a ‘man’s world’, but aim to make more space for women and 
female approaches. Hence, their struggle for equality is not centred on sameness, but 
on difference. If we compare these approaches in the discipline of history, we see the 
first approach focuses on ‘important women’ who may not have received the attention 
they would have if they were male. Through this approach a historian demonstrates 
that women have also played important roles in history, as, for instance, politicians or 
revolutionaries, and works to integrate them in historical descriptions. Through the 
‘difference approach’ however, a historian would focus on other areas of life and, for 
example, emphasize the importance of taking into account the private sphere in 
analyzing history. The final approach in this categorization system is deconstruction. 
This approach is related to poststructuralism and postmodernism and has two main 
starting points: that binary oppositions can be transcended and that the idea of the 
autonomous subject is an illusion (Buikema and Smelik, 1993). This approach would 
emphasise deconstructing the binary between men and women, and the meanings of 
the terms female and male.  
    Another way of categorizing different feminist approaches is by dividing them on 
the basis of the questions that are being asked.  This also leads us to three categories. 
The first group can be recognized by its reference to empirical questions: why/how 
are women oppressed? Criticism of dichotomous constructions of social spheres, such 
as the public/private domains, is central to these analyses (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p 5). 
The second perspective focuses on the differences between women and men. 
Research on this theme has usually been referred to as the ‘sex and gender debate’. 
Authors in this field deal with questions around the ontological basis of differences 
between men and women; are these determined socially, biologically or are they a 
combination of the two? Within the third category that Yuval-Davis describes, the 
differences among women and men are investigated. Black and ethnic minority 
women have indicated that mainstream (white) feminist research has been 
‘ethnocentric’ and ‘westocentric’ and that for example race and ethnicity should be 
included in feminist analyses.  
    Neither of these categorizations is fixed and/or exclusive, nor should they be 
regarded as progressive. But they can be useful instruments in the analysis of feminist 
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issues. When we compare the above categorizations of feminism, we can recognize at 
least one important difference between feminist approaches: those which aim to 
emancipate women through fighting for equal rights and hence focus on sameness, 
and those who focus on the differences between men and women, and between 
women, and want more space for these differences. If we want to make meaningful 
statements about the relationship between feminism and multiculturalism, we have to 
theorize the connections between sexual difference and other axes of difference 
further, addressing questions such as how gender and ethnicity are related, and how 
we can undertake an analysis that takes gender and ethnicity into account 
simultaneously. We also need to ask, what is whiteness and how does it relate to 
debates about multiculturalism and feminism?  
 
     
Feminism and Difference 
 
The debates about ‘difference’ among feminists have a very different history from 
those among multiculturalists. Where the latter always wanted to reach equality 
through recognition of differences, mainstream feminists first of all dismissed the 
differences between men and women in their struggle for equality (Chanter, 1998, p 
267-268). In the 1980s however, more and more feminists criticised this approach, 
and argued that: 
 
“by focusing on the fact that women can measure up to men, feminists 
conceded inadvertently that men’s traditional roles are more valuable than 
women’s traditional roles.” (Chanter, 1998, p 268) 
 
These writers claimed that women differ from men and consequently require different 
treatment. Here we can recognise the multiculturalist approach as described by for 
instance Bhikhu Parekh: sometimes treating people equally, means treating them 
differently. But, as I discussed above, this ‘difference’ approach does not only take 
into account the differences between men and women, but also between women. And 
these differences between women are particularly at stake when we think about the 
relationship between multiculturalism and feminism. If we want women to be equal in 
the way Okin argues, we have to consider the question: equal to whom? It is not 
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always clear what a society, which puts an end to domination and androcentrism, 
should look like (Bock and James, 1992).  
    Flax has defined gender as a: 
 
“historically variable and internally differentiated relation of domination. 
Gender connotes and reflects the persistence of asymmetric power relations 
rather than ‘natural’ (biological/anatomical) differences.” (Flax, 1992, p 193) 
 
This means that although there are power relations between men and women, there 
are no universally shared differences between men and women; these differences are 
always differentiated by factors such as class, sexuality, race, nationality and religion. 
Or as Flax puts it: “No ‘women’ exist who have experiences of oppression (or 
dominance) unmarked by race and class” (Flax, 1995, p 436). Therefore, if we want 
to develop a better understanding of the relationship between feminism and 
multiculturalism, we need to theorize the differences between women, and the 
complicated constitution of gender.  
 
 
Revisiting Difference 
 
In 1851, Sojourner Truth delivered the groundbreaking speech ‘Ain’t I a Woman?’. In 
this talk she argues that people make statements that are supposedly about women in 
general, but are in fact only about a specific group of (white, middle class) women:  
 
“That man over there says that women need to be helped into carriages, and 
lifted over ditches, and to have the best place everywhere. Nobody ever helps 
me into carriages, or  over mud-puddles, or gives me any best place. And ain’t 
I a woman?” (Truth, 1851)9 
 
According to many women of colour, mainstream (universalist) explanations of 
gender inequality simply weren’t adequate. Their lives and experiences, such as those 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Truth, Sojourner, ‘Ain’t I a woman?’, speech delivered at the Women’s Convention in Akron, Ohio, 
1851. See for example: http://www.feminist.com/resources/artspeech/genwom/sojour.htm 
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described by Sojourner Truth, were not just determined by their sex or their skin 
colour, but by the connections between them. Sojourner truth was treated as a black 
woman.  
    In 1977, the Combahee River Collective from Boston published A Black Feminist 
Statement on this issue. Like Truth, the writers of this statement argue that different 
forms of oppression influence each other, and that the synthesis of sexism, classism 
and racism, is what creates the life circumstances of black women (Combahee River 
Collective, 1977, p 232). Because of this, black feminists often did not feel ‘at home’ 
in the traditional liberation movements. They realised that they needed to develop a 
politics that was “antiracist, unlike those of white women, and antisexist, unlike those 
of black and white men” (The Combahee River Collective, 1977, p 233).  
    The women of The Combahee River Collective first organised on the basis of their 
combined anti-racist and anti-sexist positions; later they also included heterosexism 
and economic oppression in their politics (The Combahee River Collective, 1977, p 
234). Their most important point is that black women not only suffer from the sum of 
sexism and racism (and class oppression), but that these systems of oppression also 
influence each other. Furthermore, they explain why and how their political struggle 
differs from those of white women: 
 
“Our situation as black people necessitates that we have solidarity around the 
fact of race, which white women of course do not need to have this with white 
men (...). We struggle together with black men against racism, while we also 
struggle with black men about sexism.” (The Combahee River Collective, 
1977, p 235)  
      
A Black Feminist Statement ends with another concern of the women involved: racism 
in the (white) women’s movement. They describe how little is done by white 
feminists to understand and fight their own racism. Even though the Combahee River 
Collective believes that this change should come from those women themselves, they 
(the Combahee River Collective) will continue to demand accountability.     
 
Since the 1970s, the term ‘universal sisterhood’ has become more and more 
problematised by feminists. The apparent common identity of women was revealed as 
being based on white, middle-class women’s experiences (Ang, 2003, p 191). Maybe 
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all women suffered from sexism, but that does not mean that the sexism all women 
experience is the same. But what then does this mean for feminism and feminist 
solidarity? And are there other important factors to take into account besides class and 
race? If we want to understand how difference works in a European context, we have 
to take the specificity of European history into account. Critical race studies have 
done tremendously important work, but these need to be adapted to the specific 
European context in order to be useful in analysing European issues. This means we 
have to start taking into account the factors that have been important for the 
construction of European whiteness, for example the role of eugenics and anti-
Semitism. 
    Griffin and Braidotti describe how, with the rise of European colonial empires, a 
‘science’ developed that tried to justify the subjugation of other ‘races’ by ‘proving’ 
their inferiority. The concept of ‘biological inferiority’ was not only used to describe 
other racial groups, but also women or people from the lower classes. With the help of 
Eugenics a complex hierarchy of races was developed, with Aryans as the most 
superior. However, Griffin and Braidotti also claim that in order to get a better 
understanding of European racism and whiteness, it is important to go beyond the 
black-white (or race) dynamic. Or, to put it bluntly: biological racism alone does not 
explain why gypsies, communists, homosexuals and Jews were sent to the gas 
chambers (Griffin and Braidotti, 2002, p 226). Griffin and Braidotti argue that intra-
group differences are at the heart of European racism: not just the relationship 
between ‘black’ and ‘white’, but the definition of white itself. These differences are 
not only based on colour, but also on culture or ethnicity, and should be the main 
focus of European research on racism and whiteness. However they warn us not to 
exclude race from our analyses completely, for even though much of European racism 
is based on ethnicity; biological arguments have been, and sometimes still are used to 
‘racialise’ these cultural differences. If we relate this to the discussions about 
multiculturalism and feminism, we can see the importance of ethnicity in general, and 
religion specifically, as markers of difference in Europe. And it is currently Islam and 
Muslims who receive most attention. I will return to this in later chapters, but here I 
want to briefly demonstrate how religion and gender intersect, by focussing on Islam. 
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Unveiling the Oriental Woman 
 
The image of the Orient is probably the deepest and most recurring image of the 
European Other: “European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off 
against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self” (Said, 2003, in: 
Said, 1978, p 3). According to Said, the idea of the superiority of the West compared 
to non-Western cultures and peoples in general, and the Orient specifically, is perhaps 
one of the most important aspects of European culture. Generally, Orientalism can be 
described as a discourse based on a distinction between ‘the Orient’ and ‘the 
Occident’. Both images are constructions with a particular history, which have created 
traditions of thought and vocabularies: 
 
“Under the general heading of knowledge of the Orient, (…) there emerged a 
complex Orient suitable for study in the academy, for display in the museum, 
for reconstruction in the colonial office, for theoretical illustration in 
anthropological, biological, linguistic, racial, and historical theses about 
mankind and the universe, for instances of economic and sociological theories 
of development, revolution, cultural personality, national or religious 
character.” (Said, 1978, p 7-8)  
 
This way, an image is created of the world separated into two (unequal) halves: the 
Orient and the Occident.  
    Elaborating on Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism, Yeğenoğlu shows us how 
the image of the Oriental woman intrigues Westerners even more. The Muslim veil 
speaks especially to the imagination. The idea of modernity is a central concept in 
these discussions about the Middle East or Muslim women, and is often connected 
(positively) to the supposed Enlightenment in Western societies and (negatively) to 
the backwardness of Muslim countries. The assumption in such Oriental texts is that 
if backward Islamic countries want to modernise themselves and adopt liberal values 
such as freedom, then they have to break down their cultural, religious and political 
systems (Yeğenoğlu, 2002, p 82). Differences between the Middle East (or Muslim 
societies) and the West are presented as though they were on a time-line, in which the 
latter are supposed to be backward: 
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“their temporality and dynamism are not understood to be simply different. 
This difference is negated, denied, pushed back in a temporality which is 
construed in linear and progressive terms.” (Yeğenoğlu, 2002, p 83) 
 
In this way, the West is connected to modernity and the East to tradition and religion. 
This is a persistent image in discussions about women or gender equality. Women 
have become a symbol for the ‘backwardness’ of Islam or the Orient.  
    The position of Muslim women in general, and veiling specifically, has also been 
important themes for Western feminists. The veil, Yeğenoğlu argues, is:  
 
“taken as the sign of the inherently oppressive and unfree nature of the entire 
tradition of Islam and Oriental cultures and by extension it is used as a proof 
of oppression of women in these societies.” (Yeğenoğlu, 2002, p 8 4) 
 
From this perspective, Western feminists who want to free Muslim women from their 
veils are attempting to force their own ideas about liberation on these women. This 
way, Western women seem to confirm their own identity as free women while 
presenting Muslim women as the oppressed Other. One of the consequences of this is 
that the agency of the Muslim women is ignored, or not recognised. Furthermore, no 
attention is given to the possible different meanings of traditions. Even though most 
outsiders see the veil as a sign of oppression, more and more Muslim women are now 
claiming that the veil can be empowering. They argue that veils can have many 
different meanings: they can be a woman’s own choice or forced upon her; they can 
liberate or imprison; mark piety or political statements; and reduce a woman’s space 
or facilitate her professional activities (Cooke, 2002, p 154).  
 
 
Against the Production of a Singular Subject 
 
In ‘Unbinding our feet: Saving Brown Women and Religious Discourse’, Kwok Pui-
lan argues that the mission of ‘saving brown women’ is not only an important part of 
the colonialist ideology, but is also entrenched in white women’s consciousness, from 
where it returns in current Western feminist discourses on religion (Pui-lan, 2002, p 
630). For example, in Antoinette Burton’s research we can clearly see how white 
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women used the supposedly ‘backward position of indigenous women’ to promote 
their own emancipation (Burton, 1994). One of the consequences of this approach to 
emancipation is the construction of women from the colonies as ‘victims of their 
brutal men’. Not only is their suffering under imperialism not taken into account, they 
are also presented as ignorant poor women who need help from Western saviours 
(Pui-lan, 2002, p 67). Referring to the work of Spivak, Pui-lan argues that brown 
women are not allowed to speak: “the subaltern woman has been written, represented, 
argued about, and even legislated for, but she is allowed no discursive position from 
which to speak” (Pui-lan, 2002, 67).  
    In her famous essay ‘Under Western Eyes’, Chandra Talpade Mohanty discusses 
the “production of the ‘Third World Woman’ as a singular monolithic subject” 
(Mohanty, 1988, p 61). She argues that the relationship between the idea of Woman, 
as a “cultural and ideological composite Other constructed through diverse 
representational discourse” (Mohanty, 1988, p 62), and women as, “real material 
subjects” (Mohanty, 1988, p 62), is one of the central issues in feminist scholarship. 
But even though many feminists claim that this is not a relationship of direct identity 
or correspondence, they do not seem to make this distinction for women in the ‘third 
world’ (Mohanty, 1988, p 62). According to Mohanty two things cause this: 
 
“assumptions of privilege and ethnocentric universality on the one hand, and 
inadequate self-consciousness about the effects of western scholarship on the 
‘third world’ in the context of world system dominated by the west on the 
other.” (Mohanty, 1988, p 63) 
 
She argues that (overly simplistic) comparative analyses of ‘sexual difference’ not 
only create homogeneous descriptions of the lives of women in the third world, but 
also systematise their oppression (Mohanty, 1988, p 63).  
    According to Mohanty, Western feminists have to situate themselves more, and 
examine their role in the global economic and political framework. She focuses her 
criticism on three elements of (Western) feminist analyses: women as monolithic 
category of analysis; methodological universalism, and the construction of the ‘third 
world woman’. The first part of Mohanty’s criticism attacks the usage of the category 
‘women’ as a homogeneous group for analysis: 
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“all of us with the same gender, across classes and cultures, are somehow 
socially constituted as a homogeneous group identifiable prior to the process 
of analysis (...) Thus what binds women together is a sociological notion of 
the ‘sameness’ of their oppression.” (Mohanty, 1988, p 65) 
 
It is here, Mohanty argues, that the distinction between women as represented in 
society, and women as real life subjects, is lost. The error is that instead of 
investigating the social and political circumstances that make certain groups of 
women oppressed, a variety of cases of  ‘oppressed women’ is used to ‘prove’ the 
oppression of women as group (Mohanty, 1988, p 66). This kind of analysis is easy to 
recognise, because women are always referred to as objects. She argues.that in order 
to really challenge existing structures, we should try to get a better understanding of 
the complexity and contradictions of social relations.  
    The second element of Mohanty’s criticism is ‘methodological universalism’ 
(Mohanty, 1988, p 75), or the use of certain methodologies to demonstrate the cross-
cultural oppression of women. In such analyses, concepts like reproduction and the 
sexual division of labour are used to explain women’s oppression, without looking at 
the socio-historical context. The meaning of a certain development, Mohanty argues, 
depends on the value given to the content or the background of that development in a 
certain society. Both in the US and in Latin America for instance, there is a rise of 
female-headed households (Mohanty, 1988, p 76). In the first country this is a result 
of the growing independence of women (who choose more and more independently 
how to live their lives), in the latter however, the development is related to poverty. 
Hence, the same statistics have completely different meanings. According to 
Mohanty, researchers who fall into this trap confuse the descriptive potential of 
concepts such as labour division with their explanatory power.  
     The last thing that Mohanty goes in to is connected to both of the previous ones. 
The concept of ‘The third world woman’ is created by referring to women as a 
category of analysis, already constituted and placed within religious, political, 
economical, familial and legal structures (Mohanty, 1988, p 78). This assumption of 
women as a homogeneous and oppressed group is always problematic, but even leads 
to more problems when it is used in a context of western women writing about third 
world women, Mohanty argues. By contrasting the representation of women in the 
third world with western feminisms’ self-representation in the same context, we see 
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how western feminists become the true ‘subjects’ of history. Third-world women, on 
the other hand, never rise above the ‘object’ status (Mohanty, 1988, p 79). As I 
already mentioned above, such a perspective denies the agency of the women from 
the so-called ‘third world’ and neglects to give attention to the resistance of these 
women. 
 
 
How to Approach Difference 
 
Most feminists agree that there are differences among women, but there is much 
disagreement about the possible consequences of and approaches to these differences. 
Some argue that too much focus on the differences between women is highly 
problematic for the feminist movement, and might result in relativism. Others are of 
the opinion that difference should not automatically be seen negatively or regarded as 
a source of conflict, and that feminists should accept that they cannot provide all the 
answers to all problems, and acknowledge instead that women sometimes turn to 
other political movements in order to improve their life circumstances (Ang, 2003). 
Kum-Kum Bhavnani adds that women’s studies should combine the politics of 
difference with a politics of possibilities (Bhavnani, 1997, p 49). She emphasises that 
feminists should realise that there are important differences among women, but also 
acknowledge that these differences are not ‘natural’, but socially/politically created, 
thus: 
 
“My suggestion is to argue that feminisms can represent both current realities 
about women and our lives (that is, a politics of difference) and 
simultaneously represent the hope that such differences of interests may not 
always be the case.” (Bhavnani, 1997, p 49) 
 
According to Bhavnani, one of the best ways for scholars from the industrial countries 
to examine the interconnections of ethnicity, gender and class, is to focus on feminist 
work from the third world about these women’s lives, struggles and movements 
(Bhavnani, 1997, p 48), because analyses like these encompass most, if not all, 
categories of inequality. This is necessary, she says, because despite all the 
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discussions about difference in women’s studies, women of colour are still excluded 
in many different ways (Bhavnani, 1997, p 31).  
 
 
Intersectionality 
 
In an article on anti-discrimination doctrine and feminist theory, the American lawyer 
Kimberly Crenshaw shows how race and gender intersect, and identifies some 
problems with mainstream anti-discrimination policies (Crenshaw, 1989). Even 
though many feminists had already referred to connections between race and gender, 
this was probably the first time the term ‘intersectionality’ was introduced (McCall, 
2005). Crenshaw argues that even though racism and sexism readily intersect in the 
lives of real people, they seldom do so in feminist and anti-racist practices. Therefore 
the interests and experiences of women of colour are often not taken into account. 
Furthermore, she suggests that the single-axis framework of anti-discrimination 
theories marginalises and even erases women of colour in the conceptualisation and 
identification and of race and sex discrimination: 
 
“in race discrimination cases, discrimination tends to be viewed in terms of 
sex- or class-privileged Blacks; in sex discrimination cases, the focus is on 
race- and class-privileged women” (Crenshaw, 1989, p. 139).  
 
    Just adding black women to the current framework cannot solve these issues; 
according to Crenshaw the intersectional experience of women of colour is greater 
than the sum of racism and sexism. For example, observing intersectionality in a 
study of battered women’s shelters she found that most women who sought protection 
were not only victims of violence, but very often unemployed and poor. This means 
that shelters that serve these women cannot afford to only address the violence these 
women experience, they must also confront other forms of domination that might 
hinder their ability to get out of the abusive relationship in the first place.  
    To show how complicated the experience of women of colour is, Crenshaw 
compares their lives with a traffic intersection, where traffic comes from different 
directions. As mentioned before, black women can experience discrimination in ways 
that are both similar to and different from those experienced by white women and 
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black men (Crenshaw, 1989). An example of this is rape. Historically, rape has been 
analysed as a manifestation of male power over female sexuality. However, by 
looking at rape from this perspective, we tend to ignore the use of rape as racial terror: 
 
“when Black women were raped by white males, they were being raped not as 
women generally, but as Black women specifically: their femaleness made 
them sexually vulnerable to racist domination, while their Blackness 
effectively denied them any protection.” (Crenshaw, 1989, p. 151) 
  
Following Crenshaw, many scholars have used the term ‘intersectionality’. According 
to McCall however, there has been little discussion on how to study intersectionality 
(McCall, 2005). What exactly is intersectionality and how can we use it in scientific 
research? Gloria Wekker and Helma Lutz provide a clear description of what 
intersection theory is: a way of analysing cultural texts and social relations (Wekker 
and Lutz, 2001). The main argument of the theory is that everyone is situated at an 
intersection, which means that our lives are always influenced by our gender, 
ethnicity, sexuality, class and nationality. Furthermore, these categories influence 
each other; gender is always racialised, ethnicity is closely connected to class etc. 
Intersection theorists argue that you can never investigate gender independently from 
other axes of difference. According to Wekker and Lutz we should also be conscious 
of the fact that this method of analysis is radically different from the kind of analyses 
we are used to, which means it will not be easy to change our old habits of thinking in 
binaries.  
    The lawyer Mari Matsuda has developed an instrument to bring intersection theory 
into practice (Wekker and Lutz, 2001). To understand the connection between 
different forms of oppressions better, she uses the method of ‘asking the other 
question’: 
 
“when I see something that looks racist, I ask: what are the interests of 
patriarchy in this? When I see something that looks sexist, I ask: what is 
heterosexist about this? And when I see something that looks heterosexist, I 
ask what the class interests in this are?” (cited in Wekker and Lutz p. 41, my 
translation) 
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   McCall has delineated the three main methodological approaches to 
intersectionality, which she defines as, “the relationships among multiple dimensions 
and modalities of social relations and subject formations” (McCall, 2005, p. 1771). 
The first approach is anticategorical and is based on the idea that social life is too 
complex to make fixed categories: one will only produce inequalities, while trying to 
define the differences. The second, intercategorical approach uses existing categories 
to explicate the fact that those categories are socially constructed, ever-changing and 
ever-enhancing inequality. The last approach that McCall describes is 
intracategorical, which falls conceptually midway between the anticategorical 
approach that rejects categories, and the intercategorical approach that uses them 
strategically. The intracategorical approach criticizes both the boundary-making and 
boundary-defining process, as the anticategorical approach does, but like the 
intercategorical approach it also acknowledges the fact that categories do have a 
meaning in our society. The special aspect of this last approach is that it usually 
focuses on particular social groups at neglected points of intersection.      
    Crenshaw also divides intersection into different categories and distinguishes 
structural from political intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1991). Structural 
intersectionality refers to the way in which the location of a person at the intersection 
of race and gender produces that person’s experiences in life. As mentioned before, 
the way women of colour experience domestic violence or rape is different from 
white women’s experiences. Political intersectionality refers to the fact that women of 
colour are situated within at least two subordinated groups that frequently pursue 
conflicting agendas: 
 
“the need to split one’s political energies between two sometimes opposing 
political agendas is a dimension of intersectional disempowerment that men of 
colour and white women seldom confront.” (Crenshaw, 1991, p. 1249) 
 
Hence, by referring to the term political intersectionality, Crenshaw shows how 
difficult it can be for black women to develop an anti-racist women’s movement and 
an anti-sexist black movement.  
    Intersectional theories teach us that various axes of difference influence our lives 
and experiences. These axes always influence each other and cannot therefore be 
separated analytically. The racism that a black man experiences differs from the 
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racism that a black woman encounters, and the sexism that white women have to deal 
with is not the same as the sexism against black women. Among other things, this 
means that feminists cannot tackle first one axis of difference, followed by another 
one. Instead, we have to make more nuanced analyses of the oppression different 
women experience and develop instruments to fight these different power relations 
and oppressions. It can be rather difficult to think through intersectional frameworks 
(especially when one theorises the relationship between multiculturalism and 
feminism), but it is necessary to recognise the complexity of the issues at stake and 
adjust our analytical instruments accordingly. This includes an appropriate analysis of 
one’s own background and standpoint. We are all positioned at an intersection and we 
are all influenced by our gender, ethnicity, class, sexuality, ability etc.  
 
       
Politics of Location 
 
In order to avoid viewing women as one homogeneous group,we should recognise 
their location. We need to name the ground we are coming from and build a feminist 
consciousness that is not simply centred on universalist perspectives of the category 
of women. In her famous essay ‘Notes toward a Politics of Location’, Adrienne Rich 
takes an important step in this struggle for accountability (Rich, 1987, p 211). As a 
white woman, she argues that white women have to become more aware of their 
position: 
 
“marginalised we have been as women, as white and western makers of 
theory, we also marginalise others because our lived experience is 
thoughtlessly white, because even our ‘women cultures’ are rooted in some 
western tradition.” (Rich, 1987, p 219) 
 
    One of the main points of the ‘Politics of Location’ is that we should avoid easy 
generalisations: 
 
“If we have learned anything in these years of late twentieth-century 
feminism, it’s that ‘always’ blots out what we really need to know: when, 
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where, and under what conditions has the statement been true.” (Rich, 1987, p 
214) 
 
This clearly shows that Rich does not plead for a relativist approach; instead she tells 
us to ask these extra questions before we make a statement. The first thing (white) 
feminists have to do, according to Rich, is to ask who ‘we’ mean when ‘we’ talk 
about ‘us’/‘women’. ‘We’ called ourselves radical feminists, Rich says, and we 
wanted liberation for all women, but the problem was “that we did not know whom 
we meant when we said ‘we’,” (Rich, 1987, p 217). There is no liberation movement 
that starts from ‘I’, but neither is a movement collective if it speaks for an illusionary 
‘we’. Therefore, the women’s movement needs to change; it needs to recognise the 
differences between women, and women need to be accountable for these differences.  
    Besides avoiding easy generalisations, another important aspect of the ‘politics of 
location’ is ‘locating yourself’. No longer will Rich quote Virginia Woolf’s, “as a 
woman I have no country”; as a woman she does have a country, she argues. Her aim 
with the ‘politics of location’ is to show how she can be accountable for where she 
comes from: 
 
“I need to understand how a place on the map is also a place of history within 
which as a woman, a Jew, a lesbian, a feminist I am created and trying to 
create.” (Rich, 1987, p 212)  
 
This means that the search for accountability does not start with a geographical place, 
but with one’s body. While thinking about her body, Rich argues that she sees many 
things: scars, three pregnancies and the teeth of someone that goes to the dentist twice 
a year, but the most obvious features of her body are probably her white skin and the 
fact that it is ‘female’ (Rich, 1987, p 215). Because white is the dominant skin colour, 
it seems that it has had no influence on her life: her white identity was neutralised by 
the assumption that white is no colour. Therefore, she argues, it is important to note 
that locating yourself in your body, means more than just stating the basic facts. If 
one really wants to be accountable, it involves “recognizing this white skin, the places 
it has taken me, the places it has not let me go” (Rich, 1987, p 215-216). Hence, the 
‘politics of location’ are not about numbering your bodily features or geographical 
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background; but about trying to understand the consequences of these for your life, 
experiences and standpoints.   
    Rich’s essay has been very important for feminist theory, but it has also received 
criticism (see for instance Kaplan, 1994). Black feminists especially have argued that 
even though Rich is trying to become accountable for her position, her essay also 
confirms and reinstates the power relations that she is writing about. Black feminists 
had been stating similar arguments for years and yet it is Rich’s essay that has 
become canonized and world famous. Rich’s ‘politics of location’ do however 
provide us with two important tools for feminist analysis. I would like to argue that 
especially in the debates about multiculturalism and feminism, it is essential to ask in 
what circumstances our statements are true and how our own background has 
influenced our questions, approaches and answers.  
 
 
Critical Whiteness Studies 
 
In the previous sections, I have demonstrated how our identity is composed by the 
intersection of various axes of difference. In order to better understand how 
oppression works, more complex analyses are therefore needed, that take into account 
the intersections of, for example, ethnicity and gender. I have also discussed how race 
is always gendered, just as gender is racialised. Among other things, this means that 
both white people and people of colour live racially structured lives; white people are 
“raced”, just as men are “gendered” (Frankenberg, 1993). For this reason it is 
important to prevent generalizations and always consider when, where and under 
what circumstances a statement is true and how your own background influences your 
questions, approaches and answers. This also includes being accountable for your 
own ‘location’ and the acknowledgment that a person can be marginalised on the 
basis of one axis of difference and yet marginalise others on the basis of another. 
However, in order for white people to be accountable for their whiteness, more 
knowledge is needed about what whiteness is, and what it does, and to understand 
“the racialness of white experience” (Frankenberg, 1993, p 1).  
    One of the most well-known books about whiteness is Richard Dyer’s White 
(1997), in which he studies the representation of white people in white Western 
(visual) culture. Dyer’s aim in White is to describe and analyse the racial imaginary of 
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white people. He does this not just to fill in the gaps (most work on race is still about 
non-white people), but also for a more political reason. There is something at stake, 
he says, in continuing to ignore white racial imagery: 
 
“as long as race is something only applied to non-white peoples, as long as 
white people are not racially seen or named, they/we function as human 
norm.” (Dyer, 1997, p 1) 
 
There is no more powerful position than just being ‘human’, Dyer argues. Contrary to 
non-whites, who can only speak for their race, ‘we’ can speak for the whole of 
humanity since ‘we’ do not seem to represent a race. This way ‘we’ see and present 
ourselves as the norm, standard or the ordinary. This does not mean that ‘we’ are not 
represented, but that ‘we’ are not represented as whites. Instead ‘we’ are portrayed as 
people who are gendered, classed, sexualised or abled (Dyer, 1997, p 3). White 
people are taught that everything ‘we’ do and achieve can be based on our 
individuality: 
 
“it is intolerable to realise that we may get a job or a nice house (...) because 
of our skin colour, not because of the unique, achieving individual we must 
believe ourselves to be.” (Dyer, 1997, p 9) 
 
    Responding to the criticism of feminists of colour, Ruth Frankenberg investigated 
how feminism had failed to challenge racism, and sometimes even abetted it. Her 
research mostly deals with two main aspects of whiteness: firstly, the significance of 
race in white women’s lives and how it shapes those women’s perspective on race, 
and secondly, the influence of race discourses on these women’s lives (Frankenberg, 
1993). According to Frankenberg, whiteness consists of a set of linked dimensions: 
 
“First, whiteness is a location of structural advantage, of race privilege. 
Second, it is a ‘standpoint’, a place from which white people look at 
themselves, at others, and at society. Third, whiteness refers to a set of cultural 
practices that are usually unmarked and unnamed.” (Frankenberg, 1993, p 1) 
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One of the main aims of her research is to show how white women’s experiences are 
shaped by racism: challenging the notion that racism is something external to us, 
rather than a system that shapes everyone’s daily lives, experiences and sense of 
selves (Frankenberg, 1993, p 6). An interesting, but also complicating, part of her 
work is what Frankenberg herself calls the lacunae in perception. She wanted to find 
out how race is lived, or seen by white women, but more often she had to deal with 
what is not seen or experienced (Frankenberg, 1993, p 9). She argues this has to do 
with standpoint: because of our privileged position ‘we’ do not see what the 
consequences of race are in our lives.  
    White women (just like women of colour) are marked by their location in the racial 
order’ and these women’s senses of self, other, identity and worldview are also 
racialised (Frankenberg, 1993). But Frankenberg also recognises the possibilities of 
change and influence in the race discourses. White women that were involved in 
interracial relationships, for instance, were much more conscious of race relations, 
and problematised discourses about race. Therefore, she concludes how important it is 
to give attention to the construction of ‘white experience’ and its connection to 
discursive orders, because it “may help make visible the processes by which the 
stability of whiteness is (...) secured and reproduced” (Frankenberg, 1993, p 240). 
Only then we can try to transform the meaning of whiteness specifically and race 
relations in general, Frankenberg argues. 
    Griffin and Braidotti add to these important conclusions that our conceptualization 
of difference is essential for dealing with race and ethnicity in Europe (Griffin and 
Braidotti, 2002). We need to make whiteness visible as a colour, but also to redefine 
the concept of whiteness in order to take into account that in Europe one’s colour does 
not automatically determine one’s socio-cultural position. In other words, we have to 
acknowledge that culture, nation and religion have often been more important 
markers of difference in Europe than race. Furthermore, since whiteness in Europe 
has been so closely connected to nations and nation-states, Griffin and Braidotti 
argue, we also have to redefine European identity in a ‘post-nationalist’ way (Griffin 
and Braidotti, 2002, p 234). The authors propose a political strategy that approaches 
European identity as an open and multi-layered project, not as fixed or given (Griffin 
and Braidotti, 2002, p 234).  
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Conclusions   
 
Susan Moller Okin argues that most non-Western cultures are more patriarchal than 
Western cultures and that protecting these cultures will harm the interests of women 
rather than promote them. One can contest this statement on different levels, but in 
this chapter I have investigated the relationship between feminism and difference. 
Can we really separate women from their cultures, as Okin does?  
    The feminist research I have described shows that gender and ethnicity are 
connected: gender is ethnicised and ethnicity is gendered. The women from the 
Combahee River Collective explained in 1977 how the connections between race and 
gender created their oppression. Their specific experiences made it difficult for black 
women to fight the subjugation they encountered: the women’s movement was blind 
to racism, and the anti-racist movement did not recognise sexism as an equally 
important source of oppression. But sexuality, class, and ability interact with gender. 
And in the recent debates about multiculturalism and feminism, religion (read Islam) 
plays an important role as well. Orientalist perspectives on Islam and women 
influence many of these debates, and Muslim women are generally considered as 
unfree and oppressed. Moreover, their agency is often denied. Different 
conceptualisations of agency are the subject of the next chapter; here is it important to 
recognise the connections between culture, religion and gender.  
    Chandra Mohanty demonstrates how Western feminists have created a singular 
subject of ‘third world women’. Their differences and agency are ignored because 
they are investigated as a monolithic and subjugated group. In order to be able to 
acknowledge the differences between women, I discussed three sets of theoretical 
frameworks. Intersectionality teaches us that all identities are based on the 
intersection between various axes of difference. Separating gender from ethnicity in 
an analysis would therefore make it impossible to truly understand how gender or 
ethnicity works. In order to understand the sexism that black women have to deal 
with, we have to take into account the mechanisms of racism, and if we want to 
understand the racism black women experience, we also need to look at sexism. 
Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that whiteness is a racial position as well. 
White people often consider themselves as race-less; this way, their position is 
neutralised and universalised. In order to break through the dominance of whiteness, 
we need to understand more about what it means to be white in a racist world. White 
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feminists can address this by positioning themselves in relation to their research. They 
have to ask themselves under what circumstances their statements are true and how 
their background and experiences have influenced them. The next chapter will discuss 
this issue of experience and how it can be used in feminist research.  
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Chapter 4 Experiencing feminism: Experience and Subjectivity in the 
Debates about Multiculturalism and Feminism 	  	  
Introduction 
   
“Liberalism, grounded in the equal rights of individuals, (...) would have no more 
need to consult with the women of such a group than it need consult with slaves 
before it insisted upon their emancipation or with workers before it insisted upon 
their protection from deadly workplace hazards” (Okin, 2005, p 86).  
 
Susan Moller Okin argues that certain cultural practices and beliefs can be harmful to 
women and that liberal democracies should not encourage these through 
multiculturalist policies. The views of the women involved are in this context 
irrelevant, and need to be ignored when these women have been raised in a strict 
patriarchal society. In the latter case, women can accept certain cultural traditions 
because they lack power, are socialized into inferior roles or simply lack the self-
esteem to fight against them (Okin, 1998, p 675). In chapter one I discussed Ayaan 
Hirsi Ali’s argument that Islam is a potential threat to the emancipation of (Muslim) 
women and that the headscarf is a sign of women’s subordination within Islam (Ali, 
2004a). She describes how Muslim women claim that they wear a scarf to show who 
they are, or to be able to go to work, but states that women are fooling themselves 
with these reasons.  
    Both Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Susan Moller Okin believe that women in liberal 
societies should be protected from harmful traditions in their religion or culture. They 
argue that Muslim women living in Western democracies should have the same rights 
as other women in their country, and ought to be able to live their lives without 
fearing circumcision or other possibly harmful customs. I have analysed the concepts 
of multiculturalism and feminism and have demonstrated that multiculturalism is a 
multi-layered and dynamic concept that can be interpreted in different ways. In that 
context, I argued that Okin’s conceptualisation of multiculturalism is rather limited 
and ignores interpretations that take into account power differences within cultures, 
including gender relations. Furthermore, I argued that gender and ethnicity both 
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influence women’s lives and cannot be analysed separately. In this context I outlined 
an interpretation of feminism that incorporates theories of intersectionality and where 
feminists should be accountable for their own background and prevent generalisations 
in their work and activities. Here I want to build on this interpretation of feminism 
and discuss the role of experience and subjectivity in the debates about 
multiculturalism and feminism. If feminists are accountable for their own location and 
take into account the differences between women, how then can they apply women’s 
specific experiences in their research and activities?  
    The argument that multiculturalism specifically, or culture and religion in general 
are a threat to gender equality and should therefore not be supported by feminists, 
seems to at least partially ignore the will of the women involved. This appears to be 
contradictory to feminist ideals of the autonomy of women. However, according to 
some feminists, women occasionally need to be protected from patriarchal cultures 
and religions, even if it is against their own will. In this context, it is often argued that 
women might not always be able to make a good judgment because they suffer from 
false consciousness. Invisible premises of what subjectivity and experience are, play 
an important role in the current debates about multiculturalism and feminism and 
need to be made visible and questioned, in order to rethink these discussions properly. 
In this chapter, I will therefore investigate these notions of experience and 
subjectivity. My main aim is to show why (white/secular) feminists ought to listen to 
the arguments, experiences and strategies of other women involved in this debate, and 
to explain what the best approach to this would be. But first, I want to focus on the 
history behind Okin’s argument. The thought that religion/culture in general, or Islam 
specifically cannot coexist with the struggle for gender equality is not new, nor 
unproblematic; Okin is not the first white feminist who wants to ‘save’ women from 
other cultures. This history needs to be taken into account when we think about 
multiculturalism and feminism. I do not mean to argue that because white feminism 
has a possibly problematic history, white women (or men) should not be able to 
criticise other cultures or religions, but I do believe we should be careful and 
conscious of the background and context in which we talk about these issues. 
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‘Burdens of History’ 
 
The mission of ‘saving brown women’ is not only an important part of the colonialist 
ideology, it is also entrenched in white women’s consciousness and returns in current 
Western feminist discourses on religion (Pui-lan, 2002, p 630). The ‘White Man’s 
Burden, or the notion that the West has a responsibility to bring Christian civilisation 
and its values to non-Western countries, has a gender aspect. First of all, it is mostly 
white men who feel the urge to save brown women from their men. But white women 
also believed they needed to save others. According to Pui-lan the role of women in 
the colonies was far from innocent (Pui-lan, 2002, p 66). White women were 
disadvantaged because of their sex, but benefited from their class and colour. Indeed, 
as women, “they were charged to reproduce domesticity in a strange land and to be 
guardians of Western morality and religious piety” (Pui-lan, 2002, p 66), but they also 
appeared to be “clinging more to their class and racial privileges, and displaying more 
racial intolerance than the white men did” (Pui-lan, 2002, p 66). Furthermore, white 
women often used the supposedly ‘backwards position of indigenous women’ to 
promote their own emancipation (Burton, 1994).  
    One of the consequences of the above-mentioned approach to emancipation is the 
construction of women from the colonies as ‘victims of their brutal men’. As I explain 
in chapter 2, these women’s suffering under imperialism is not taken into account and 
they are also presented as ignorant, poor women who need help from Western 
saviours (Pui-lan, 2002, p 67). Referring to the work of Spivak, Pui-lan argues that 
brown women are not allowed to speak: “the subaltern woman has been written, 
represented, argued about, and even legislated for, but she is allowed no discursive 
position from which to speak” (Pui-lan, 2002, p 67). In order to avoid the colonial 
ideology in current research, Pui-lan makes several important recommendations: do 
not present the other culture as unchanging or timeless and try to recognise the 
variation of, for example, certain traditions according to religion, class or ethnicity 
and finally, listen to the women involved. In other words: 
 
 “A postcolonial interpretation does not name all men as the enemy in an 
essentialist manner, but acknowledges that some men and women have more 
power than others. It simultaneously challenges colonial discourse on sati, 
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footbinding, and genital mutilation, as well as patriarchal constructions that 
reinforce gender hierarchy. Such postcolonial rewriting is one of many 
learning devices to glean new insights from our ‘common’ history.” (Pui-lan, 
2002, p 70-72)  
 
Dube adds to this that “postcolonial feminist spaces are inscribed within the 
worldwide international relations of domination, suppression and resistance” (Dube, 
2002, p 117). She argues that we have to take into account oppression of the past as 
well as the present, and the influence this has on colonized women. Among other 
things, this means we have to be aware of differences among women and we should 
not attempt to organise the world according to Western standards, but try to recognise 
the strategies of resistance of formerly colonized women and acknowledge how 
important religion and culture can be, especially in a process of de-colonialization 
(Dube, 2002, p 115-117).   
 
 
Islamic Feminism 
 
Many women from all over the world do not feel that their culture/religion is a threat 
to their emancipation, but an inspiration. Islamic (or Muslim) feminists are an 
important example here and their strategies, experiences and arguments should play a 
more prominent role in discussions about the relationship between multiculturalism 
and feminism. It is not only because feminists ought to learn from history that more 
understanding of (and possibly solidarity with) other women’s struggles is necessary, 
but also because, for example, Islamic feminists demonstrate through their struggles 
that feminism can be interpreted in various ways and is not limited to secular/white 
interpretations.  
    Islamic feminism is a product of people for whom both religion and gender 
equality is important and whose views on emancipation are inspired by their religious 
beliefs. The struggle for gender equality within Islam is not grounded in a certain 
geographical area. It is developing in various parts of the world, both originally 
Muslim and non-Muslim. However, it arose first in countries where Islamism has a 
long history, with a growing female middle class and a tradition of feminism. Often 
too, Islamic feminism is a response to secular feminist movements (Badran, 2006, p 
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48). The term ‘Islamic feminism’ is not uncontested. Some Muslim women connect 
the term feminism to the West and imperialism and some Western feminists reject the 
possibility of women struggling for equality within a patriarchal institution (Cooke, 
2002). Others would go against this and defend the term.  
    In many cases Islamic feminism is based on the Qur’an, for instance by 
reinterpreting holy texts (Badran, 2006, p 49). Barlas argues that change from within 
is possible, but requires a shift in how people interpret and practice Islam and a 
willingness to read liberation from the same scripture that male authorities now use to 
discriminate against women (Barlas, 2005). According to Barlas, it is important to 
note that who reads the Qur’an and in which context highly influences what is read 
into it. She aims to make visible the relationship between knowledge and its means of 
production. Furthermore, she argues, that the Qur’an is often not read according to the 
hermeneutic principles required by the Qur’an itself (Barlas, 2005). First of all one 
ought to read the Qur’an in the light of a proper understanding of God; for instance 
God would never do anything to harm human beings. Secondly, the Qur’an asks 
people to read it for its best meanings. Among other things this means that it 
emphasises reading the text as a whole, and in context and not to confuse it with its 
interpretations. Barlas re-read the Qur’an starting from these principles and argues 
that it does not represent God as male and warns against “following the ways of the 
father”. Additionally, she argues that through such a reading, the so-called misogynist 
verses can also be interpreted in many different ways.  
    But even though more and more women are now active in this process of 
reinvestigating religious sources, they are in a complex position. Very often, Muslim 
women are represented as victims or ‘lesser human beings’. Because of the multiple 
representations of Muslim women, these women have had to develop ‘multiple 
critiques’, Miriam Cooke argues. Or, in other words: 
 
 “a multilayered discourse that allows them to engage with and criticize the 
various individuals, institutions, and systems that limit and oppress them while 
making sure that they are not caught in their own rhetoric” (Cooke, 2002, p 
151). 
 
They discuss gender roles in their local and religious communities; challenge 
conventional interpretations of holy texts and traditions and at the same time defend 
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their religious and national communities. According to Cooke, Muslim women create 
new histories and knowledges about their own lives and criticise the many accounts 
that are often produced about them, without consulting them. Debates about veiling 
are an important example of the struggle of Islamic feminists. Where most outsiders 
see the veil as a sign of oppression, more and more women are now claiming that the 
veil can be empowering. Furthermore, they show that veils can have many different 
meanings: they can be a woman’s own choice or forced upon her; liberate or 
imprison; mark piety or political statements; reduce a woman’s space or facilitate her 
professional activities (Cooke, 2002, p 154). By emphasising these different 
meanings, Islamic feminists can create new, contingent and dynamic subject 
positions.  
    Recognising the possible problems with the term, Cooke uses the concept of 
Islamic Feminism to describe the double-edged struggle of Muslim women who are 
committed to both their religion and women’s rights: 
 
“They are claiming that Islam is not necessarily more traditional or authentic 
than any other identification nor is it any more violent or patriarchal than any 
other religion. They are claiming their right to be strong women within this 
tradition, to act as feminists without fear, so that they may be labelled 
Western and imitative. They are highlighting women’s roles within their 
religious communities, while at the same time declaring common cause with 
Muslim women elsewhere who share the same objectives.” (Cooke, 2002, p 
145) 
 
This means that Islamic feminists have a lot of enemies; both among Muslim men 
who do not want to lose their privileges and among those who criticise Islam by 
calling it ‘unfriendly to women’ (Badran, 2006, p 48). One of the ways of ‘playing 
back’ to the men in their own communities is to refer to the strategies they themselves 
used in the anti-colonial struggles (Cooke, 2002). They are studying the same texts 
that ‘their men’ used to counter the West, and point out that they are in danger of 
making the same mistakes as the West. 
    By studying the strategies and arguments of Islamic feminists, it becomes possible 
to develop a more comprehensive understanding of feminist struggles in general. The 
concept of ‘multiple critiques’ for example points out that Muslim women not only 
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suffer from oppression in which gender and religion intersect; they also try to develop 
different forms of criticism through which they fight both those who believe that they 
are victims of their religion and those who interpret Islam in a misogynist way. 
Hence, even though Susan Moller Okin argues that some women lack the self-esteem 
and possibilities to fight patriarchal customs in their culture/religion, there are also 
many who do fight these, albeit in their own way and from within that community. 
But that leaves the question of how to decide when a woman is fighting for her own 
interpretation of equality while holding on to her faith, and when, as Okin suggests, a 
woman is holding on to certain traditions because she does not dare to, or thinks she 
cannot, change them.  
 
 
Standpoint Theory 
 
Feminists have extensively theorized the use of experience in research. When 
women’s studies departments started to emerge in the 1970s, one of their first points 
of critique was the fact that other fields had not incorporated women as subjects of 
research (McCall, 2005). One of the main aims therefore, was to ‘add women’ to the 
leading research agendas across the full range of disciplines. Later on, the ‘simple’ 
addition of women to the research process did not seem to be enough to fight the male 
bias in science. Feminist scholars then introduced ‘gender’ as analytical category 
(Harding, 1991). Women’s distinct experiences became an important part of the 
feminist agenda. This led, among other things, to a feminist critique of mainstream 
scientific methods. According to many feminists these methods claimed to be 
objective and value-free, but were in fact excluding women, and thus only telling 
‘half of the story’ (Harding, 1991). Furthermore, they argued that the exclusion of 
women was not a matter of ‘bad science’, but more ‘science-as-usual’. In other words, 
the problems are inherent in the scientific method and cannot be solved without 
changing these methods. This feminist alternative to mainstream science is known as 
‘standpoint theory’ and starts from the experience of women.  
    Standpoint theory is based on the originally Marxist idea that knowledge is socially 
situated and that one’s position in society shapes and constrains what one knows, or 
even what one can know (Harding, 1991). Furthermore, standpoint theorists argue 
that knowledge from a marginalised point of view could be more valuable than 
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knowledge from a dominant position: “one can expect that the vision of each will 
represent an inversion of the other, and in systems of domination the vision available 
to the rulers will be both partial and perverse” (Rose Hartsock, cited in: Harding, 
1991, p 120). The argument is that the oppressed have a more complete idea of 
society, because very often they not only know how things work in their own groups, 
but also in the group that is dominating them. For example, because of their work as 
domestic helpers, many black women are familiar with family traditions of both white 
and black families. Moreover, feminist standpoint theorists argue that women, 
because of their marginalised position, can function as ‘critical strangers’ to the social 
order: they have the right combination of nearness and remoteness to criticise and 
notice things that are hard for those immersed in the culture to detect (Harding, 1991, 
p 124). Secondly, as members of the oppressed groups, women have fewer interests in 
ignoring the social order. This too should make them more critical (Harding, 1991, p 
125).  
    But does this mean that women, or other oppressed groups, are always right? No: 
according to Sandra Harding, standpoint theory gives us important reasons to listen to 
the arguments of women, but that does not mean that they are always right (Harding, 
1991, p 123). There is a difference between an individual claim and a standpoint, she 
argues. A standpoint is a location from where feminist research should begin: 
 
“it is not the experiences or speech that provides the grounds for feminist 
claims; it is rather the subsequently articulated observations of and theory 
about the rest of nature and social relations - (…) that look at the world from 
the perspective of women’s lives” (Harding, 1991, p 124). 
 
This also means that a standpoint is not something you have, but something to 
achieve. Thus not all men have ‘male standpoints’, and not all women have ‘feminist 
standpoints’: a man can also take a feminist standpoint, e.g. by joining women to 
work for the improvement of women’s conditions.  
    Thinking from women’s lives does not mean that we have to let go of the concept 
of objectivity. Instead, Harding argues, standpoint theory requires and generates 
stronger standards of objectivity (Harding, 2004). The concept of ‘strong objectivity’ 
challenges the classic notion that objectivity is connected to neutrality, and argues 
that the objectivity of claims becomes stronger when they are linked to partial or 
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particular positions (Prins, 1997, p 68). All research, Harding argues, is socially 
situated; only when we stop claiming it to be value-free can we can develop a stronger 
objectivity:  
 
“The requirements for achieving strong objectivity permit one to abandon 
notions of perfect, mirror like representations of the world, the self as a 
defended fortress, and the ‘truly scientific’ as disinterested with regard to 
morals and politics, yet still apply rational standards to sorting less from 
more partial and distorted belief” (Harding, 1991, p 159). 
 
    Giving up the classic notion of objectivity does not automatically mean that one 
turns to relativism. People fear, Harding argues, that if we let go of the idea that there 
is not one universally and eternally valid standard of judgement, then we have to 
regard each person’s judgment as equally valid. However, the concept of strong 
objectivity shows that there are alternatives outside of the narrow dichotomous 
relation between objectivity and relativism. This requires us to “investigate the 
relationship between subject and object rather than deny the existence of, or seek 
unilateral control over, this relation” (Harding, 1991, p 152). Thus, standpoint theory 
is not doomed to relativism; instead it claims that some standpoints or situations are 
better starting points for knowledge projects than others (Harding, 2004, 131).   
    In order to be able to maximise objectivity, subjects of knowledge should be 
reflexive. Or as Harding puts it: “strong objectivity requires strong reflexivity” 
(Harding, 2004, p 136). Instead of eliminating all external factors from scientific 
research, we should include those factors that influence the process of knowledge 
production, such as gender, race or class. Researchers have to be aware of the fact that 
they always look at certain issues through the eyes of their communities and begin 
thought with its assumptions (Prins, 1997, p 70). To summarise: strong objectivity 
and reflexivity do not help us to find one true account of a certain issue, but to locate 
less false or distorted accounts (Prins, 1997, p 69).  
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Standpoint Theory and Others 
 
Standpoint theory presents interesting arguments and tools to prevent us from 
producing knowledge from a supposedly universal standpoint, which is in fact 
hegemonic and partial. The concept of ‘thinking from women’s lives’ is therefore an 
important approach for feminist research. However, as I demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, black and ‘third world’ women particularly have argued that the category of 
women is heterogeneous. Therefore, not only gender, but also other classifications 
such as race, culture, class, sexuality, should be taken into account. What does this 
mean for standpoint theory?  
    In order to answer this question, Sandra Harding examines the relationship between 
experience and knowledge in the context of standpoint theory. According to her, we 
can learn more about a society in general when we start from marginal perspectives. 
Not experience itself, but the view from a certain standpoint is central to this 
approach. These standpoints are always multiple and contradictory: women are not 
just women, but also rich or poor, black or white, heterosexual or lesbian etc 
(Harding, 1991, p 284). Therefore, each feminist knower is ‘multiple’, in the sense 
that thinking from a contradictory standpoint generates feminist knowledge. Harding 
argues:  
 
“The logic of standpoint theory requires that the subject of liberatory 
feminist knowledge must also be the subject of every other liberatory 
knowledge project. Since lesbian, poor, and black women are all women, 
feminism will have to grasp how gender, race, class, and sexuality are used 
to construct one another.” (Harding, 1991, p 285).  
 
Thus, in order for liberatory movements to be successful, they have to take into 
account these different categories and their intersections.   
    If white women want to take into account the experiences of, for example, black 
women, they can use the approach of ‘reading against the grain’ (Harding, 1991, 288). 
This method comes from the experience of lesbian women and suggests that people 
whose identity is not marginal, have to ‘become marginal’. This does not mean that 
they should give up or change their identity (e.g. being heterosexual), but that they 
give up the “spontaneous consciousness created by their heterosexual experience in a 
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heterosexist world” (Harding, 1991, p 289). Consequently, they can think as 
heterosexual persons who have learned from lesbian lives. The same approach can 
also work for whites, who can learn from the experiences of blacks etc. Sandra 
Harding also refers to this as ‘traitorous identities’. Such thinking does not start from 
direct experience, but from critical reflexivity. Among other things, this means that 
we cannot literally repeat the arguments of ‘the oppressed’. Instead we have to 
develop a new critical view from our standpoint, including evaluating our own 
dominant position.  
    An interesting aspect of the ‘traitorous identities’ of Sandra Harding is that they 
make it possible for men to be feminists or whites to be anti-racist. But there is 
another, maybe even more important consequence of this approach: it brings back 
responsibility to people with a dominant identity, e.g. whites, to rethink their own 
position and learn from the perspectives of others about their own privileged locations 
(Prins, 1997, p 74). Thus, attention is moved away from marginalised positions to the 
dominant positions. This means that the concept of ‘traitorous identities’ is first of all 
an alternative to Okin’s view on protecting minority women, but it also provides an 
answer to the question, ‘are white women not allowed to say anything about minority 
women?’ Of course women can share struggles with other women and make 
statements about oppressions, but it is important to note the power differences and to 
be accountable for one’s position.  
 
 
Situated Knowledges 
 
Standpoint theory has had enormous influence on feminist research and is still 
important in many research projects. However, feminists have also criticised its main 
premise that the oppressed know better. Do they really know better, and is this not an 
essentialist thought? The work of Donna Haraway is an important example of such 
criticism. In ‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the 
privilege of Partial Perspective’ (1991), she builds on Sandra Harding’s criticism of 
the social constructionist view on objectivity, but also takes it a step further. Haraway 
describes alternatives to the narrow interpretation of the concept of objectivity that 
feminists have developed, such as standpoint theory, and how these have influenced 
our image of ‘good science’. However, she also argues that feminists seem to be 
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trapped in discussions about science and objectivity, and she proposes another way of 
thinking about these issues: ‘situated knowledges’.  
    Like Harding’s ‘strong objectivity’, ‘situated knowledges’ aim to achieve a more 
objective perspective by letting go of the concept of neutrality. Haraway argues that 
objectivity should be connected to ‘situatedness’: 
 
“This is an objective vision that initiates, rather than closes off, the problem of 
responsibility for the generativity of all visual practices. Partial perspective 
can be held accountable for both its promising, and its destructive monsters” 
(Haraway, 1991, p 190). 
 
Haraway uses the metaphor of ‘vision’ to illustrate her interpretation of objectivity: 
all vision comes from a certain perspective and uses a particular instrument; the 
combination of these factors creates different ways of seeing. According to Haraway 
we have to develop an objectivity, which is just as embodied as vision is. This 
embodied objectivity should prevent the so-called “god-trick” (Haraway, 1991, p 189) 
of neutral objectivity; to see without being seen or seeing everything from nowhere. 
    Vision is always about the power to see. Furthermore, seeing is always active and 
mediated:  
 
“All eyes, including our own organic ones, are active perceptual systems, 
building in translations and specific ways of seeing (…). There is no 
unmediated photograph or passive camera obscura in scientific accounts of 
bodies and machines; there are only highly specific visual possibilities, each 
with a wonderfully detailed, active, partial way of organizing worlds” 
(Haraway, 1991, p 190).  
 
According to Haraway, in order to achieve embodied objectivity we have to 
understand how visual systems work (socially, physically and technically) (Haraway, 
1991, p 190). Thus, we have to be accountable for the way we see: where we see 
from and with which instruments. In feminist research this means that we have to 
position ourselves. Seeing is about translating and if we want to be able to recognise 
tensions, contradictions, transformations or resistances, we have to be aware of the 
fact that we only have a partial view, from a certain location (Haraway, 1991, p 195).  
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    An important aspect in the act of positioning oneself is the awareness of difference: 
 
“Feminism is about the sciences of the multiple subject with (at least) double 
vision. Feminism is about critical vision consequent upon a critical 
positioning in inhomogeneous gendered social space” (Haraway, 1991, p 
195). 
 
Hence, there is no single feminist standpoint according to Haraway. We have to 
respect difference and avoid fixation. Here is where Haraway clearly distinguishes 
her theory of ‘situated knowledges’ from Harding’s standpoint theory. Haraway 
agrees with Harding (and other standpoint theorists) that there are good reasons to 
believe that ‘vision is better from below’, but she also warns against romanticizing 
the position of the subjugated: 
 
“to see from below is neither easily learned nor unproblematic, even if ‘we’ 
‘naturally’ inhabit the great underground terrain of the subjugated 
knowledges. The positionings of the subjugated are not exempt from critical 
re-examination, decoding, deconstruction, and interpretation; that is, from 
both semiological and hermeneutic modes of critical enquiry. The 
standpoints of the subjugated are not ‘innocent’ positions.” (Haraway, 1991, 
p 191).  
 
Thus, according to Haraway, standpoint alone is not enough for embodied and 
objective knowledge production. We need instruments to actually see something from 
a certain standpoint. And the most important instrument for a researcher, according to 
Haraway, is ‘critical positioning’ (Haraway, 1991, p 193). Hence, not identity, but 
critical positioning produces partial, locatable and critical knowledges (Haraway, 
1991, p 193). Positioning implies responsibility and should therefore be at the base of 
an accountable science.  
    Besides positioning oneself, Haraway mentions another crucial aspect for feminist 
epistemology: ‘splitting’. Maybe even more than positioning, the concept of splitting 
is a very important criticism of standpoint theory. Subjects, Haraway argues, are 
always multidimensional, and therefore their vision too. This makes our vision 
always partial. Therefore, we should not define our standpoint on the basis of 
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identity, but on partiality; we have to acknowledge our partiality and position 
ourselves accordingly.  
    Because location and critical positioning are not self-evident (knowing subjects are 
always split and contradictory); a located position has to be made in order to make 
particular objects of knowledge possible (Prins, 1997). Haraway proposes to use the 
concept of the ‘modest witness’ as the knowing subject: a knower whose modesty 
renders her invisible (Haraway, 1997). So, even though Haraway lets go of the 
foundation of  ‘objective knowledge’ as used by standpoint theorists, she does not 
resort to relativism: 
 
“Relativism is a way of being nowhere while claiming to be everywhere 
equally. (…). Relativism is the perfect mirror twin of totalization in the 
ideologies of objectivity; both deny the stakes in location, embodiment, and 
partial perspective; both make it impossible to see well (Haraway, 1991, p 
191).  
 
Instead, Haraway suggests that we need other critical tools than the unmasking of 
prevailing accounts as lies (Prins, 1997). Critical theory, in this view, should no 
longer be about revealing ‘how things really are’, but about making a difference in the 
world. Hence, feminists should not try to find the best representatives of a story, but 
develop alternative stories that can change our perspective. The concept of the modest 
witness could be a starting point for the production of such stories.  
 
 
Experience in Feminist Research 
 
Both standpoint theory and situated knowledges have been and are important 
contributions to feminist theory. Both theories have taught us that location can 
influence our views on certain issues. The main difference is that standpoint theory 
starts from the normative notion that certain positions provide better grounds for 
knowledge production, while the theory of ‘situated knowledges’ demonstrates that 
all standpoints provide partial views and that we have to be accountable for that.  
    If we apply standpoint theory and situated knowledges, we will see that both will 
help us in the rethinking of the relationship between multiculturalism and feminism. 
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Standpoint theory tells us why we need a view from below, and should for example 
take the experiences of women from minority cultures into account. But standpoint 
theory is not merely about women’s experiences; these are just a point of departure, a 
ground for ‘knowledge-claims’  (Bracke, 2004). In order to develop a standpoint, one 
needs to combine social location with political analysis: “an initial link is not enough 
to make a standpoint; it takes a theoretical and political project to contextualise 
experiences and perspectives of oppression” (Bracke, 2004, p 7). When we approach 
standpoint theory in such a manner, it becomes obvious why it is important that the 
voices from Islamic feminists, as described above, are taken into account in feminist 
research and theory. These women have transformed their experiences (from below) 
into standpoints, through their political projects and ‘multiple critiques’. But the 
question of which standpoints are ‘proper’ standpoints, is not always easy to answer 
and leads to much discussion between feminists.  
    Sarah Bracke argues that if we want to ‘think from women’s lives’, we have to ask 
ourselves whose women’ lives we want to think from (Bracke, 2004, p 8). We have to 
take into account the differences between women and prevent ‘false universality’. 
Bracke does not aim to answer the question whether the women in her research could 
engender proper (feminist) standpoints. Instead, she wants to: 
 
“take the lives of women that stand in an ‘awkward relationship’ to feminism 
as a starting point to explore what kind of knowledges such vantage points 
engender and how these knowledges make feminist thinking more complex” 
(Bracke, 2004, p 10). 
 
In this context Bracke cites Willy Jansen, who also argues that in order for Women’s 
Studies to be able to do justice to the differences between women, we need to 
understand why women make certain choices, what interests influence these choices 
and how women are divided among themselves (Jansen, cited in: Bracke 2004, p 9).  
    Where Bracke starts from a political interpretation of standpoint theory to make 
feminist thinking more complex, one could also turn to the concept of situated 
knowledges. According to Baukje Prins, situated knowledges are so appealing 
because of their multi-layeredness. In her view, there are at least three important 
dimensions to distinguish within the concept. The first level is descriptive and claims 
that all knowledge is partial and situated. The second level is more normative and 
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refers to the fact that a view from below could be a better vantage point for seeing the 
world. Obviously, this is where standpoint theory and situated knowledges meet each 
other. However, Haraway is much more careful with this normative account and also 
warns us not to romanticise oppressed standpoints. The third level is the visionary 
dimension of meaning: situated knowledges aim to actively construct new 
perspectives to ‘knowing’ (Prins, 1997, p 104). Prins argues that the idea of situated 
knowledges emphasizes the construction of identities much more explicitly than 
Harding does. Social positions are not fixed and do not automatically lead to 
resistance to the system (Prins, 1997, p 104-5). Haraway plays with identities and 
boundaries, where for Harding these are much more static. For instance, Harding 
writes about feminist men as men who occupy a ‘contradictory position’; Haraway on 
the other hand describes them as “a little bit different, a little bit fraught” (Haraway, 
cited in Prins, 1997, p 105). For Prins these are examples of the many possibilities 
Haraway’s work provides. To summarise: 
 
“The feminist subject position of the ‘outsider within’ has been radicalized by 
the figuration of the cyborg, whose vision is not simply double, but whose 
artifactual eyes diffract the world into a mosaic pattern. Furthermore, 
Haraway’s relativization of the distinction between subject and object as two 
types of ‘material-semiotic actors’ seriously weakens the traditional 
hegemonic relationships constituted by practices of knowledge. Finally, her 
work shows a persistent awareness of the existence of power/knowledge 
configurations: by suggesting the non-innocence of its constructions, by its 
focus on the empowerment of ‘inappropiate/d others’, and by emphasizing the 
inevitable responsibility that goes with any knowledge claim.” (Prins, 1997, p 
106) 
 
    Prins argues that the Dutch discourse on ethnic minorities and multiculturalism is a 
good case for exploring the concept of situated knowledges, because it is a discourse 
in which many ‘non-innocent’ positions are put forward, and because the relations 
between marginal and dominant groups in society are at stake.  
    Briefly summarized, we can say that standpoint theory provides feminists with an 
essential tool, and explains why it is important to include the view from ‘outsiders 
within’ in feminist research. Haraway’s ‘situated knowledges’ de-essentialised 
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standpoint theory and shows us that the view from below should not be romanticised. 
In that sense, situated knowledges open the way to a more dynamic and less static 
interpretation of standpoint theory. However, both the more political interpretation of 
standpoint theory and the dynamic theory of situated knowledges leave us with the 
question of how to decide which views are relevant for feminist research or activism.  
 
Even though Bracke does not (want to) answer the question (how to differentiate a 
good standpoint from a problematic one), she does give good reasons to start thinking 
from the lives and experiences of women who might make feminist thinking more 
complex, such as women who are actively involved in ‘fundamentalist’ movements. 
This seems to contradict her point about the necessity to combine location with 
political struggle in standpoint theory. Hence, in her second statement she argues that 
it is more important to understand the lives of religious women than to focus on the 
question whether their experiences could engender feminist standpoints. I would like 
to argue that both issues are important in feminist research, such as this project, but 
they relate to different angles of the debate about multiculturalism and feminism. 
Hence, if we want to rethink statements such as those from Susan Moller Okin, one 
could argue that minority women also fight for equality, albeit it in another way and, 
for example, from within their community. Another argument, however, would be 
that some women might not want the equality of freedom that Okin stands for. These 
different lines of reasoning are connected to different theoretical frameworks. I would 
like to argue that standpoint theory would be an important instrument in the first and 
that situated knowledges provides us with an entry to the latter. A redefinition of the 
relationship between multiculturalism and feminism needs to take into account both 
aspects and hence develop theoretical frameworks that help to understand both.  
 
 
Moving from Standpoints to Subjectivities  
 
Saba Mahmood states that if feminists really want to understand the lives, experiences 
and strategies of all women, we have to be open to the possibility that we can learn 
from other women and maybe even change our political views accordingly. 
Therefore, according to Mahmood, feminists have to separate their analytical and 
prescriptive work (Mahmood, 2005). This means we should openly engage with other 
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worldviews in our analytical work and then decide whether these might change our 
political standpoints. Hence, we should not try to define beforehand whether a certain 
experience is a good standpoint or not, but first try to understand it and discuss the 
political consequences afterwards. In order to be able to do this, Mahmood argues, 
feminists have to rethink their conceptualisation of agency.  
    In general, the participation of Muslim women in Islamist organisations is 
considered a paradox: they are active in movements that do not support their interests 
and agendas (Mahmood, 2005, p 2). Mahmood does not believe in this paradox, her 
goal is to rethink the: 
 
“normative liberal assumptions about human nature (…), such as the belief 
that all human beings have an innate desire for freedom, that we all 
somehow seek to assert our autonomy when allowed to do so, that human 
agency primarily exists of acts that challenge our social norms and not those 
that uphold them” (Mahmood, 2005, p 5).  
 
This way she not only aims to challenge classical liberal thought, but also feminist 
theory, which for in large part rests on liberal assumptions about human nature and 
agency. Resistance is an important theme in the work of Mahmood. As I mentioned 
above, feminists have often defined agency in terms of resistance. According to 
Mahmood this is problematic and causes us to be blind to many ways of being that are 
not embedded in the framework of subversion.  
    Most feminist thinking is primarily liberatory and agency is in this context is 
described as a model of subordination and subversion. Mahmood argues that this 
attachment of agency to progressive politics is problematic. If, she says, there are 
different ways to change the world depending on social, political and historical 
contexts; then the meaning of agency should not be fixed in advance. Thus, if we 
really want to understand the lives, experiences and strategies of all women’s lives, 
we should not try to place their activities and ways of being in the simply 
dichotomous relation of subversion and subordination. This might mean that we have 
to re-conceptualise individual freedom, and adjust it to a situation where the 
distinction between: 
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“the subject’s own desires and socially prescribed performances cannot be 
easily presumed and where submission to certain forms of (external) authority 
is a condition for achieving the subject’s potentiality” (Mahmood, 2005, p 
31). 
 
The point Mahmood makes here is radically different from most other feminist work.  
    Many feminists (and others) might wonder whether Mahmood’s approach can still 
be defined as ‘feminist’. She herself is conscious of this fact and keeps reflecting on 
this issue. Mahmood does not want to let go of feminist criticism of patriarchy, but 
she does believe that feminists should expand their definition of criticism. This 
means that, in her view, criticism is most powerful when we leave open the 
possibility of learning something new. We should openly engage with other 
worldviews and occasionally turn the critical gaze upon ourselves (Mahmood, 2005, 
p 37). Finally, she argues for a separation of prescriptive and analytical work. We do 
not have to abandon our critical stance towards practices we consider unjust. Rather: 
 
“we should leave open the possibility that our political and analytical 
certainties might be transformed in the process of exploring non-liberal 
movements (…), that the lives of the women with whom I worked might have 
something to teach us” (Mahmood, 2005, 39). 
 
Thus, if we open up our analytical practices, we might learn something new about 
our own political standpoints.  
 
 
Negotiating Subjectivities Further 
 
Mahmood’s rethinking of agency has been a major intervention in feminist thinking. 
Her more open, conception does give feminists an instrument to better understand 
women whose lives and choices (at first sight) seem contradictory to the feminist 
project. But her work led to much criticism and it is often argued that Mahmood’s 
interpretation of agency is a threat to the feminist project. This debate cannot be 
analysed in detail here, but I do want to point out some issues that emerged from this 
debate, which might influence our thinking about multiculturalism and feminism.  
 	   116 
    The question of subjectivity has regained its prominence in feminist theory. 
Especially in relation to religion, the terms ‘subjectivity’, ‘agency’ and ‘false 
consciousness’ have become central in theoretical debates. Some criticise the turn to 
agency and its consequences. Bracke for example argues that: 
 
“it is important to investigate the theoretical work that ‘agency’ performs. A 
problematic division of labour emerges in those studies on pious women that 
take a women’s studies approach to focus on agency in contrast to mainstream 
scholarship attending to structural power relations, including women’s 
oppression. Such a division of labour effectively produces an impoverished 
understanding of agency (…) through evacuating structural constraints and 
conditions from the very notion of agency (Bracke, 2008, p 62).  
 
Bracke also mentions the work of Asad, who argues that religious agencies are often 
considered to be ‘defective, not the least because they insist on circumstances and 
reasonings ‘outside of their own will’ (Bracke, 2008). The work of Mahmood would 
be another form of such criticism, though her aim is to rethink the meaning of the 
concept of agency.  
    I believe that such ‘rethinking’ of the meaning of subjectivity is highly important 
for my project on multiculturalism and feminism. I agree with Mahmood that 
feminists need more open analytical tools in order to research these topics. However, I 
also think that, besides opening up the concept, the discussions about multiculturalism 
and feminism would benefit from a conception of subjectivity that combines a certain 
form of openness with a road to change. I believe that the work of Rosi Braidotti 
provides us with such a combination (Braidotti, 2008). While arguing that normative 
secularism is too closely connected to islamophobia, she calls for a more nuanced 
analysis of the relations between feminism and religion/spirituality. She emphasises 
the long history of feminism and spirituality (think of the work of Audre Lorde or 
Luce Irigaray) and the importance of recognising this. The interesting aspect of 
Braidotti’s definition of subjectivity is that she aims to keep subjectivity ‘political’ 
without letting it become negative or fixed. This means that her interpretation of 
subjectivity is not about producing radical counter subjectivities, but rather about 
daily practices and negotiations within dominant norms: 
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“Political subjectivity or agency therefore consists of multiple micro-political 
practices of daily activism or interventions in and on the world we inhabit for 
ourselves and our future generations” (Braidotti, 2008, p 16). 
 
By applying these different interpretations of subjectivity, it becomes possible to 
analyse the lives and experiences of religious women or women from minority 
cultures differently. Rather than evaluating their activities and choices within the 
limited framework of subordination versus liberation, more nuanced perspectives can 
be developed, with attention to daily negotiations or alternative perspectives on 
equality and liberty.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I discussed the use of experience in feminist research and the recent 
developments in the discussions about subjectivity in connection to this. In the 
introduction I quoted Susan Moller Okin, who argued that multicultural policies 
might harm the interests of minority women and that their opinion in this is often 
irrelevant and even to be ignored if they were raised in a patriarchal society. I argued 
that there are two important counterarguments in this context. First of all, there are 
many women from minority groups who are also fighting for equality (albeit in their 
own way and from within their communities) who deserve the support of (other) 
feminists and their experiences and strategies should be included in the debate about 
multiculturalism and feminism. The other argument against Okin’s statements would 
be that not all women want the freedom and equality that she fights for.  
    Standpoint theory starts from the idea that one’s location determines what one 
knows, or even what one can know (Harding, 1991). Furthermore, standpoint theorists 
argue that knowledge from a marginalised point of view could be more valuable than 
knowledge from a dominant position. In that context, the experience of women can be 
an important source in generating knowledge. But not all experiences are standpoints. 
These experiences need to be connected to articulated observations, theory or political 
ideas. However, this does make it difficult to judge which experiences are proper 
standpoints and which are ‘mere experiences’. Through the concept of situated 
knowledges, Donna Haraway takes up the main ideas of standpoint theory, but 
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without the normative statement that the oppressed know better. All knowledge is 
partial, Haraway argues, and we have to become accountable for this, for example by 
recognising the lens through which we see. In this view, social positions are not fixed 
or automatically related to resistance. Haraway plays with identities and makes the 
concept of situated knowledges more dynamic and less fixed than (most 
interpretations of) standpoint theory. This leads her to propose ‘the modest witness’ 
as knowing subject, who can tell the stories that would otherwise remain invisible.  
    I argue that both standpoint theory and situated knowledges are important 
instruments in the debates about multiculturalism and feminism. Where the first 
provides us with proper arguments to support and incorporate the struggles of 
minority women, the latter can provide an entry for the narration of alternative stories, 
such as those from women who do not necessarily want freedom or equality. This is 
not to say that situated knowledges are to be connected to relativist politics. Rather, it 
means that they can open our minds to other possibilities and relations to feminism. 
    This connects to the debates about subjectivity and agency that followed when 
Saba Mahmood published her Politics of Piety, in which she argues that feminists 
should separate their analytical work from their political ideas and that the concept of 
agency ought to be redefined. She proposes to take agency out of the subversion 
versus submission framework and to leave it more open in order to better understand 
the lives and choices of women who do not fit this structure. In an attempt to rethink 
the concept of subjectivity, without letting go of the idea of oppositional 
consciousness, Rosi Braidotti emphasises the importance of daily activism and 
interventions. These new interpretations of subjectivity, agency and knowledge 
claims provide us with essential tools to rethink the relationship between 
multiculturalism and feminism, and include the arguments, experiences and strategies 
of women who fight alternative struggles for equality as well as those of women who 
do not desire freedom or autonomy. However, this leaves unanswered questions, such 
as, how open can our definition of agency and subjectivity be without endangering 
feminist struggle? In the following chapters, this question will be taken up through an 
analysis of the feminist magazine Opzij and an analysis of group interviews with 
women. These empirically based chapters will provide for a more thorough evaluation 
of the discourses about multiculturalism and feminism in the popular media (as 
captured in Opzij) and among women involved in grass-roots organisations.  
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Chapter 5  The Debate on Multiculturalism and Feminism in the Dutch 
Media: An Analysis of the Feminist Magazine Opzij  
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters the relationship between multiculturalism and feminism has 
been discussed from various perspectives. In chapters 2 and 3, I showed that both 
multiculturalists and feminists struggle for equality, but that we find various ways of 
thinking about difference and sameness and their relation to equality both within and 
between these groups. Interpretations of the boundaries of sameness and difference in 
relation to equality are essential when we think about the relationship between 
multiculturalism and feminism. Does equality mean that we all have the same rights, 
or should we all have the right to be different? And, if we have the right to be 
different, how do we transform differences between groups into a ‘politics of 
difference’?  
    Another important aspect of the debate about multiculturalism and feminism is 
subjectivity and its relation to power and discourse. In chapter 4, I described how 
these concepts are related to the discussions about multiculturalism and feminism and 
in what way they can help us understand the issues at stake. In the popular media, it is 
often argued that Muslim women are oppressed and need to be liberated. Ayaan Hirsi 
Ali for example, wrote that Muslim women do not know what is best for them 
because oppression has become part of their lives and they have accepted it as such. 
Such remarks raise many questions about possible conceptualisations of agency, 
subjectivity, liberal freedom and discourse.  
    In this chapter I will scrutinize three years of coverage in the magazine Opzij. The 
above-mentioned concepts of difference, sameness, equality, subjectivity and 
discourse will be of much importance throughout this chapter. Moreover, I will 
undertake an in depth analysis of how the notions of multiculturalism and feminism 
are interpreted and discussed in Opzij. As will become clear in the following section, 
Opzij is the most longstanding and influential feminist monthly in the Netherlands 
and it represents the dominant approach to feminism. Furthermore, through its many 
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interviews with politicians and opinion leaders, it also makes a bridge between 
feminist views and the broader public debate. Therefore, an analysis of Opzij will give 
important insights into its specific interpretations of feminism and the relation to 
multiculturalism. This knowledge can subsequently play an important role in the 
redefinition of the relationship between feminism and multiculturalism. By bringing 
together the approaches, arguments and statements in Opzij with those of the women 
from the women’s organizations (chapter 6), an overview can be taken of the different 
arguments, perspectives and starting points of these two discourses about the 
relationship between feminism and multiculturalism. When this information is 
combined with the theories and experiences of other feminists (described in the 
previous chapters), we can map out the differences and similarities and work on a 
redefinition of the relationship between multiculturalism and feminism, in a positive 
and constructive manner. 
 
 
Opzij: a Short Introduction 
 
Opzij is a monthly magazine in the Netherlands in which various issues related to 
women, emancipation and feminism (such as work, family life and politics) are 
discussed. The first issue came out in 1972, and was an initiative of two, ‘second 
wave’ feminists: Wim Hora Adema and Hedy D’Ancona.10 It started as a rather 
radical and activist magazine, but changed over time into a more mainstream feminist 
magazine. Opzij not only produces the monthly magazine, but also organises a yearly 
emancipation event on the 8th of March, awards a yearly emancipation prize and 
supports an ‘Opzij-chair’ at the Gender Studies Department of the University in 
Maastricht. The total circulation of the magazine is 85.000 and the readers are mostly 
well-educated, well-off women, between the ages of 25 - 49. Remarkably, the website 
does not say anything about the ethnicity of the readers. I would expect the majority 
of Opzij readers to be white and secular, but this goes unstated. 
    Since September 2008, Margiet van der Linden has been the chief editor of Opzij. 
She is the successor of Cisca Dresselhuys, who held this position from 1981 to 2008. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The information in this section about the history and readers of Opzij comes from the website of the 
magazine: http://www.opzij.nl 
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Van der Linden has changed Opzij considerably. She states that the most important 
transformation is that the magazine has become more open to diversity. One of the 
examples she mentions is the Moroccan-Dutch columnist, Nora Kasrioui, who will 
write about emancipation of ‘allochtonous’ girls. This chapter does not cover these 
changes in Opzij; the sample for my analysis came from the years 2004 - 2007 when 
Cisca Dresselhuys was still the chief editor. It is important to gain more knowledge 
about the different discourses on multiculturalism and feminism in the years that these 
issues were at the top of the political agenda, and these ‘earlier years’ cover an 
important strand in the discussions about multiculturalism and feminism that needs to 
be investigated further, and taken into account in a redefinition of the relationship 
between multiculturalism and feminism in a more nuanced, dynamic and positive 
manner.  
    In the years that Cisca Dresselhuys was chief editor of Opzij, she was an important, 
well-known figure who represented the magazine in many public discussions. She 
also reached headlines regularly with her often explicit and controversial statements. 
One of the most famous of these is the previously mentioned remark she made in the 
daily newspaper de Volkskrant11 
 
“In a coffee house I don’t endure sexism; circumcision is a taboo for me and 
editors with a headscarf are not welcome at Opzij” (Dresselhuys, 2001, cited 
in: Van Gelder and Schottelndreier, 2001)12. 
 
    On its website, Opzij defines feminism as a diverse political and social movement 
and philosophy that criticises the unequal power relations between men and women 
and aims to break through traditional relations between - and positions of - men and 
women. The editors also argue that feminism has already achieved a lot; women get 
more opportunities and motherhood is not considered their only destiny anymore. 
Nevertheless, they say, this does not mean that the emancipation of women is 
‘finished’. They especially mention the group of ‘allochtonous’ women, who are still 
being discriminated against, from within their culture or religion. The editors argue 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See chapter 1 for a discussion of this quote. 
12 Original text: “In het koffiehuis verdraag ik geen seksisme, vrouwenbesnijdenis is bij mij taboe en 
redactrices met een hoofddoek komen er bij Opzij niet in.” 
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that because of the growing number of (mostly) Muslim women who now struggle for 
equality, a Third Wave13 of feminism is rising. Finally, the website of Opzij 
emphasises that only ‘allochtonous’14 women need emancipation, also ‘autochtonous’ 
women still experience discrimination on the basis of their gender.  
 
 
Sample 
 
The material I used to analyse Opzij, covers a period of time in which the relationship 
between multiculturalism and feminism was a much discussed subject: July 2004 - 
July 2007. It includes very important moments related to the topic of this research, 
such as: the first broadcast (on Dutch national television) of Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s film 
Submission (August 2004); the murder of the director of this film, Theo van Gogh 
(November 2004), and the case around the passport of Ali and her departure to the 
USA (May 2006). As I explained in chapter 1, Ayaan Hirsi Ali is generally seen as 
the dominant factor in the Dutch debates about multiculturalism and feminism (or 
gender equality), so her input and these events are also of great importance for this 
project.  
    In order to find all articles in Opzij (from July 2004 - July 2007)15 that deal with 
multiculturalism, I chose a combination of search terms that refer both to the issue in 
general (multiculturalism, religion, integration, ‘allochtonous’ and traditions) and to 
specific events or themes that have been important in the Dutch debates about 
multiculturalism (Islam, burqa, Muslim women and Ayaan Hirsi Ali).16 This resulted 
in a total of 164 articles, of which 56 were actually relevant to this research project. 
Articles were regarded as irrelevant if they only mentioned one of the search terms in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The history of feminism is often described in waves. The First Wave took place at the end of the 19th 
century and dealt mostly with basic legal issues, such as suffrage. The Second Wave was in the 1960s 
and focussed, among other things, on sexuality and other issues related to the body. Some argue that at 
this time a third wave is developing. One of	  the main themes in this wave is supposed to be Islam, but 
also economic emancipation and sexuality are mentioned in this context. For more information, see for 
instance: Henry A. 2004. Not my Mother’s Sister: Generational Conflict and Third Wave Feminism. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press and Tuin, van der I. ‘Jumping Generations: On Second- and 
Third-Wave Feminist Epistemology’. Australian Feminist Studies. Vol. 24. Nr. 59. Pp. 17-31 
14 See footnote 3 for short explanation of this term.  
15 The search was conducted electronically, through the search engine of Lexis Nexis 
16 The exact words I used are (in Dutch): multiculturalisme, religie, integratie, allochtonen, tradities, 
Islam, Moslima, boerka (and Burqa) and Ayaan (and Hirsi). 
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passing, and did not actually discuss the subject. In some cases for instance, one of 
the search terms was only mentioned once in passing in an example. The relevant 
articles can be divided into four main categories: Meetlat Interviews (interviews by 
Cisca Dresselhuys with well known men), Columns (by Jolande Withuis and Cisca 
Dresselhuys), (group) interviews and main articles (written by the editors, mostly 
about current affairs). Finally, there were a number (20) of short articles and news 
items, which were relevant but were excluded from the analysis because of their short 
length and lack of argumentation. This brings the total of articles for the analysis to 
36.  
 
 
Method of Analysis 
 
The main aim of this research is to analyse different discourses on multiculturalism 
and feminism and to develop a nuanced, dynamic and positive interpretation of the 
relationship between these concepts. For this chapter the main approach will be 
critical discourse analysis (CDA). However, in order to get a broader insight into the 
debates about these issues, I will combine this approach with an argumentation 
analysis. This latter method provides us with tools to better understand the reasoning 
behind certain standpoints in discussions. Questions that can be asked with the use of 
argumentation analysis are for example: what argument does an author use to defend 
his/her statement, what assumptions lie beneath these arguments and is the general 
argument coherent? In other words, this approach is very useful for getting a better 
understanding of the content of the disagreements in the debates. However, it does not 
tell us much about the context of the texts or the relations between texts. In other 
words, a study of the argumentation in certain articles does not help us to answer 
questions like: who is participating in the debate and who is being excluded, and are 
there any rules that prescribe a certain way of speaking? For such a broader analysis 
of the debates, I will make use of critical discourse analysis (CDA), following 
especially the work of Norman Fairclough. 
    Generally, we can call a combination of texts and images ‘a discourse’. But the 
term discourse is a highly disputed one and can be used in many different ways. In the 
introduction of Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader, Wetherell, Taylor and 
Yates mention two other possible definitions of discourse: ‘the use of language’ or 
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‘meaning-making’ (Wetherell, Taylor and Yates, 2001, p 3). In this research, I will 
apply the definition that Norman Fairclough uses in Language and Power: “language 
as social practice determined by social structures” (Fairclough, 2001, p 14). An 
important point to note here is that discourse has effects upon social structures, as 
well as being determined by them (Fairclough, 2001, p 14). I have chosen to focus on 
the work of Norman Fairclough regarding CDA because his work largely 
corresponded to my aims for this part of the analysis. The main reason for this is that 
power and power relations are central in his work. Fairclough has a background in 
linguistics but developed an approach to discourse, which is also useful for social 
scientists and philosophers. His main aim is to: 
 
“help correct a widespread underestimation of the significance of language in 
the production, maintenance, and change of social relations of power” 
(Fairclough, 2001, p 1). 
 
Social relations, he argues, are for a large part determined by linguistics, and language 
is not just a tool we use to express social processes, but part of these processes 
themselves.  
    Fairclough distinguishes two different forms of power related to discourse: power 
in discourse and power behind discourse (Fairclough, 2001, p 38-9). The first refers to 
the fact that powerful participants of discourse can control and constrain less powerful 
participants. This can be done on three different levels: content (what is or can be 
said), relations (the social relations people enter into in discourse) and subjects (the 
subject positions people can occupy). Very often, especially in the mass media, this 
power is hidden. Power behind discourse, on the other hand, refers to the social order 
of discourse; this includes things such as access. Fairclough refers in this context to 
the power of the myth of free speech. Cultural goods, such as free speech, are not 
equally distributed. In principle, he argues, everyone is free to obtain them, but in 
practice they are mostly in the hands of people from the ‘dominant bloc’ (Fairclough, 
2001, p 53). The power in and behind discourse is not just dominating or oppressive 
power; there is also struggle over this power and resistance to the dominant forces.  
    Another aspect of power and language that Fairclough discusses is the relationship 
between common sense, ideology and discourse. This part of critical discourse 
analysis is an important link to argumentation analysis, where hidden arguments or 
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statements without arguments are also central for the evaluation of a text. Fairclough 
uses a definition of common sense, which is closely related to Gramsci’s description 
of ideology. (Ideological) common sense according to Fairclough is thus: “an implicit 
philosophy in the practical activities of social life, back grounded and taken for 
granted” (Fairclough, 2001, p 70). Usually, he argues, common sense is used to 
sustain unequal power relations in an invisible way. For example the myth of free 
speech disguises and helps to maintain the actual barriers to free speech (Fairclough, 
2001, p 70). Ideologies or ideas usually become ‘common sense’ by a process of 
naturalization (Fairclough, 2001, p 76). Through such a process, an ideology loses its 
ideological image and becomes standard, or common sense. This is important for the 
analysis of this project’s discourses: are there any standpoints or arguments that seem 
common sense, but are in fact ideological?  
    An important dimension of ideological common sense is ‘meaning giving’ 
(Fairclough, 2001, p 76). Most words have different meanings, and these meanings 
often correspond to different ideological positions. When one of these meanings 
becomes the standard definition, this can be a mere coincidence, but it can also be a 
result of ideological struggle. Another point that Fairclough mentions about common 
sense is its relation to subjects and subject positions in discourses (Fairclough, 2001, 
p 85). Subject positions in discourses can also be naturalised. In medical discourse for 
instance, people who receive medical care are often called patients (Fairclough, 2001, 
p 85). But this term is usually interpreted as a sick person, often in pain, who needs 
help. A woman giving birth is called a patient, but does not really fit this term. In 
those cases more neutral terms would be more appropriate.  
    Where CDA focuses very much on the structures and power relations in and behind 
discourse, argumentation analysis deals with the content of discussions, and centres 
on disagreements and the arguments people use to solve these. In general, 
argumentation analysis aims to first scrutinise the manner in which statements are 
structured within a discursive text and secondly to assess their soundness 
(Liakopoulos, 2000, p 153). Arguments are generally considered to be verbal (either 
written or oral), social (arguments are directed towards others) and rational (they aim 
to convince a reasonable critic) (van Eemeren, Grootendortst and Snoeck Henkemans, 
2002, p xi). Furthermore, the concept of argumentation refers to arguments both as a 
product and as a process (van Eemeren, Grootendortst and Snoeck Henkemans, 2002, 
p xii). This last point means that an argumentation analyst not only looks at 
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arguments as written down in a certain text (product), but is also interested in the 
argument as part of a communication and interaction process.  
    Originally, the study of argumentation focussed on the formal aspects of 
argumentation. Aristotle for example, approached argumentation from a purely 
logical perspective (Liakopoulos, 2000, p 153). Such a formal evaluation of 
arguments does not seem to be appropriate for the analysis of current discourses. 
Mass media have changed the rules and possibilities of public discourses completely 
and require new tools of analysis. This does not mean that analyses of arguments have 
become irrelevant; with some adjustments to the approach argumentation analysis is 
still an important tool. 
    In the pragma-dialectical approach of van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 
argumentation is defined as a way of resolving differences of opinion by verbal means 
(van Eemeren, Grootendortst and Snoeck Henkemans, 2002, p ix). This means that 
they analyse argumentation as: 
 
“an explicit or (in case of a monologue) implicit discussion between two 
parties that have different positions with respect to the same proposition” (van 
Eemeren, Grootendortst and Snoeck Henkemans, 2002, p ix). 
 
Their analysis is not (only) focussed on the formal or logical structure of arguments, 
but also on situational and verbal aspects of the argumentation. Van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst evaluate arguments on two aspects: logical and pragmatic consistency. 
If two statements contradict each other, the argument is logically inconsistent. But, as 
I mentioned earlier, the authors also find it important to give attention to the more 
practical elements of argumentation. In this context they also evaluate arguments on 
the basis of pragmatic consistency. In some cases an argument might be logically 
sound, but practically impossible. For example, they argue, you cannot promise that 
you will pick someone up by car, and also say you don’t have a driver’s license.  
    In the following paragraphs I will present my approach towards the Opzij sample 
and make clear how I have combined insights from both CDA and argumentation 
analysis for my analysis of Opzij. The investigation started with two main questions 
inspired by CDA, and the sample is further analysed by taking into account the 
content and assumptions behind the argumentation. 
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Discourse Structures in Opzij 
 
After a preliminary analysis of the sample, it turned out that the articles in Opzij could 
not simply be divided on the basis of their arguments (positive or negative) regarding 
the relationship between multiculturalism and feminism. In fact, only a small part of 
the sample explicitly discussed this relationship and presented an either pessimistic or 
optimistic argument about it. In the other articles, only a specific facet of this 
relationship was focussed upon. This focus was often a dilemma, a problem to be 
resolved or something that needed to be changed, according to the author or 
interviewee. Definitions of multiculturalism, feminism and their relationship were 
taken for granted and hence not further investigated. In one article for instance, the 
author asks herself the question: why do (Muslim) women decide to wear a 
headscarf? (Bochhah, 2006). So even though the author does not write about the 
actual relation between multiculturalism and feminism, she does refer to the 
connections between religion and gender. Since viewpoints on the latter are strongly 
connected to the former, the author is implicitly engaging in the debate about 
multiculturalism and feminism. Explicitly however, the focus of the article (and hence 
the argument) is the decision of young Muslim women to wear or not wear a 
headscarf.  
    The fact that most articles did not have an explicit argument on the relationship 
between multiculturalism and feminism (but rather make a statement about a related 
topic, based on a certain, often not explained, interpretation of this relationship) was 
not only an important first conclusion of the preliminary investigation of Opzij, but 
also a complicating factor for further analysis of the sample. Hence, not only explicit 
arguments about multiculturalism and feminism turned out to be relevant for the 
research, but also much more implicit ones. In that context, argumentation analysis 
theory and its methods to investigate assumptions were very important for my 
approach towards the sample. But, as I explain in the previous section, I also wanted 
to include power relations in my analysis. In order to get a better understanding of the 
Opzij discourse on multiculturalism and feminism, I decided to focus on 2 basic 
questions from discourse analysis. First of all, who or what is the object of the 
article/statement? Or, to make it more concrete: who or what needs change according 
to the author or interviewee? This question was followed with two sub-questions: who 
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or what is considered as the problem and who or what as the solution? The answers to 
these questions result in a rich overview of the arguments in Opzij articles when it 
comes to multiculturalism and feminism. These results are much more detailed than 
would have been the case if I had only looked at the basic evaluation of this relation 
as either positive or negative. Instead we get to know who or what is focussed upon in 
the articles and what are considered to be the problems and/or solutions. This way, the 
different interpretations and assumptions related to the relationship between 
multiculturalism and feminism can be analysed and eventually, with the use of this 
knowledge, a more constructive reading of the connections between these concepts 
can be theorized and discussed.  
    After analysing the sample with the first question, 6 categories or answers could be 
distinguished: feminism (or feminists), Muslim women, Islam (or Muslim traditions), 
Dutch society (or government), the style of debating and finally the relationship 
between multiculturalism and feminism. As I mentioned above, all 6 categories refer 
to an aspect of the relationship between multiculturalism and feminism, which was 
focussed upon in a particular article (or part of an article). Of course one could think 
of possible other facets of this relationship but they could not be found as such in 
Opzij. The last two categories (style of debate and relationship between 
multiculturalism and feminism) were discussed in more articles than the other ones, 
but most of the categories were discussed in approximately equal amounts. 
Remarkable is that all comments on the category ‘Dutch society’ come from the male 
interviewees from the Meetlat series. None of the other Opzij articles contained any 
statements about how Dutch society should deal with multiculturalism. Another issue 
that could be noted at this point is that most remarks about the ‘style of debating’ 
were related to (the work of) particular people; especially Ayaan Hirsi Ali was 
mentioned often.  
    In the first category feminism is the main theme. The main question addressed 
within this group of articles is: how should feminism deal with difference related 
issue? The second category focuses upon Muslim women. Articles in this section do 
not try to answer a similar question to those in the first, but rather discuss the issue: 
why do Muslim women make certain decisions with regard to religion/culture? The 
clear difference in focus between these two categories will be analysed later in this 
chapter. The third category is Islam/Muslim traditions. Articles in this section contain 
a statement about this religion or its religious traditions and use gender equality or 
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feminism as an argument to back this. Articles in the fourth group centre on the 
question: how should Dutch society deal with the relationship between 
multiculturalism and feminism? In these articles, very often a particular interpretation 
of this relation is already assumed and used for another argument. Articles on the 
‘style of debating’ fall into the fifth category. These usually contain remarks about 
either the harshness or the weakness of certain debates, strategies or statements. 
Finally, in the last group the relationship between multiculturalism and feminism 
itself is focused upon. This category is divided between positive and negative 
arguments about the connection between these concepts.  
    At first glance it might be difficult to recognise the different categories mentioned 
above, for instance the distinction between an argument on ‘Islam’ and one on ‘the 
relationship between multiculturalism and gender equality’. Theoretically however, 
there is a clear difference. The first statement only refers to Islam (as for instance 
traditional, backwards, radical, et cetera), and uses women or gender equality as a 
basis for this:  
 
1. Islam is …… because of the gender relations 
 
The second type of statement refers to the relationship between multiculturalism and 
gender equality as good or bad and then uses certain traditions, for instance, as 
arguments: 
  
 2. Multiculturalism is good/bad for gender equality because ……. 
 
Hence, the second category tries to argue in favour of, or against, the so called tension 
between gender equality and multiculturalism, while the first already assumes certain 
gender patterns and makes another statement on the basis of that.  
    The analysis of the 6 categories of Opzij articles/statements resulted in a broad 
range of conclusions on how the relationship between multiculturalism and feminism 
is discussed in this magazine. Most arguments and disagreements were related to the 
authors’ interpretations of the main concepts of this research: feminism and 
multiculturalism. Furthermore, there was a considerable amount of statements found 
on discourse itself. In order to make it possible to both critically analyse these 
conclusions and keep the chapter readable, I have chosen to divide the chapter into 
 	   130 
three main sections: the terms of the debate, feminism and emancipation and finally 
multicultural issues. This structure also makes the results more comparable with those 
in the next chapter. It does mean however, that the descriptions of the first results 
(problems and solutions that were put forward in the 6 categories of articles) can only 
be found in the chapter in a summarized form. 
 
 
Use of Main Terms in the Public Debate 
 
In chapter 2, I described what is generally understood by multiculturalism: an 
ideology that values the existence of different cultures in a certain society and aims to 
protect these by, for instance, proposing laws to safeguard their languages or 
traditions. I also explained that there are many possible interpretations of 
multiculturalism; for instance liberal or critical multiculturalism (see chapter 2 for a 
discussion of several different forms of multiculturalism). Furthermore, the different 
terms multiculturalism and multicultural are often confused. While the latter is only 
descriptive, as it refers to societies with various cultures, the former is the normative 
response to that fact and aims to respect and protect these different cultures.  
    If multiculturalism is about protecting (minority) cultural groups, how then could 
the sample mostly refer to only one particular group and one which is not only 
defined as a cultural collective, but also as religious? The public debates in the 
Netherlands at this moment about minorities and the recognition of difference are 
mostly about Muslims. In that sense, this sample follows the broader development.17 I 
have already discussed this in the previous chapters; here I would like to repeat two 
main issues connected to equating multicultural issues with Islam-related issues. Note 
that this means not only culture and religion being very often confused, but also that 
the whole debate about cultural recognition has been reduced to just one particular 
group. Moreover, the majority is almost completely excluded from most debates, as if 
they do not play a role. Two important issues that are connected to this are: (1) a 
transformation in the discourse about migrants: from guest workers to Muslims, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Note that in this chapter the analysis reflects the interpretation of multiculturalism in Opzij and thus 
focuses very much on Muslims. In the following chapters, I will look at this restricted definition more 
critically and explore other interpretations of multiculturalism.  
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(2) a (re)new(ed) definition of the Dutch identity, very much related to secularism.18 
(See chapter 2 for a more detailed description of these developments.)  
    For the Opzij sample I used general terms such as ‘multiculturalism’, ‘culture’ and 
‘religion’, but also specific ones like ‘Muslim women’, ‘Ayaan Hirsi Ali’ and ‘the 
headscarf’. I did this to capture both the articles that are actually about 
multiculturalism and cultural recognition, and also the more particular articles. This 
way, I tried to balance the different interpretations of and discussions about 
multiculturalism, cultural recognition and integration. As a researcher one does not 
want to confuse multiculturalism, foreign cultures, and religion etc, but at the same 
time one aims to capture the debate as it is, with all its problematic assumptions. This 
means that in the rest of the chapter, I will sometimes refer to multiculturalism, 
culture and/or religion simultaneously. This is not because I think these concepts have 
the same or a similar meaning, but because the authors and interviewees in Opzij use 
the terms together, or because they can be placed in the context of the broader public 
debates on these issues where the terms are also mixed up. In the next chapter (with 
focus groups interviews) I will focus on these different terms more accurately and 
describe and analyse how the women from women’s organisations define and 
experience them.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See chapter 2 for a more elaborate discussion of these issues. Also the following articles contain 
interesting analyses of the changing discourse in the Netherlands: R. Peters. 2006. ‘‘A dangerous 
book’: Dutch Public Intellectuals and the Koran’. RSCAS Working Paper No 2006/39. European 
University Institute. Also online available: 
http://home.medewerker.uva.nl/r.peters/bestanden/Dangerous%20book.pdf and M. Bruinessen. 2006. 
‘After van Gogh: Roots of Anti-Muslim Rage’. Paper Presented at the seventh Mediterranean Social 
and Political Research Meeting, Florence, Italy. Also online available: 
http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/ws10-2006MM-van-Bruinessen.pdf 
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Terms of the Debate: Discourse on Discourse 
 
At the beginning of this chapter, I explained how important it is to look at the 
relationship between multiculturalism and feminism from a discursive perspective. 
We have to investigate the way people discuss the relationship between 
multiculturalism and gender equality and emancipation: which issues are discussed 
and which are not, and who is talking and whom are they talking about? Take for 
instance the Dutch words ‘allochtoon’ and ‘autochtoon’. These apparently neutral 
terms officially refer to the ‘country of origin’ of a person. Implicitly however, they 
are closely connected to race or skin colour (Wekker, 2005, p. 4). It is still difficult to 
imagine a black person as an ‘autochtoon’, even though there are more and more 
people of colour born in the Netherlands for whom this is their ‘country of origin’. 
For that reason, I also analyse and compare different discourses on the relationship 
between multiculturalism and feminism in this thesis. For this chapter this means that 
I scrutinize who is talking about whom in Opzij. The chapter is mainly structured by 
two main questions: who/what is presented as a problem and what solutions are 
presented?  
    Various difficulties arise when one aims to conduct a discursive analysis, most 
importantly the position of the researcher. I do not consider myself to be outside of 
discourse and am not claiming to make an objective or outsider’s analysis of the 
articles in Opzij. However, by committing to asking these two basic questions, I do 
aim to produce a more structural understanding of the debates on multiculturalism and 
feminism in our society. And by asking these questions, I came to an interesting (first) 
conclusion: the authors and interviewees in Opzij were themselves also making 
discursive analyses. There were many statements to be found in the articles about the 
style of debating. People mostly argued that this mode was either too soft or too 
harsh. Interestingly, this discursive perspective on the debates about multiculturalism 
has now also become part of the debate itself. With this I mean that participants of a 
certain discourse mention the way people discuss culture-related issues as an 
argument for their statement. 
    This conclusion closely relates to the work of Baukje Prins on the Dutch debates on 
multiculturalism. Prins argues that the harsh discussions of multiculturalism 
 	   133 
demonstrate that a new type of public discourse has arisen in the Netherlands since 
the 1990s (Prins, 2004). According to her, this ‘neo-realist’ genre can be recognised 
by four main characteristics (Prins, 2002). First of all, authors or speakers in this 
discourse present themselves as persons ‘who dare to face the facts’; secondly, neo-
realists believe to be representing ‘normal people’. A third characteristic of the genre 
is the belief that having ‘a sense of reality’ is an important part of Dutch national 
identity and finally, neo-realists can be recognised by their aversion to the political 
left. In general, gender equality and women’s issues are important elements in neo-
realist discourses.  
    I find these characteristics very typical of the recent debates in the Netherlands on 
multiculturalism and Islam and have found similar arguments in Opzij. However, the 
opposite arguments were also there; some people stated for example that more respect 
is needed in these debates. In the following section I will present both types of 
arguments and finally discuss a specific subject of discursive arguments: Ayaan Hirsi 
Ali. In many cases, authors or interviewees did not mention any general aspects of the 
discourse, but explicitly evaluated the approache of Ali. Note that Ayaan Hirsi Ali is 
the only individual who is the subject of such enquiry, regarding the approach she 
takes.   
 
 
‘Dare to Face the Facts’  
 
The clearest example of ‘neo-realism’ in Opzij can be found in the conversation of 
Cisca Dresselhuys with politician Geert Wilders. When the chief editor confronts 
Wilders with his remark on women who wear headscarves (“I could eat them raw” 19), 
he replies: 
 
“That is of course metaphorical language. Just as when I said that the 
Netherlands are hit by a tsunami of Islamisation. But I do mean it and I would 
say the same thing again tomorrow. (…) I wouldn’t physically attack these 
women. But in the indolent political The Hague you have to say things 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Original text: “Die lust ik rauw” 
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sharply, otherwise you will not get a discussion. In that case nobody would 
have listened and I couldn’t have made my point, believe me. It would have 
disappeared in the big grey mincing machine.”20 (Wilders, 2007, cited in: 
Dresselhuys, 2007) 
 
Hence, according to Wilders you have to be very clear and provocative if you want to 
be heard. This fits perfectly with Prins’ remarks about neo-realists and their drive to 
‘say what is really happening’ and to ‘face the facts’. Furthermore, because of his 
particular use of language he clearly provokes people. Not only does his statement 
about women with headscarves not show much respect for these women, or open up 
any dialogue about this issue, he explicitly works on people’s emotions. By 
comparing Islam to the tsunami of 2004, he evokes fear among people. We can all 
remember the horrible images of the tsunami, and can easily imagine how destructive 
another ‘tsunami’ could be.  
    Fiction writer and columnist Nahed Selim also believes that we should be more 
direct in the debates about multiculturalism, but she argues from a different 
perspective than Geert Wilders. Selim is a Muslim woman, originally from Egypt, 
who is known for her critical views on Islam and certain Muslim traditions. She refers 
to the title of her new book (staying silent is the same as betrayal) when she says:  
 
“I feel abandoned by both the majority of the Dutch Muslims, who do not 
speak about intolerable customs in their culture, and by left wing people such 
as Geert Mak. That he mentioned Ayaan in one breath with Goebbels is 
inadmissible. Left wing people have criticised everything themselves in the 
sixties and seventies, also their own faith, but if Ayaan and I criticise Islam, 
they stop us by saying: it used to be the same with  us. As if that means that 
we can’t criticise it anymore.”21 (Selim, 2006) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Orignal text: “Dat is natuurlijk beeldspraak. Net zoals toen ik zei dat er een tsunami van islamisering 
over Nederland komt. Maar ik meen het wel, en zou het morgen weer precies hetzelfde zeggen. Ik zal 
die vrouwen heus niet te lijf gaan. In het gezapige politieke Den Haag moet je de dingen scherp 
zeggen, anders krijg je geen discussie. Dan had niemand ernaar geluisterd en was het punt nooit 
gemaakt, geloof mij. Dan was het verdwenen in de grote, grijze gehaktmolen.” 
21 Orginal text: “Ik voel me niet alleen in de steek gelaten door de meerderheid van de Nederlandse 
moslimbevolking, die zwijgt over ontoelaatbare praktijken binnen hun cultuur, maar ook door linkse 
mensen als Geert Mak. Dat hij Ayaan in een adem met Goebbels heeft genoemd, is ontoelaatbaar. 
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This rich quote refers to many of the subjects of this chapter, such as solidarity with 
Muslim women (see the next section). But above all, it makes a statement about what 
can be said and what cannot be said in the view of Selim. Contrary to Geert Wilders 
however, she does not literally say that we should be more direct in our discussions 
and she also seems less provocative than Wilders. But what the two writers share is an 
explicit (neo-realist) purpose to ‘face the facts’. They both believe that certain things 
are obscured in the Netherlands and should be revealed. Furthermore, Selim adds 
Prins’ fourth characteristic of neo-realism to the discussion: critique of ‘the Left’.  
She disapproves of certain left-wing standpoints related to cultural and religious 
issues and regrets left-wing politicians’ attitudes when it comes to these themes. She 
makes her argument more explicit in the following quote, in which she criticises 
socialist feminist Anja Meulenbelt, who wrote on her web log that Selim “polarizes 
and splits”. According to Selim:  
 
“You polarize when you don’t fight customs in Muslim culture that are 
unfriendly to women. (…). I do not polarize, the Qu’ran does. Look at what it 
says about Jews, Christians and non-believers. It is about time to distance 
ourselves from that. Just as from the sexist texts in it. Feminist Muslim 
women such as Amina Wadud and Rifat Hassan have tried to explain these in 
a women friendly way, but in reality that is like fiddling with language.”22 
(Selim, 2006) 
 
    In the first quote Selim focussed upon the left-wing people who try to stop her from 
criticising Islam, in this one she pleads for taking a more active stand against women-
unfriendly customs and texts in Islam/Qur’an. Again, Selim’s words resemble the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Linkse mensen hebben in de jaren zestig en zeventig zelf alles aan de kaak gesteld, ook hun eigen 
geloof, maar als Ayaan en ik kritiek op de islam hebben, snoeren ze ons de mond met: bij ons was het 
vroeger ook zo. Alsof wij daarom geen kritiek meer mogen hebben.” 
22 Original text: “Je polariseert juist als je vrouwvijandige praktijken in de moslimcultuur niet bestrijdt. 
Niet ik polariseer, de Koran polariseert. Kijk maar wat daar allemaal voor nare dingen over joden, 
christenen en ongelovigen in staan. Het wordt hoog tijd daar afstand van te nemen. Net zoals van de 
vrouwvijandige teksten erin. Feministische moslima's als Amina Wadud en Rifat Hassan hebben 
geprobeerd die toch vrouwvriendelijk uit te leggen, maar eigenlijk is dat een beetje sjoemelen met 
taal.” 
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‘dare to face the facts’ style of (other) neo-realists. Moreover, her remark about 
Muslim feminists who try to develop alternative interpretations of the Qur’an is rather 
provocative. She excludes possible opponents to her argument by dismissing them 
without any (proper) arguments. This also shows that Selim herself starts from a 
rather fixed interpretation of what religion is and what the message of the Qur’an is. 
Hence, those who are imagining other interpretations of what religion means to them, 
or what the message of the Qur’an could be, are only “fiddling with language”.  
    One might expect neo-realists to be white, middle-aged and conservative men. But 
here and later, we can also recognise aspects of this discourse in the words of Nahed 
Selim and Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Not only are these actors in the debates women, but they 
were also born into Muslim families. This raises important questions in relation to 
finding more nuanced ways of thinking about Islam and women specifically, or 
feminism and multiculturalism in general. In the article Feminism, Democracy and 
empire, Saba Mahmood discusses the autobiographical genre that has become very 
popular and deals with the so-called problematic relation between Islam and women’s 
rights. Not only does Mahmood expose the symbiotic relationship between the 
authors in this genre and conservative political parties, she also shows how these 
books legitimise Islamophobia in Europe and the US by making use of an Orientalist 
discourse. Orientalism, according to Mahmood, “reproduces and confirms the 
impressions of its Western audience, offering no surprises or challenges to what they 
think they already know” (Mahmood, 2008, p 93). In my view, Mahmood explains 
with this article how important it is to make nuanced analyses of these issues and to 
take into account various power relations. Among other things this means that we 
need to engage with and respect certain forms of religiosity and not reject these as 
false consciousness (Mahmood, 2008).  At the same time, we need to let go of 
essentialist interpretations of ‘The Muslim woman’s voice’, and think from the 
concept of situated knowledge’s as I described in chapter 4. This way we can better 
understand remarks such as those from Nahed Selim. Even though at first sight her 
argument seems to be a marginalised one, a more thorough analysis of the power 
relations at stake combined with an evaluation of her standpoint in the debate (rather 
than thinking from her identity), shows that Selim’s statements do not deviate from 
the dominant discourse.   
    I would like to conclude that the neo-realist discourse, as described by Baukje 
Prins, is apparent in the articles of Opzij. Especially, the argument of ‘daring to face 
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the facts’ returns several times. Note that this is not just a statement about the mode of 
discourse, but is also used to dismiss opponents. The disagreement is framed as a 
situation in which one side ‘dares to face the facts’ while the other is ‘blinded’, for 
example by faith in multiculturalism or respect for other cultures/religions. This frame 
makes it almost impossible to actually discuss the content of the disagreements at 
stake. 
 
 
An Alliance of Gentle Powers 
 
Only one person in Opzij (besides the comments on Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s style) explicitly 
pleads for more respect and understanding in the discussions about integration and 
multiculturalism:  
 
“I am in favour of an alliance of gentle powers, a vote against the politics of 
fear and polarisation. My field, feminist ethics, can contribute to this. In this 
field, it is argued that dialogue and communication will get us further than the 
current polarisation of positions. I don’t care that this sounds old fashioned, 
also in the field of emancipation you achieve more by keep talking to each 
other and really listening to others.”23 (Sevenhuijsen, 2005, cited in: 
Dresselhuys 2005b) 
 
This quote shows that Sevenhuijsen opposes the harsh style of debating in the 
Netherlands when it comes to the subject of emancipation and integration. Contrary to 
the previous authors, she believes that ‘saying out loud what is really happening’, or 
as Ayaan Hirsi Ali once called it, ‘the right to offend’24 is not an efficient approach 
when it comes to issues related to culture and religion. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Orignal text: “Ik ben juist in deze tijd voor een verbond van de zachte krachten, tegenstem tegen de 
politiek van angst en polarisering. Mijn vakgebied, de feministische ethiek, kan daaraan een bijdrage 
leveren. Die stelt dat je met dialoog en communicatie veel verder komt dan met de huidige verharding 
van standpunten. Het kan me geen bal schelen dat dat ouderwets klinkt, ook op emancipatiegebied 
bereik je het meest door in gesprek te blijven en echt naar elkaar te luisteren.” 
24 Ali A. Hirsi. 2006. The Right to Offend. Unpublished speech, Berlin, 9 February, see for full text 
e.g.: http://www.nrc.nl/opinie/article215732.ece 
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Ayaan Hirsi Ali: Criticism and Support 
 
Among the many remarks in Opzij that especially refer to Ayaan Hirsi Ali and her 
approach we can find various examples of people who find her too harsh and of those 
who appreciate her because of her approach. Moreover, there are also numerous 
remarks in Opzij on her strategy in general.  
    Two examples of people who support Ayaan Hirsi Ali and agree with her 
approaches are Hafid Bouazza and Jolande Withuis. In the following quotes we can 
find several arguments that correspond to those mentioned above about the style of 
the debates. Hafid Bouazza argues for instance:  
 
“I support Ayaan and her approach a hundred percent, because I believe that 
the injustice she wants to fight is many times more important and bigger than 
the hurt feelings of a segment of the population or the honour of a religion. 
That the style she chooses would not be good, is in my view an empty 
discussion that ignores the true issues we are talking about: the liberation of 
Muslim women.”25 (Bouazza, 2004, cited in: Dresselhuys, 2004b) 
 
Even though he does not say it literally, Bouazza’s argument is connected to the 
‘daring to face the facts’ category: we should stop taking into account the feelings of 
migrant groups and start focussing on what is ‘actually happening’ in our society. But 
his remarks are also related to another issue: the relationship between language and 
pain, or the ability of language to hurt people. In Excitable speech, Judith Butler 
argues not only that language can indeed create wounds, but also links this to current 
debates on freedom of expression. In the foreword of the Dutch translation of her 
book, she argues that we should not make Theo van Gogh or his murder a symbol of a 
senseless cultural war between people who defend ‘freedom’ and those who defend 
‘religion’ (Butler, 2007). According to Butler, such a cultural war much too easily 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Original text: “Ik sta voor honderd procent achter Ayaan en haar aanpak, omdat ik vind dat het 
onrecht dat zij wil bestrijden vele malen belangrijker en groter is dan de gekwetstheid van een 
bevolkingsgroep of de eer van een religie. Dat de vorm die zij kiest soms niet goed zou zijn, vind ik 
een loze discussie die voorbijgaat aan waar het werkelijk om gaat: de bevrijding van de moslimvrouw.” 
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results in a war between those people who want others to adjust to certain values and 
those who desire a diverse Europe. If we take the first route, and interpret ‘freedom’ 
in such a limited way, ‘freedom’ runs the risk of becoming an instrument for the 
oppression of minorities. Through Butler’s remarks, we can connect Bouazza’s quote 
to two issues: the ability of language to hurt and the relationship between freedom (of 
expression) and the rights of certain (religious) minority groups. Both play an 
important role in the discussions about the relationship between multiculturalism and 
feminism. I will go into these themes in more detail in my concluding chapter. 
Finally, it is too often assumed that only religious people ‘get hurt’ by certain 
language. This has become a very important argument in the discussions about Islam, 
and needs further investigation. Among other things for example, we need more 
research on the sensibilities of secular people and how they influence social norms in 
society.  
    Jolande Withuis also talks about sensibilities, but she does not mention the pain of 
religious people. Instead her focus is more on those who defend certain cultural 
groups:  
 
“Hirsi Ali [has] accomplished more than them [her colleagues, EM], with their 
long years of trying to hold things together. Because, let’s be honest: a few 
years ago it was simply a taboo to even whisper that Muslim women were 
maybe a tiny bit oppressed. After all, they were very happy in ‘their 
culture’.”26 (Withuis, 2004) 
 
These rather cynical words support Ayaan Hirsi Ali and criticise those who, for 
example, argue that Islam and feminism are compatible. Just as in the quotes above, 
Withuis’ dismisses her opponents completely. Judging from this quote, there does not 
seem much space for dialogue. I will return to the issue (supporting Muslim women) 
in the next section (on feminism). 
    According to these authors, Ali’s approach might be provocative, but it is certainly 
also efficient and legitimate. There were also articles in Opzij in which the opposite 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Original text: “Hirsi Ali [heeft] in korte tijd meer bereikt dan zij [haar collega’s, EM] met hun 
jarenlang pappen en nat houden. Want laten we wel wezen: een paar jaar geleden was het simpelweg 
taboe ook maar te fluisteren dat wellicht moslimvrouwen heel misschien een heel klein beetje werden 
onderdrukt. Die waren immers dolgelukkig in 'hun cultuur'.”  
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was argued. One of the most explicit quotes came from writer and historian Geert 
Mak. He wrote a booklet about the days after the death of Theo van Gogh in 2005 
(Dresselhuys, 2005c)27. This small book also contained serious criticism of Ayaan 
Hirsi Ali’s position in these debates in general and the film Submission specifically. 
In an interview with this historian, Cisca Dresselhuys asks him to reflect on this: 
 
“I was very angry with her, indeed because of Submission. I find that film a 
dangerous provocation. Of course I don’t compare her with Goebbels. I 
compare certain techniques of propaganda in film with each other. Whether I 
would keep that comparison in the reprint of my leaflet? The politician in me 
says: no. The stubborn historian says: yes. A man can compare different 
techniques, can’t he? I would try to find other examples too now.”28 (Mak, 
2005, cited in: Dresselhuys, 2005c) 
 
    Interestingly, Mak criticises Ali’s approach for being too provocative by criticising 
her work in a rather provocative way: comparing her film techniques with those of an 
important WWII Nazi propagandist. When Dresselhuys asks him what he thinks of 
Ayaan personally he is more careful and says that she is a “forerunner who runs too 
fast”; if she really wants to achieve something she should start building bridges with 
her target groups, according to this historian (Mak, 2005, cited in: Dresselhuys, 
2005c).29 Mak believes that Ali should get more involved with her target group and 
thus listen more to what they want and need. 
    The final remarks on Ayaan Hirsi Ali that I would like to put forward here come 
from a group interview with some of her ‘European colleagues’. All these women 
fight oppressive customs in Islam, but their styles and approaches differ 
tremendously. One of them explicitly mentions Ali’s style:   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See chapter 1 for more information on his argument. 
28 Original text: “Ik was woedend op haar, inderdaad vanwege Submission. Die film vond ik een linke 
provocatie. Natuurlijk vergelijk ik haar niet met Goebbels, ga weg, zeg. Maar ik vergelijk bepaalde 
technieken van propaganda bedrijven via film met elkaar. Of ik die vergelijking zou handhaven in een 
herdruk van mijn pamphlet? De politicus in mij zegt: nee. Het koppige historische mannetje zegt: ja. 
Een mens mag bepaalde technieken toch we met elkaar vergelijken? Ik zou nu wel naar meer andere 
voorbeelden zoeken.”  
29 Orignal text: “Als ze daar nog iets wil betekenen, moet ze als de sodemieter bruggen slaan naar haar 
echte achterban: de moslimvrouwen. Ze is een voorloper, maar ze holt te ver vooruit.” 
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“The way the Dutch parliamentarian directs the integration discussions, is too 
provocative (…) ‘She only evokes resistance; Muslim women do not feel 
addressed by her. Hirsi Ali makes the right diagnoses, but would accomplish 
more by talking about reformation’.”30 (Kelek, cited in: Kraaijo, van Vliet, and 
Wiemand, 2005) 
 
Note, that like Geert Mak, Kelek connects the provocative style to the lack of contact 
with Muslim women and non-efficiency. This specific aspect of the relationship 
between multiculturalism will be focussed upon in the next section. At this point I 
want to point out that Ayaan Hirsi Ali is constantly evaluated on the basis of her 
approach and style. Again, it shows the importance of investigating discourse and the 
way people discuss certain issues. Ayaan Hirsi Ali is not only an actor in the debates 
about Islam and emancipation, but also an object. People very explicitly talked about 
her and her approach, often with extreme words. I will come back to this in the next 
chapter; in the focus groups Ayaan Hirsi Ali also formed an important part of the 
conversations.  
    To conclude, I would like to point out that this combination of quotes shows that 
the way we discuss multiculturalism and feminism is a very important aspect of the 
debate itself. In other words, the style of the actors in the debate is often used as an 
argument and hence becomes more and more mingled with the content, or with what 
can and cannot be said. In many articles and interviews it is mentioned that people 
either are too provocative or not direct enough. Very often too, these statements are 
used to back up or criticise certain arguments or strategies. It is important to note that 
such framings of the debate exclude certain speakers, not because of their arguments, 
but because of their style.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Original text: “De manier waarop de Nederlandse parlementarier het integratiedebat voert, vindt 
Kelek te provocerend. 'Ze roept alleen maar weerstand op, moslimvrouwen voelen zich door haar niet 
aangesproken. Hirsi Ali stelt een juiste diagnose, maar zou meer bereiken door over hervormingen te 
spreken.”  
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Feminism, Female Agency and Experience 
 
This section will focus on the interpretations and conceptualisations of feminism and 
emancipation in Opzij articles. How does this magazine define feminism and what 
standpoints are considered to be feminist and which not? In the following, I will 
present an analysis of articles about feminism and Muslim women. These two sets of 
articles are discussed here because they both argue for or against a certain 
interpretation of what feminism is or when women are emancipated. One could argue 
that the main question in this section is: who is included in the feminist ‘us’ and who 
is excluded from this?  
     It appeared that the first group of articles on ‘feminism’ particularly addressed the 
question: how should feminism deal with difference in general, or multiculturalism 
and religion specifically? Notice that the question that Opzij authors/interviewees 
discuss here is rather ideological: they are theorizing feminist approaches and 
strategies. In the second group of articles on Muslim women, however, I did not 
encounter a similar focus. Instead, when Opzij articles discussed ‘Muslim women’, 
the main question was: why do these women make certain choices? This means that 
the articles on feminism share a common goal: theorizing feminism. The articles on 
Muslim women on the other hand seem to have another aim: understanding Muslim 
women. This suggests a discrepancy between feminists and Muslim women. 
Apparently these are two separated groups. The assumption behind this seems to be 
that feminism is white and secular and that Muslim women are not feminists. This 
division plays an important role throughout the following analysis.  
    Another point that needs to be addressed before moving to the further analysis of 
these articles is the use and abuse of standpoint theories. In my view, one of the main 
disagreements revolves around the question: who can decide what a feminist 
standpoint is, or is not? On many occasions, remarks are found that refer either to a 
lack or to a surplus of contact with certain groups of women. Can feminists develop 
general ideas about what feminism is, or should they be more open to the experiences 
and opinions of women? The discussions in this group of articles are directly related 
to the debates about standpoint theory as described in chapter 4. The essential 
question in this section is, when we talk about experience, whose experience do we 
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mean? Those who want to take experiences into account seem to refer to a specific, 
rather political, interpretation of standpoint theory. They do not propose to ask 
‘average’ women what they think of certain issues, but, for instance, propose to work 
more closely with Muslim feminists. The opponents of this approach on the other 
hand, often mention a much more individual interpretation of ‘taking women’s 
experiences into account’. Below, I will present the different views of experience and 
feminist standpoints, followed by an analysis of the statements about solidarity.  
 
 
Feminist Standpoints 
 
In her two columns around the issue of how feminism should deal with 
multiculturalism, Jolande Withuis puts forward two main problems related to the 
‘experience issue’. The first is ‘historical’ and the second is about current feminists in 
the field of gender studies.  
    In ‘Strijdbaar en Superieur’ (‘warrior like and superior’) Withuis writes about the 
struggle of a ‘first wave’ feminist and shows why feminists should defend their own 
struggles, instead of asking average women what they want: in 1917, 43.000 Christian 
women signed the petition ‘do not give us the right to vote (Withuis, 2006). 
Nevertheless, Withuis argues, nobody would now dare to say that feminists at that 
time should have changed their views on voting. According to Withuis: 
 
“This historical fact teaches us (…) that religions can change (…); it teaches 
us that Christianity is not less hostile to women than Islam is. Furthermore, it 
reminds us that also the pioneers of the first wave sometimes did not get 
support from the women whose interests they defended.”31 (Withuis, 2006) 
 
Hence, according to Withuis, feminists do not need the approval of all women for 
their struggles; in some cases they should just fight for what they think is right. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Original text: “Dit historisch gegeven leert ons (…) dat religies kunnen veranderen (…); het leert ons 
tevens dat het christendom niet minder vrouwvijandig was dan de islam. Bovendien herinnert het ons 
eraan dat ook de pioniersters van de eerste golf soms geen steun kregen van vrouwen wier belangen zij 
verdedigden.” 
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question that comes to mind here is: when is a female argument a feminist one? Or, 
which standpoints count as feminist? Withuis argues that feminists do not need the 
approval of all women, but who says that feminists do? In the debates about, for 
example, the approach of Ayaan Hirsi Ali, we find the argument that she is not 
working with any other Muslim women, but nobody talked about approval. It seems 
that, just as in the previous section, Withuis tries to exclude her opponents from the 
discussions by referring to extreme arguments. Unfortunately this rules out the option 
of a possible fruitful debate about standpoint theory.  
    In ‘Meninkjes’ (‘little opinions’) Withuis expands on the issue of ‘approval’. The 
problem, in her view, is that researchers constantly refer to the fact that we should 
listen to the opinions of Muslim women, instead of criticising certain categories, such 
as Muslims and non-Muslims. The argument she gives for this statement is that 
oppressed people are not always open to liberation:  
     
“If someone argues that ‘Muslim women want to wear a headscarf’, I not only 
see the veiled 10 year olds, but also Aafke Komter’s De macht van de 
vanzelfsprekendheid  (The Power of the self evident). After this analysis of 
invisible power differences in marriages, the phrase ‘what they want 
themselves’ is an empty slogan. Komter shows that something as simple as ‘to 
want something yourself’ does not exist: the least powerful people give shape 
to their desires through those of the powerful and experience those as their 
own.”32 (Withuis, 2005a).  
 
According to Withuis, it is meaningless to think about ‘what women themselves 
want’, because there is no such thing as ‘wanting yourself’. I must agree with her that 
people are indeed shaped by the society they live in. The question is however, 
whether Withuis is criticising the concept of autonomy and starting a (legitimate) 
discussion from there, or whether she is using the argument to claim that certain 
people cannot critically judge their own decisions? It is difficult to answer this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Original text: “Als wordt betoogd dat 'moslima's zelf een hoofddoek willen', zie ik behalve bedekte 
tienjarigen ook Aafke Komters De macht van de vanzelfsprekendheid voor me. Na die ontleding van 
de onzichtbare machtsongelijkheid in huwelijken is 'wat ze zelf willen' een frase. Komter liet zien dat 
zoiets eenduidigs als 'zelf willen' niet bestaat: de minst machtige vormt langs velerlei mentale 
sluipwegen haar wensen naar die van de machtige en ervaart die vervolgens als eigen.” 
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question based on these two quotes only, but it does appear that Withuis is not 
referring to her own ability to make decisions here. 
    To summarise, Withuis argues that discussions about religion and culture too often 
end up with statements from certain (multiculturalist) feminists about the experiences 
and opinions of the women who live in these communities. She believes that this is 
not the right approach for feminists. First of all, she says, we have historical examples 
that show that sometimes some women just do not know what is best for them and 
secondly, gender theorists have shown that women can think they want something, 
without realizing they might have been influenced by more powerful others. For these 
reasons, Withuis argues, it is problematic that feminists refer to categories such as 
‘Muslim women’, without deconstructing these. 
 
The issues of experience and feminist standpoints are also discussed in a group 
interview with 14 experts. Contrary to Withuis, many of these experts say that we 
should talk to Muslim women, instead of about them33. The various answers given in 
the interviews also show that the question of feminist standpoint is not just about 
listening or not listening to Muslim women (as Withuis seems to argue), but rather 
about whose experiences should count as feminist. Finally, before moving to the next 
quote, I would like to point out that the division between ‘feminists’ and ‘Muslim 
women’ continues to play an important role in most Opzij articles/statements.  
Local politician Fatima Elatik believes that feminists should respect the fact that there 
are different ways to be emancipated. She further argues that the strength of Muslim 
women is not acknowledged enough:  
 
“Muslim women want to emancipate in their own way, with respect for their 
background and religious traditions and by keeping the dialogue with their 
family. We have to facilitate that.”34 (Elatik, 2005, cited in: Dresselhuys, 
2005b).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 ‘Talk to Muslim women, not about them’ is the title of the article that is referred to in this paragraph. 
34 Original text: Moslima's willen emanciperen op hun manier, met respect voor hun achtergrond en 
religieuze tradities en door in dialoog te blijven met hun familie. Daarbij moeten we ze faciliteren. 
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Elatik explicitly argues that there are different ways of emancipating women, 
implicitly however, she also points out that Muslim women’s experiences and 
standpoints should be taken into account in feminist analyses or struggles. Elatik 
therefore goes beyond the framework that feminists either need or do not need 
approval, as presented by Jolande Withuis. The issue according to Elatik is not about 
approval, but about defining emancipation. However, judging from the quote above, 
the question related to the division between ‘Muslim women’ and ‘feminists’ remains. 
Who is the ‘we’ she is referring to in the last sentence of the quote? It seems that 
Elatik criticises feminists who judge Muslim women for having a different 
perspective on emancipation, but she does not deconstruct the framework and power 
relations behind this.  
    Philosophy professor Marli Huijer argues that Dutch feminists should not act like 
‘big sisters’. She does not make a division between Muslim women and feminists, but 
explicitly talks about different forms of feminism.  Dutch feminists, she argues: “can 
contribute by not regarding these women as more oppressed, but as women whose 
own feminism needs support” (Huijer, cited in Dresselhuys 2005b). Also Media and 
Popular Culture professor van Zoonen emphasises the importance of supporting the 
struggles of these women:  
 
“I get so sick of all these little opinions and do not understand where Dutch 
people get their so called expertise about Islam and Muslim women from. I do 
not have this expertise and would rather have the women who are trying to 
combine emancipation and Islam to speak up, instead of myself”35 (van 
Zoonen, 2005, cited in: Dresselhuys, 2005b).  
 
In the above quotes, the interviewees argue for an alternative approach towards 
feminism. They plead for cooperation between various women, but frame the issue 
rather differently than Withuis. They propose that Dutch or secular feminists support 
Muslim feminists and recognise their struggles and choices. Hence, they aim to 
acknowledge different interpretations of emancipation and feminism, but do not claim 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Original text: “Ik word doodziek van al die meninkjes en snap niet waar Nederlanders hun 
zogenaamde deskundigheid over de islam en moslima's vandaan halen. Ik heb die deskundigheid in elk 
geval niet en zou ook liever vrouwen die emancipatie en islam proberen te combineren aan het woord 
laten dan mezelf.” 
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that feminists have to ‘ask for approval’ for certain struggles. In other words, they 
want to work together with women who share similar goals, not with those who do 
not share these.  
    Van Zoonen and Huijer start from multiple interpretations of feminism and aim to 
achieve cooperation between women, while acknowledging differences. Withuis on 
the other hand, frames the discussion rather differently; she starts from the problem: 
how should feminists respond to women who do not want to be emancipated? 
Feminists, according to Withuis, should not ask these women what they want, but 
fight the oppression and deconstruct certain categories. In my view, Huijer and van 
Zoonen do not necessarily dispute this when they say that feminists should support 
the struggles of Muslim women. Withuis talks about who we should not listen to and 
Huijer and van Zoonen talk about who we should listen to. This connects to the many 
discussions among feminists about standpoint theory (see also chapter 4). Withuis 
seems to fight a rather essentialist and fixed interpretation of standpoint theory. 
According to her, not all women can produce better knowledge because they are in a 
marginalised position. On the contrary, she believes that oppression can blind people 
to a critical view. Huijer and van Zoonen, however, defend a rather different, much 
more dynamic and collective perspective on standpoint theory. They not only take 
into account the power differences (and oppression) between men and women, but 
also between women. Furthermore, they do not start from any marginalised woman’s 
position, but from those who have developed oppositional consciousness. In that 
context, I would like to argue that if we want to theorise this issue further in a 
productive way, we should not allow ourselves to get stuck in arguments such as 
‘should we or should we not listen to Muslim women’, but instead think about how 
we can use experience as a basis for feminist standpoints. Moving the focus of the 
discussion to different interpretations of standpoint theory might help to change 
certain problematic aspects of the discussions about multiculturalism and feminism, 
but that doesn’t mean it will solve all disagreements.  
    Sociology Professor Sawitri Saharso puts forward a different perspective. Contrary 
to the previous authors, she starts her analyses from individual women’s choices: 
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“I am not against operations that recover the hymen; when we have many of 
these operations, virginity will become a farce. The wish of individual girls is 
decisive for me ” (Saharso, 2005, cited in: Dresselhuys, 2005b).36 
 
In this context, she is the clearest opponent of Withuis. Where Withuis argues that we 
should not listen to ‘average’ Muslim women and accept their opinions as such, 
Saharso wants to do exactly that: the choice of the individual woman is decisive for 
her (at least when it comes to this issue). In that context, Saharso adds the factor of 
practicality into the discussion. First of all, she moves beyond principles about 
virginity and argues that if we go along with certain developments, the problem will 
disappear automatically. I would like to add the issue of individual women’s safety 
here. A principled perspective on, for example, the issue of virginity might not be in 
the interests of individual women who are trying to navigate between different 
spheres in their lives here and now. I will return to this in more detail in the next 
chapter.  
 
 
Feminist Solidarity 
 
Many of the statements deal with different aspects of the problems related to 
feminists’ responses to multiculturalism (or actually Islam), without really engaging 
in a single and well-defined debate. I would now like to move the focus of attention 
from feminist standpoints to feminist solidarity. Many statements in Opzij were in one 
way or the other related to the issue of solidarity. It seems again though that there is 
no clear definition of the disagreement. In most quotes the discussion is framed as if 
there is a difference of opinion between those who aim for solidarity between women 
and those who do not. Yet when we take a closer look at the statements it appears that 
most (if not all) authors aim for more solidarity. Hence, the actual debate is about the 
right interpretations of solidarity.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Original text: “Ik ben niet tegen maagdenvlieshersteloperaties, omdat maagdelijkheid een farce 
wordt als deze operaties op grote schaal plaatsvinden. De wens van de meisjes zelf is voor mij 
doorslaggevend.” 
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    Jolande Withuis talks about solidarity through the case of Ayaan Hirsi Ali. In her 
view, feminists need to show their solidarity with this politician:  
 
“Where are the educated feminists who support Ayaan (or if necessary refute) 
with fundamental analyses and usable research results? When do besides the 
‘friends of Ayaan’ finally also the ‘girlfriends of Ayaan’ turn up? (…) Why 
are professors and students from women’s studies not protesting at the 
parliament buildings since November 2: we are not leaving until she is 
returning? (…) A black refugee is threatened with death because of her 
feminist political opinion. That they could not even put their little theories and 
interest struggles aside for this obvious ‘women’s interest’, made all their talks 
about ‘women themselves’ empty gabble.”37 (Withuis, 2005a) 
 
Judging from this quote, Withuis strongly believes there is a lack of solidarity 
between feminists, which is especially shown in the lack of support for Ayaan Hirsi 
Ali. Because Ali is threatened as a black feminist, feminists should support her, 
Withuis argues. This view clearly differs from most remarks that were made in the 
group interview. Marli Huijer for instance, argues that:  
 
“Solidarity with Muslim women starts with informing ourselves of the long 
tradition of (pan-) Arabic feminism, with interest in the lives and stories of 
Muslim women and with allowing and facilitating these women’s own ideas 
in public space. (…) The symbolic capital of Dutch Muslim women – or the 
value society attaches to them – can grow a lot when they get more access to 
public positions. Dutch feminists can contribute to that by not seeing Muslim 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Original text: “Waar zijn de geleerde feministen die Ayaan steunen (of desnoods tegenspreken) met 
fundamentele analyses en bruikbare onderzoeksresultaten? Wanneer dringen zich naast de 'vrienden 
van Ayaan' eindelijk eens 'vriendinnen' aan haar op? (…) Waarom staan hoogleraren en studentes in de 
vrouwenstudies niet sedert 2 november met spandoeken met teksten van Hirsi Ali op het Binnenhof om 
te demonstreren: wij gaan niet weg voor zij er weer is? (…) Er wordt hier een zwarte vluchtelinge om 
haar feministische politieke overtuiging met de dood bedreigd. Dat ze zelfs ten behoeve van zo'n 
overduidelijk 'vrouwenbelang' (en veel meer dan dat) hun theorietjes en belangenstrijdjes niet even 
opzij wisten te zetten, maakt alle gepraat over 'vrouwen zelf' tot loos gebabbel.” 
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women beforehand as more oppressed, but as women whose feminism 
deserves support.”38 (Huijer, cited in Dresselhuys 2005b) 
 
This shows how close the connection is between the discussions on feminist 
standpoints and on feminist solidarity. Those who are considered to have proper 
feminist standpoints are also regarded to deserve feminist solidarity. Related to this 
are the different views on equality and difference. There is a connection between 
which views are considered to be feminist standpoints and the different views on 
equality and difference. Withuis supports Ayaan Hirsi Ali and her struggle for 
equality as sameness, Huijer connects to Muslim feminists, who fight for equality 
through difference. Both authors detect a lack of solidarity among feminists, but aim 
for solidarity with different struggles.  
    In the interview with politician Ahmed Aboutaleb, yet another interpretation of 
solidarity is put forward. His view is not based on feminist standpoints, but on class. 
He argues that women like Dresselhuys should not try to discuss issues such as 
freedom with the most marginalized in our society; these women have to learn to 
write and read first. (Dresselhuys, 2006a). According to Aboutaleb, feminists should: 
 
“Start with the young ones, the privileged, and the ones who found their ways 
to an education. They can mean something for their mothers. For instance, in 
Amsterdam we have a group called Daughters for Mothers, young girls who 
organise activities for their own mothers. They try to get their mothers outside, 
to institutes, for example to learn the language”39 (Aboutaleb, 2006, cited in: 
Dresselhuys, 2006a) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Original text: “Solidariteit met moslimvrouwen begint met het kennisnemen van de lange traditie van 
(pan-)Arabisch feminisme, met interesse voor het leven en de verhalen van islamitische vrouwen en 
met het toelaten en faciliteren van hun eigen geluiden in de publieke ruimte. Het symbolisch kapitaal 
van Nederlandse moslimvrouwen - de waarde die de samenleving aan hen hecht - kan flink toenemen 
als zij meer toegang krijgen tot openbare posities. Nederlandse feministen kunnen daaraan bijdragen 
door moslim- vrouwen niet bij voorbaat als meer onderdrukt te beschouwen, maar als vrouwen wier 
eigen feminisme ondersteuning verdient.” 
39 Original text: “Begin bij de jongeren, de kansrijken, die de weg naar het onderwijs gevonden hebben. 
Die kunnen dan op hun beurt iets voor hun moeders betekenen. Zo hebben we in Amsterdam de groep 
Dochters voor Moeders, jonge meiden die activiteiten organiseren voor hun eigen moeders. Zij 
proberen die moeders naar buiten te krijgen, naar een instituut, waar ze bijvoorbeeld de taal leren.” 
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Hence, Aboutaleb makes a rather different analysis of the issues at stake. He moves 
beyond the relationship between multiculturalism and feminism, by focussing on 
more classical social democratic themes, such as education. This means that his 
interpretation of solidarity does not really engage in the debates about 
multiculturalism. Instead he puts forward the idea that different generations of women 
can show solidarity by organising activities for each other.  
 
Who counts as feminist? Mechanisms of in/exclusion 
 
When does a female standpoint count as a feminist one and when should feminist 
show their solidarity with other women? These questions are connected to the 
division I detected in the statements between ‘feminists’ and ‘Muslim women’. Here, 
I will elaborate on this division and its consequences for the interpretations of 
feminism in Opzij. Among other things this means that the focus will move from 
statements about feminists and feminism to Muslim women. By scrutinizing the 
remarks about Muslim women in Opzij, it becomes clear how they are separated from 
‘feminists’ and ‘feminism’.  
    The first thing to be noted about the articles on Muslim women is that they are 
written from a rather different perspective than those on feminism and feminists. In 
most of the articles in the latter category there was often an explicit statement to be 
found on the problems and solutions related to the connection between 
multiculturalism and feminism. In the articles on Muslim women on the other hand, 
these statements are much more implicit. I believe that this is connected to the 
different aims of these pieces. The articles on ‘feminism’ share a commitment to 
theorise feminism. As mentioned above, the discussions were mostly about feminist 
standpoints. The articles that focus on Muslim women do not correspond to that goal; 
they do not theorise how Muslim women see feminism or how to be a Muslim 
feminist in a Western country. Instead, they are centred on one particular question: 
why? Why do women choose to wear a veil? Why do Dutch women decide to convert 
to Islam?  
    The number of articles on feminism and Muslim women is not large enough to 
make strong conclusions, but it is worth noting that Opzij has no articles that theorise 
how for instance feminism and Islam can/cannot be combined. I would like to argue 
that this is connected to the conceptualisation of feminism in Opzij. Instead of 
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discussing different interpretations of feminism, such as Muslim feminism and 
secular feminism; Opzij’s articles either talk about how feminists should deal with 
difference or about the decisions of Muslim women. This way, it seems they position 
(secular/white) feminists on one side and Muslim women on the other. In other 
words: there are feminists and there are Muslim women.  
 
The headscarf is an important theme in Opzij and in many articles and interviews 
there is some sort of reference to it. In this section I would like to present the 
instances in which the decisions of women to wear the headscarf are central. 
When Aboutaleb is asked by Dresselhuys why women wear a headscarf, he argues 
that women first of all wear it as a response to the heavy criticism on Islam in Dutch 
society: 
 
“It seems to me like the logical response to the denunciation of this piece of 
clothing. When you say to young people that we do not want them to wear 
bomber jackets or headscarves, they will precisely do that. I see it as a 
statement of these girls: if the headscarf is criticised more, more of them will 
wear it.”40 (Aboutaleb, 2006, cited in: Dresselhuys, 2006a) 
 
He adds to this that there is a religious component too, but the political statement is 
more important in his view.  
    In the interview with Muslim women we also find this reason given, but among 
many others. The 6 women who are interviewed for the article (Bochhah, 2006) 
mention a broad range of arguments, but most of these can be divided into 4 
categories: (1) rebellion/resistance, (2) religion, (3) Identity/definition of the self and 
(4) family/community. Most of the women mention reasons which are related to their 
self-image or identity: I feel prettier when I wear one; I feel more secure; it reminds 
me of my Muslim identity, or it makes me feel more conscious of my behaviour. 
Then there are the religious reasons for wearing a headscarf: I do it out of love for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Original text: “Het lijkt me een logische reactie op de verkettering van dit kledingstuk. Als je tegen 
jonge mensen zegt dat het dragen van bomberjacks of hoofddoeken ongewenst is, gaan ze dat juist 
doen. Ik zie het als een statement van die meiden: naarmate de hoofddoek meer verketterd wordt, 
zullen ze hem meer dragen.” 
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Prophet; it makes my faith complete, or it is a command and I like living according to 
the rules of the Qu’ran. Finally, there are the arguments related to the (expectations 
of) family or community: I get more respect from Moroccan boys; my family 
appreciates it that I wear a headscarf, or I want to show people that I am a good 
Muslim.  
    Some of the arguments are focused on what other people think or want these 
women to do; others are more about the desires and aims of these women themselves. 
When we talk about the first category of arguments (those focussed on what others 
think of them),, it is not only the Muslim community, but also the Dutch society in 
general that influences these women in their choices. See for instance, “I want to 
show that you can reach a lot as a Muslim woman, without losing your identity” 
(Bochhah, 2006). This can be directed both towards other Muslim women and 
towards Dutch people who think that wearing a headscarf prevents you from 
integrating or developing yourself. Note that most women in the interview also 
mention the disadvantages of wearing the headscarf. The problems they mention are 
related to acceptance and respect from society: it is more difficult to find an internship 
or job; you get negative responses from people; they think you are not educated or 
cannot speak Dutch, and one woman was even called a terrorist and told to go back to 
her own country.  
    The statements about the headscarf are very descriptive: Opzij does not explicitly 
write about what Muslim women should or should not do, as it does regarding 
feminists. Instead the magazine is exploring why Muslim women do certain things. 
This could mean that the editors find these women’s choices problematic, but not 
necessarily. They could also try to make their choices more acceptable. In any case, 
Opzij is trying to understand these women and their choices, which suggests a 
distance between the Opzij editors (or their audience) and Muslim women. I believe 
that this shows again that the editors of Opzij focus on a white or non-Muslim 
audience: one would not try to increase understanding of Muslim women among 
Muslim women.  
 
In the article ‘De lokroep van de Islam’ (The call of Islam), psychiatrist Carla Rus 
investigates why young women (especially 'autochtonous' Dutch women who decide 
to convert) are attracted to Islam. The question she wants to answer is:  
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“Which young women voluntarily give up the rights and freedoms that my 
generation of women have obtained during the second wave with so much 
pain? ”41 (Rus, 2006) 
 
Two aspects of this question stand out for me. First of all, Rus assumes that these 
women are giving up rights when they convert to Islam. One might wonder whether 
this is necessarily the case, but furthermore, they might not mind giving up certain 
liberal rights.42 Implicitly, Rus approaches this issue as a matter of false 
consciousness: why do people do things that are not in their best interests? This 
means that she is not really asking an open ‘why’ question. Or to put it more bluntly, 
she seems to already judge these women’s choices in her question, instead of being 
open to understanding them better.  
    Secondly, there is a generational aspect in the question. The women who become 
Muslim are not just giving up any rights, but the rights that women from Rus’ 
generation have fought for. There seems to be pain in this part of the question. I 
believe that this could be an important aspect of the discussions about 
multiculturalism and feminism that needs further investigation. At first sight, the 
differences between feminist generations might not be connected to multiculturalism, 
but we need to ask why many of the feminists from the second wave generation are 
now so fiercely criticising Islam. The answer could be found in the following quote:  
 
“For me as an ex-Reformed person, who has wrested from an external 
authority and had learned to trust her own authority, this is shocking to read. 
These women are actually saying that they do not know what to do in life 
without a religious leader and that they do not trust themselves enough when it 
comes to morals.”43 (Rus, 2006) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Original text: “Welke jonge vrouw doet vrijwillig afstand van de rechten en vrijheden die mijn 
generatie vrouwen tijdens de tweede golf met zo veel moeite heeft verworven?” 
42 See the work of Saba Mahmood for more information on this issue: Mahmood S. 2005. Politics of 
Piety. The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
43 Oringal text: “Voor mij als ex-gereformeerde, die zich heeft ontworsteld aan een externe autoriteit en 
op haar eigen autoriteit heeft leren vertrouwen, is dat schokkend om te lezen. Eigenlijk zeggen deze 
vrouwen dat ze zonder religieuze leider geen raad met het leven weten en dat zij zichzelf onvoldoende 
vertrouwen op het gebied van de moraal” 
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Rus herself has struggled against external authorities and cannot imagine why other 
women would actually choose this. From her perspective every woman would choose 
to be free (from authorities) if she could. Authors such as Saba Mahmood however 
have shown us that not all women want liberal freedom; some women actually choose 
to submit to God and/or (possibly) patriarchal religious traditions. I will return to the 
generational issue in more detail in the next chapter.  
    In the first instance, this article on conversion seems comparable to those on the 
headscarf, but the final argument of this piece is considerably different. The authors in 
the previous section only tried to understand Muslim women who decide to wear the 
headscarf. In other words, there was no clear normative statement to be found. Rus on 
the other hand, is providing the reader explicitly with her opinion on this issue. A 
statement follows most arguments for conversion from the author in which she 
explains why such arguments are problematic. Hence, in this case, the author is trying 
to understand these women’s choices but at the same time thinking about how to 
change them. This is confirmed by her conclusion, in which she says:  
 
“There is no use in fighting these new Islamic Dutch girls; the history of 
Christianity teaches us that faith grows when it is oppressed. They should be 
tempted back via good examples: women with self esteem who help others out 
of an inner civilisation, without wanting anything back for it – not even 
afterwards in paradise.”44 (Rus, 2006)   
 
A long history lies behind the words Rus is using here. For example during the First 
Wave of feminism, white, bourgeois feminists tried to emphasise their importance for 
the nation (and hence the need for civil rights) by arguing that they needed to help 
Others. They created a task for themselves by defining social issues as other people’s 
problems. This way they managed to transfer the boundaries of the nation; they 
included themselves, by creating new second range citizens, such as women from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Original text: “Ten strijde trekken tegen de islamitisch geworden Hollandse meiden heeft geen zin; 
de geschiedenis van het christendom leert ons dat geloof juist tegen de verdrukking in groeit. Ze zullen 
teruggelokt moeten worden via goede voorbeelden: vrouwen met eigenwaarde die vanuit innerlijke 
beschaving anderen helpen zonder er een beloning voor terug te verwachten - ook niet achteraf in het 
paradijs.”  
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colonies.45 Of course we cannot easily apply the strategies of certain first wave 
feminists to the remarks of Carla Rus, but it is remarkable that the concept of ‘helping 
others’ remains recurrent in feminism. The similarities (and differences) between 
these approaches to feminism need further investigation.  
    Comparing the articles in the above sections on ‘Muslim women’ with those on 
‘feminists’, I would like to argue that even though Muslim women’s issues are 
discussed in Opzij, these women are not really involved in the discussions about 
feminism. In the articles about Muslim women, choices are evaluated from a rather 
universal view of feminism. Feminism, in these cases, is approached as something 
quite fixed. For instance, there were no articles in which authors discussed whether 
and how feminism and Islam could be combined. Furthermore, in the pieces on 
feminism there was no discussion about why (white) feminists do certain things. Thus, 
Muslim women’s choices are interrogated, while those of (white) feminists are not. 
Note though that white (allochtonous) women who decide to convert to Islam are 
investigated. They seem to fall between the applied categories. Secondly, feminists 
discuss what feminism is or should be, but not how it could be combined with 
religion. In other words, only the boundaries of feminism are debated, not the basics.  
 
 
Multicultural Issues: Moving between Multiculturalism and Islam   
 
As I have discussed above, it is mostly Islam that is discussed in Opzij’s discourse, 
the statements or arguments are hardly ever explicitly about multiculturalism. Not 
only are culture and religion often conflated, it is also one group that is at the centre 
of attention: Muslims. Nevertheless, many important arguments were made in 
connection to multicultural politics and gender relations and most of them can be 
connected to the debate about the relationship between multiculturalism and 
feminism, as initiated by Susan Moller Okin. 
    In the first chapter of this thesis, I discussed how Susan Moller Okin’s essay Is 
Multiculturalism Bad for Women? led to a heated debate amongst feminists and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 See for more information for example: B. Waaldijk, 1999. ’Colonial Constructions of a Dutch 
Women’s Movement: 1898’, in: K. Rotther en H. Paul (ed.), Differenzen in der Geslechtsdifferenz: 
Aktuele Perspektiven der Geslechtsforschung. Berlin, 1999, pp. 285-299 
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others. Okin argues that progressive people who are against all forms of oppression 
assume too easily that multiculturalism is compatible with gender equality. She 
believes that cultures are suffused with practices and ideologies concerning gender 
and that most cultures facilitate the control over women in various ways (Okin, 
1999a). Many replied to this essay with counterarguments; the Dutch sociologist 
Sawitri Saharso for instance published a paper called Feminisme versus 
Multiculturalisme? (Feminism versus Multiculturalism?). This essay was also 
discussed in detail in the first chapter, where Saharso’s main argument was that while 
multiculturalism and feminism might not always be easily compatible, they are 
certainly not incompatible either (Saharso, 2000). They can be ‘friends’, according to 
Saharso, even though it is a friendship that needs to be worked on. In her view, most 
discussions about multiculturalism and gender equality are not about conflicts 
between traditional and liberal values; indeed, very often they deal with tensions 
within the liberal ideology (e.g. between autonomy and non-discrimination or 
equality). Opinion leaders might say that ‘our liberal values are non- negotiable’, but 
in reality they do not give us a clear-cut answer. Saharso therefore believes that 
dialogue is the only option we have in solving the problems that arise in a 
multicultural society. This means reinterpretation of both majority and minority 
cultures and discussion about how to deal with conflicting values.  
    In the Opzij sample we can find similar arguments. However, the concept of 
multiculturalism, defined as an ideology that aims to protect and recognise minority 
groups by acknowledging special group rights, is hard to find in Opzij. Interviewees 
and authors sometimes refer to the positive aspects of culture and religion, but do not 
always connect this to multicultural politics. Furthermore, most statements in Opzij 
about culture and religion are about the problems related to these concepts. Hence, 
Opzij does not really discuss multiculturalism as such, but reports on the themes and 
subjects closely related to multiculturalism, such as the meaning of culture and 
religion in people’s lives, migration politics and specific current issues such as the 
headscarf.  
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Redefining Religion and Culture 
 
The statements in Opzij about culture and religion can be divided into positive and 
negative ones. In four articles, the positive relationship between multiculturalism and 
feminism is discussed. In two of these, women talk from their own (religious) 
experiences and argue that their religion makes them stronger. The other two 
interviewees also use their experiences, but reason more from a general political 
perspective.  
    In ‘Minder dan een minderheid’ (Less than a Minority), the relation between 
multiculturalism and feminism is discussed in relation to homosexuality. The article is 
a report about the struggles of Muslim lesbian women and their feelings of alienation 
from both Muslim communities and (white) lesbian communities. We read about the 
experiences of three Muslim women regarding their sexuality. They all seem to agree 
that most Muslim lesbian women have (or had) difficulties within their family’s 
communities, but also feel that their religion (Islam) strengthens them. Dunya for 
instance says: 
 
“I have used faith to be able to feel love again. I believe that that is the basis of 
all faiths: love and respect for yourself and others around you.”46 (Dunya, 
cited in: Vleerlaag, 2004) 
 
Dunya believes that God gave her sexuality in order to experience him through that 
aspect of life as well (Vleerlaag, 2004). Hence, for her there is no tension between her 
faith and her sexuality. However, the people around her do find it difficult to accept 
her as she is. Also for Warda faith is a vital aspect of her life. She argues that it is not 
the Qu’ran that condemns homosexuality, but the people. Allah is very important for 
her: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Original text: “Ik heb het geloof gebruikt om weer liefde te kunnen voelen. Volgens mij is dat de 
basis van alle vormen van geloof: liefde en respect voor jezelf en je medemens.” 
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“Allah is constantly with me. (…). The only one I have to be accountable to is 
Allah. I try to live my life as good as I can and be a good person. Should I feel 
guilty about being in love with a woman? I can not believe that something that 
beautiful is forbidden”47 (Warda, cited in: Vleerlaag, 2004) 
 
Religion is thus an important instrument for these women, in their struggle for 
acceptance and a happy life. This also makes two of them argue that it is important for 
them to find a Muslim partner; if they can’t share their faith they would miss 
something. Obviously these women have to fight several struggles at the same time, 
because many people in their lives do not understand or accept them. Muslims often 
do not accept them because of their sexuality, and 'autochtonous' Dutch girls do not 
understand that they do not break with their (Muslim) families and friends. It seems 
that almost everybody in their surroundings wants them to choose between their 
sexuality and their religion. These women themselves however want to combine these 
two aspects of their lives; their faith is not an aspect of their struggles, but a source of 
inspiration.  
    Theologian Manuala Kalsky also argues that her religion helps her in her struggle 
for emancipation. According to her, we have to acknowledge that religion is an 
important source of inspiration to many people (Kalsky, 2006). Furthermore, she 
argues that because our societies are multi-religious, progressive theologians and 
feminists should support liberal interpretations of religions. For many women, faith 
plays an important role in answering important questions such as ‘why am I here’ and 
‘what do I want with my life’. According to Kalsky, feminism should also engage 
with these kinds of spiritual issues. For her personally, religion is an important 
instrument in keeping her feminist ideals and her life in balance (Kalsky, 2006). 
Many women, she says, are tired when it comes to their feminist struggles; things are 
more difficult to change than we thought. The value of religion lies in the fact that it 
shows us that not everything is immediately changeable: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Original text: “Allah is constant bij me (…). De enige aan wie ik verantwoording moet afleggen is 
Allah. Ik probeer een zo goed mogelijk leven te leiden, een goed persoon te zijn. Moet ik me dan 
schuldig voelen omdat ik verliefd ben op een vrouw? Dat zo iets moois niet mag, kan ik niet geloven.” 
 	   160 
“That is how it works for me personally as well. Feminism is my attitude to 
life that makes me look critical towards power inequalities in society and 
religion. My faith is the basis of my existence, it tones down my feminist 
impatience now and then and comforts me at the moments my world is not 
changeable. That is not a refuge from the hard reality. For me, the red thread 
through the biblical stories is the vision of liberation, of a more just world. 
That is not necessarily a happy end, but it is a promise. That touches upon the 
reality of our everyday lives. Also within feminism.”48 (Kalsky, 2006) 
 
    When we compare these articles, we can see that all of the women interviewed use 
their faith as a source of inspiration, also for their struggle for emancipation. Hence 
their faith does not stop them from being a feminist or oppresses them as women; 
instead it is an instrument that helps them to go further. This is probably related to the 
fact that they interpret religion in a personal way and start from their own 
experiences, rather than from certain dominant views on religion. The women in the 
first article talk about their personal relationship to Allah, and Manuela Kalsky shows 
how feminist theologians can (and have) change(d) dominant views on religious texts 
and traditions. In that sense these women uphold a different view on religion than 
feminists such as Susan Moller Okin, who focus more on the dominant and 
patriarchal aspects and interpretations of religion.  
    I believe that when we think about the relationship between multiculturalism and 
feminism, we can learn from these women who try to think how we can combine 
feminism and religion. They recognise the oppressive elements of religion, but try to 
find ways to transform ideas about God, human beings and society in such a way that 
religion and feminism are not contradictory.  
    Two further interviewees redefine dominant perspectives on religion from a 
different perspective. Former minister Karla Peijs for instance says that she used to 
believe that headscarves were a sign of oppression, but now she knows that for many 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Original text: “Zo werkt het ook voor mij persoonlijk. Het feminisme is mijn levenshouding die me 
kritisch laat kijken naar de machtsongelijkheid in samenleving en religie. Mijn geloof is de grond van 
mijn bestaan, relativeert zo af en toe mijn feministische ongeduld en troost me op de momenten dat 
mijn wereld niet maakbaar is. En dat is geen vlucht uit de harde werkelijkheid. Voor mij is de rode 
draad in bijbelse verhalen het visioen van bevrijding, van een rechtvaardiger wereld. Er is niet per se 
een happy end, maar wel een belofte. Dat raakt aan de realiteit van alledag. Ook binnen het 
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women wearing the headscarf is a personal choice (Vuijsje, 2006). Her meetings with 
veiled women in Abu Dhabi convinced her of this. This is how she recalls one of the 
women she met there: 
 
“The first time I saw her, I ran into her accidentally. She was with a whole 
bunch of male colleagues and openly made jokes about them. It appeared very 
natural. She had a very technical education and has done a lot with ICT. As 
minister she has several big departments under her. She is a fantastic woman. 
One day she was there in an haute  couture suit, the other day covered in a 
chador. (…) Apparently they have a lot of  freedom there.”49 (Peijs, 2006, cited 
in: Vuijsje, 2006) 
 
Contrary to the previous authors/interviewees, Peijs does not aim to redefine religion, 
instead she proposes a more practical approach that goes beyond any possible 
meanings of religious traditions and dogmas:   
 
“Look, I am a practical person. I believe that if women can be active in the 
public  sphere  because of their scarves, then that’s the way it goes. If the same 
counts for Muslim women here, then we have to give them the chance to 
develop themselves.  That is why I meant it when I said that I would be in 
favour of a Minister with a  headscarf.”50 (Peijs, 2006, cited in: Vuijsje, 
2006) 
 
Contrary to the previous interviewees, Peijs does not reason from her own religious 
experience (although she does mention her education at a monastery) but from a more 
practical and at the same time political perspective. Instead of giving her own opinion 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Original text: “De eerste keer dat ik haar zag, liep ik haar toevallig tegen het lijf. Ze was met een 
hele batterij mannelijke collega's en stond openlijk grapjes over hen te maken. Dat zag er erg natuurlijk 
uit. Zij heeft een heel technische opleiding genoten en veel gedaan in de ICT. Als minister heeft ze een 
aantal grote departementen onder zich. Een fantastische vrouw is het. De ene dag zat ze daar in een 
haute-couturepak, de andere dag was ze gehuld in chador. (…) Kennelijk hebben ze heel veel vrijheid 
daar.” 
50 Original text: “Kijk, ik ben een praktisch ingesteld mens. Ik vind: als die vrouwen daar dankzij hun 
sluiers de maatschappij in kunnen, dan moet het maar op die manier. Als hetzelfde geldt voor vrouwen 
met een moslim achtergrond hier, dan moet je ze juist de kans geven zichzelf te ontplooien. Daarom 
meende ik het ook toen ik zei dat ik ook in Nederland voorstander zou zijn van een minister met een 
hoofddoek” 
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on the meaning of the headscarf, she argues that we should not condemn it, because it 
enables women to fully participate in the public sphere. 
    If we compare the arguments of, for example, Kalsky and Peijs regarding the 
headscarf then we can clearly recognise the many layers of this subject (such as the 
symbolic, the social and the individual). By dividing the social and the symbolic 
layers, Peijs allows for a more practical view of the headscarf: even though the 
headscarf might stand for unequal gender relations, in practice it makes it possible for 
women to participate in the public sphere. In order to have a good discussion on 
issues such as the headscarf, it is important to note on which level certain arguments 
focus.  
    When Haleh Ghorashi is asked about her opinion on the burqa, she plays with all 
three levels in her answer: 
 
“How many women in the Netherlands wear a burqa? Very, very few, thus the 
prohibition of the burqa is a non-issue. But in the mean time you do give a 
signal: we do not accept you. About the headscarves: I have a few students 
with headscarves, but they aren’t any quieter with it. They do not consider the 
headscarf as a sign of oppression. When I first came to the Netherlands, I also 
thought it was strange that women  voluntarily wear a headscarf. I didn’t 
understand it, because in Iran you were obliged to wear one. I am not religious 
at all; I see myself as a secular feminist. But by now, I realise that in a 
democracy you have to give space to others.”51 (Ghorashi, 2007, cited in: 
Lambalgen, 2007)  
 
She mentions certain symbolic aspects of the discussion (prohibition gives a sign), the 
social aspects (in a democracy you give space to others) and finally the individual 
side (they aren’t any quieter with it). In the rest of the interview she returns to several 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Original text: “Hoeveel vrouwen in Nederland dragen een boerka Heel, heel weinig, dus het 
boerkaverbod is een non-issue. Maar intussen geef je wel het signaal af: wij accepteren jullie niet. Wat 
de hoofddoekjes betreft: ik heb zelf studentes met een hoofddoek, maar die hebben daarom echt geen 
minder grote mond. Zij zien de hoofddoek niet als een symbool van onderdrukking. Toen ik net in 
Nederland was, vond ik het ook raar dat vrouwen vrijwillig een hoofddoek dragen. Ik begreep dat niet, 
want in Iran was de hoofddoek juist verplicht. Ik ben helemaal niet religieus, beschouw mezelf als een 
seculier feministe. Maar inmiddels besef ik dat je in een democratie juist ruimte moet bieden aan de 
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of these issues and connects them to having respect for other women’s choices and 
acknowledging different feminist strategies for emancipation. Regarding the first 
point, she argues that we should not automatically turn our back on Muslim customs. 
The interviewer is worried about the fact that separate swimming hours for (Muslim) 
women will lead to separatism, Ghorashi replies:  
 
“Why are we making this so difficult? There are also women’s days in saunas. 
I believe it is one of the achievements of feminism that women can be among 
each other. Some women like to swim without men. That should be possible, 
feminists should not be so afraid of Islamic customs. Why would Muslim 
feminism not be possible? Many women in Islamic countries have feminist 
thoughts. They try to  reinterpret the Qu’ran, in order to give space to 
feminism. We should respect these women, not look down upon them.”52 
(Ghorashi, 2007, cited in: Lambalgen, 2007) 
 
In this quote we can see that according to Ghorashi we can interpret religion in 
different ways. It is not necessarily a bad thing that needs to be contained. Instead, it 
can be an important aspect of women’s lives that feminists should not deny. 
Furthermore, Ghorashi argues that it would be arrogant if secular women force 
Muslim women to become emancipated just as they did and to step out of their faith:  
“there just are women who want to become emancipated within their religion” 53 
(Ghorashi, 2007, cited in: Lambalgen 2007).  
    When it comes to strategies, Ghorashi believes that we should start from the needs 
of all women (Lambalgen, 2007). When the interviewer asks her how we can help 
Muslim women, she says: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Original text:  “Waarom doen we daar zo moeilijk over Je hebt toch ook vrouwendagen in de sauna. 
Ik vind het juist een van de verworvenheden van het feminisme dat je als vrouwen onder elkaar mag 
zijn. Sommige vrouwen vinden het fijn om zonder mannen te zwemmen. Dat moet toch mogelijk zijn? 
Feministes moeten niet zo bang zijn voor islamitische gebruiken. Waarom zou er geen 
moslimfeminisme mogelijk zijn? Heel veel vrouwen in islamitische landen denken feministisch. Zij 
proberen teksten in de Koran te herinterpreteren zodat er ruimte is voor feminisme. Die vrouwen moet 
je respecteren, niet minachten.” 
53 Original text: “Maar er zijn nu eenmaal vrouwen die vanuit hun religie willen emanciperen.” 
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“Why do they need help? Such a superior attitude will not help. Ask first, 
what they want. Then you can always help them later, for instance with 
internships of jobs. I believe that we in the Netherlands argue too much from a 
white, elitist middle class perspective. Women should choose themselves how 
they live their lives. (…) I  thought that women were allies. Emancipation 
should come from within. Only when you have respect for the opinions of 
others, you can talk and make alliances.”54 (Ghorashi, 2007, cited in: 
Lambalgen 2007) 
 
These words of Ghorashi are closely connected to the earlier discussions on feminism, 
on standpoint theory and on experience as a source of feminist ideas. Clearly, 
according to Ghorashi, we should ask Muslim women what they want, and not try to 
decide beforehand what is feminist and what not.  
 
 
Religion as a Problem  
 
Where the above-mentioned authors and interviewees argued for a redefinition of 
religion and a more comprehensive perspective on religious traditions, most 
statements in Opzij approach these issues rather differently. In one of the Meetlat 
interviews, lawyer and columnist Paul Cliteur argues for example:  
 
“It worries me that a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, which is bad for 
gender relations, gays and non-believers, could have success here. Even 
though I am a  conservative on certain issues; I am progressive on these areas: 
the emancipation of women, gays and non-believers. On these issues we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Original text: “Waarom moeten ze "geholpen" worden Zo'n superieure houding helpt niet. Vraag nou 
eerst eens waar ze zelf behoefte aan hebben. Dan kun je ze daarna altijd nog helpen, bijvoorbeeld met 
stages en banen. Ik vind dat we in Nederland te veel denken vanuit de witte, elitaire middenklasse. 
Vrouwen moeten zelf kunnen kiezen hoe ze hun leven inrichten. Ik dacht dat vrouwen elkaars 
bondgenoten waren. Emancipatie moet van binnenuit komen. Pas als je respect hebt voor andermans 
meningen, kun je met elkaar in gesprek komen en verbindingen maken.” 
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cannot learn from the ancient texts of Islam, Judaism and Christianity.”55 
(Cliteur, 2004, cited in: Dresselhuys 2004a) 
 
So, contrary to the interpretations of religion by the previous authors and 
interviewees, Paul Cliteur regards the fundamentalist interpretation of Islam as 
inherently problematic and as a danger for gender equality. However, the connection 
that this author makes between Islam, fundamentalism and gender inequality has a 
long history and is not unproblematic. 
    First of all, the label fundamentalism is not only attached to Islam in Opzij articles; 
the concept is very important in many public debates about Islam (and its relation to 
‘the West’). Originally, fundamentalism referred to the protestant tradition that wishes 
to maintain traditional Protestant beliefs (Bracke and Fadil, 2006, p 12). But, at this 
moment fundamentalism is used to define various religious movements, mostly 
Muslim. Hence the concept has not only changed in meaning (when is a religious 
group fundamentalist?), but also in target group (from Protestants to Muslims). 
Furthermore, the connection that Cliteur makes between fundamentalism, unequal 
gender relations and holy texts is rather contested. Fundamentalism is often connected 
to patriarchy in general or ‘disciplining the female body’ specifically (Bracke, 2006). 
However, there are not only enormous differences among the various ‘fundamentalist’ 
movements when it comes to disciplining the female body; there is neither a clear 
factor that distinguishes these groups from other religious or non-religious 
movements when we compare patriarchal systems. Furthermore, the other connection 
that Cliteur makes, regarding the literal interpretation of holy texts, is also 
problematic. This apparent characteristic of fundamentalism does not recognise the 
complexity of reading holy texts (Bracke, 2006). The meaning of a text is always 
constructed: it is impossible to read a text without interpreting.  
    Another point of criticism that Cliteur puts forward is that he believes that Islam is 
not “secularizable”: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Original text: “Het baart mij zorgen dat een fundamentalistische vorm van de Islam, die slecht is 
voor de man-vrouwverhouding, homo's en ongelovigen hier voet aan de grond zou krijgen. Hoewel ik 
op een aantal punten conservatief ben, ben ik progressief op deze gebieden: de emancipatie van 
vrouwen, homo's en ongelovigen. Op die punten kunnen we uberhaupt niet in de leer bij eeuwenoude 
geschriften van islam, jodendom en christendom.” 
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“Bernard Lewis says: Mohammed was not just a spiritual leader but also a 
political leader. The spiritual and political leadership in Islam is in the same 
hands and it is questionable whether this will change. Often it is being said 
that you have to look at things in their context. But Imam El Moumni, who 
once said horrible things about gays56, was very clear when he said: ‘I just can 
not rewrite the Qu’ran’.”57 (Cliteur, 2004, cited in: Dresselhuijs 2004a) 
 
This interpretation of fundamentalism seems to suggest that the combination of 
religion and politics is a unique feature of fundamentalist movements. But, as Bracke 
argues, religion is always connected to politics. Even in so-called secular Western 
nation-states, religion and politics are much more intertwined than we might expect. 
Furthermore, there are various movements (e.g. the civil rights movement in the US) 
that combine religion and politics and are still defined as progressive movements 
(Bracke, 2006). Cliteur uses a quote here from one of the most conservative and 
disputed imams in the Netherlands to make a wider statement about Islam; namely 
that Islam is not secularizable. In my view it is important to note that in this case a 
very partial image of ‘the other’ is presented. Indeed, El Moumni might not want to 
“rewrite” the Qu’ran, but other people are interpreting the Qu’ran in different ways. 
This way, Cliteur, like El Moumni, only leaves space for one ‘true’ interpretation of 
the Qu’ran. 
    Cliteur’s comments also connect to a more common pattern regarding the 
relationship between Muslim and non-Muslim countries: ‘the West’ is connected to 
secularism and ‘the East’ with fundamentalism. The development in the definition of 
fundamentalism has an important role in this; the traditional meaning of this concept 
has almost entirely been replaced by a new one. Fundamentalism in this new 
definition refers to a political and violent stream of Islam. Bracke and Fadil argue that 
the debates about (a fundamentalist stream of) Islam and whether this religion can be 
defined as ‘modern’ or ‘secular’ are increasingly presented in terms of its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 This imam reached headlines in the Netherlands when he said that gays were lower than pigs and he 
wouldn’t mind if they were thrown of apartment buildings 
57 Original text: “Bernard Lewis zegt: Mohammed was niet alleen een geestelijk leider, maar ook een 
politiek leider. Het geestelijk en politiek leiderschap is in de islam in dezelfde handen en het is de 
vraag of dit zal veranderen. Vaak wordt gezegd: je moet de zaken in hun context zien. Maar imam El 
Moumni, die ooit vreselijke dingen over homo's zei, was heel duidelijk toen hij zei: "Ik kan de koran 
nu eenmaal niet herschrijven’.” 
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compatibility with democracy. I would like to add that discussions about Islam and 
gender equality are strongly related to this. The position of women is used as one of 
the most important markers in the distinction between the so called secular societies 
on the one hand and fundamentalist ones on the other, as we can also see in the first 
quote from Cliteur. 
    Jolande Withuis also talks about violent movements in Islam, but makes a different 
argument. The article is not focussed on Islam as such, but on Muslim female 
terrorists. She describes the apparent contradiction between the intensity of these 
women’s struggles on the one hand and their conservative ideas about gender on the 
other. The author does not use supposed ideas about gender relations as an argument 
to criticise Islam, but argues instead that these terrorists have ‘inconsistent views’ on 
gender and the role of women in society: 
   
“These women struggle with the constraints of the domains allowed for 
women. But the holy texts of the Qu’ran appear to be stretchable: currently 
grandmothers are also allowed to die as martyrs. At the same time, the 
engagement of these women does not go together with letting go of traditional 
gender patterns – on the contrary: they choose the most orthodox misogynist 
version and echo sexist standpoints, such as that men and women should be 
spatially divided, because otherwise women provoke rape”58 (Withuis, 2007) 
 
    Withuis argues that these women (and the men who support them) have 
inconsistent gender patterns. When we look at these choices from a liberal 
perspective, they might indeed be, or at least sound, incompatible, but would that also 
be the case if we think from a different starting point?59 In chapter 4, I pointed out 
that according to Saba Mahmood feminists should rethink their conceptualisation of 
agency. Most feminist thinking is primarily liberatory and agency is in this context 
described as a model of subordination versus subversion. Mahmood argues that this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Original text: “Deze vrouwen worstelen met de begrenzingen van het aan vrouwen toegestane 
domein. Maar de heilige letter van de Koran blijkt rekkelijk: het wordt tegenwoordig ook Palestijnse 
oma's toegestaan te sterven als martelares. Tegelijk echter gaat het engagement van deze vrouwen juist 
niet gepaard aan afscheid van de traditionele vrouwenrol - integendeel: zij kiezen voor de meest 
orthodoxe en vrouwvijandige variant daarvan en echoen seksistische opvattingen, zoals dat mannen en 
vrouwen ruimtelijk gescheiden moeten zijn, want anders lok je als vrouw verkrachting uit.” 
59 Thanks to Sarah Bracke for pointing this out to me.  
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attachment of agency to progressive politics is problematic. For instance, not all 
human beings might desire freedom and autonomy. Thus, if we really want to 
understand the strategies of all women, we should not try to place their activities and 
ways of being in the simply dichotomous relation of subversion and subordination. 
Hence, the choices of these ‘female terrorists’ might not be about inconsistent gender 
views, but about something else. Maybe the paradox that Withuis detects is only a 
paradox because it doesn’t fit her analytical framework. This demonstrates how 
important it is to develop proper analytical tools in order to develop a better 
understanding of the choices and strategies of women.  
 
 
Religious Traditions as Inherently Patriarchal 
 
The first group of arguments in Opzij about religion and culture considered religion or 
culture as a positive factor in their lives and struggles, the last group argued that 
religion, or actually Islam, is a negative factor in our society, and also a threat to 
gender equality. In the next section I will investigate the statements in Opzij that are 
more focussed on particular traditions or customs.  
Writer Nahed Selim for instance says that she feels abandoned by feminists who 
“trivialize” problems with Islam. She argues we should not permit gender inequality 
out of respect for a religion (Selim, 2006). During the interview she mentions a great 
variety of examples that show why Islam is a danger for gender equality, for instance 
circumcision, segregation, headscarves and Sharia law. About the headscarf she says: 
 
“It is not just a piece of cloth. There is a concept behind it about the unequal 
position of women in society. The headscarf has become a banner for 
fundamentalists, just like the burqa. I am in favour of a burqa ban, definitely 
in schools and public spaces. But I would prefer to see that the burqa just 
disappears from the earth. I think women start wearing it if they do not get 
enough affection from the people around them.”60 (Selim, 2006) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Original text: “Het is niet slechts een kledingstuk. Er zit een concept achter over de ongelijkwaardige 
plaats van de vrouw in de maatschappij. De hoofddoek is het politieke spandoek van de 
fundamentalisten geworden, evenals de boerka. Ik ben voor een boerkaverbod, zeker op scholen en in 
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According to Selim the burqa is a sign of oppression and inequality, and women who 
wear one do so because they miss certain attention from others. These two arguments 
demonstrate on which level Selim evaluates the headscarf: the symbolic and the 
social. Her first argument relates to the symbolic meaning of the headscarf and the 
second to the social. She does not seem to agree with Peijs (above) that the headscarf 
can also have an important social function and she certainly disagrees with Ghorashi 
(above) on the symbolic meanings of the headscarf. For Selim, there is no discussion 
possible about possible alternative meanings of the headscarf:  it is a political issue 
and stands for inequality.  
    Selim’s disagreement with Ghorashi’s position comes to the fore again, when she is 
asked about her statement on segregation: 
 
“The Netherlands should not give in to Muslims who want separate swimming 
hours for women and separate groups for boys and girls in community houses, 
separate hospital rooms et cetera. In the eight fundamentalist Muslim counties 
where they live in segregated societies, for instance Iran and Afghanistan, you 
can see that this has negative effects on women. Then the house becomes the 
women’s domain and the world the place for men.”61 (Selim, 2006) 
 
Again, Selim warns of the ideologies behind these practices and the possible negative 
consequences for women. Ghorashi says that many women would like separate 
swimming hours and that we should not be afraid of Muslim traditions but make 
space for them, also within feminism.  
In an article on the kindred spirits of Ayaan Hirsi Ali we can also find this kind of 
argument against certain Muslim traditions or customs. A very extreme example 
comes from the Iranian-French writer Chahdortt Djavann, who compares women who 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
openbare instellingen. Maar nog liever had ik dat de boerka van de aardbodem verdween. Volgens mij 
gaan vrouwen een boerka dragen als ze onvoldoende genegenheid krijgen van de mensen om hen 
heen.” 
61 Original text: “Nederland moet niet toegeven als moslims aparte zwemuren voor vrouwen willen of 
aparte clubjes voor jongens en meisjes in buurthuizen, aparte ziekenzalen en ga zo maar door. In de 
acht fundamentalistische moslimlanden waar de segregatie ver is doorgevoerd, waaronder Iran en 
Afghanistan, kun je zien dat dit altijd nadelig uitpakt voor vrouwen. Dan wordt het huis het 
vrouwendomein en de rest van de wereld is er voor mannen.” 
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wear the veil with the guards in Nazi concentration camps; they are collaborators 
according to her (Kraaijo, van Vliet and Wieman, 2005). The Opzij editors describe 
her view on the headscarf as follows: 
 
“She compares the veil or the headscarf – for her there is no difference –  with 
the Star of David: a sign of inferiority. She calls the veil pornographic because 
it reduces women to sexual organs and impure beings. It is abuse if you have a 
young girl wear a veil, because you implicitly say that she is ‘consumable’. 
Exactly the veil makes her  into a sex object, she explains in almost every 
interview. Indirectly you tell her that she lives in a sinful body.”62 (Djavann, 
2005, cited in: Kraaijo, van Vliet and Wieman, 2005) 
 
Even though this quote shows a much more radical view on the headscarf than 
Selim’s, both women describe its operation at a symbolic level and believe it to 
represent only one thing: unequal gender relations.  
    MP Geert Wilders also talks about the symbolic meaning of veiling, but he adds a 
social analysis as well (note however that he talks about the burqa and not the 
headscarf): 
 
“For me it is most important that it [the burqa, EM] is a medieval symbol that 
emphasises the unequal position of women. If you wear such a thing, you will 
know one thing for sure: you will never integrate, because this piece of 
clothing is a big ‘no’ to Dutch society. Furthermore, your chances to get a job 
are close to nothing, and we would like to see Muslim women to become 
independent as well. The chance to find friends is also lower when you wear 
the burqa. Through this piece of clothing you will find loneliness.”63 (Wilders, 
2007, cited in: Dresselhuijs 2007) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Original text: “Zo vergelijkt ze de sluier of hoofddoek - voor haar is er geen verschil - met de 
jodenster: een teken van minderwaardigheid. Ze noemt de sluier pornografisch omdat deze de vrouw 
tot een geslachtsdeel en een onrein wezen reduceert. 'Het is kindermishandeling als je een jong meisje 
een sluier laat dragen, want je geeft dan aan dat ze al "te consumeren" is. Juist de sluier maakt van haar 
een lustobject,' legt ze uit in ongeveer elk interview. 'Je vertelt haar indirect dat ze in een zondig 
lichaam leeft. En waarom?” 
63 Original text: “Voor mij staat op de voorgrond dat het een middeleeuws symbool is dat de 
ongelijkheid van de vrouw benadrukt. Als je zo'n ding draagt, weet je een ding zeker: je zult nooit 
integreren, omdat dat kledingstuk een groot "nee" is tegen de Nederlandse samenleving. Verder zijn je 
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The interesting thing about this quote is that when we compare it with the previous 
ones, we can see that Wilders plays with (or maybe just confuses) the different levels 
of thinking about issues such as the headscarf or burqa. He starts by consciously 
referring to the symbolic meaning of the burqa, then he moves to a practical argument 
(you will never integrate), but then refers to a symbolic reason for this (it is a big ‘no’ 
to Dutch society) to back this up. Furthermore, he connects his arguments to 
integration in such a way that they could just as easily be used to criticise Dutch 
society instead of the burqa: if you wear a burqa in the Netherlands you cannot find a 
job, make friends or integrate  
    In the article ‘Met een hoofddoek om krijg je respect’ (When you wear a headscarf 
people give your respect) yet another approach to the headscarf issue turns up. The 
woman who is interviewed decided to wear a headscarf for a certain time, just to 
investigate how people respond to it. The results: many angry sights from 
'autochtonous' people and more respect from Muslims (Manschot, 2006). Van Roode 
both describes the different behaviour of Muslim boys, but also how it feels to be 
discriminated against. Hence the problems described by her are twofold: the negative 
aspects of Muslim culture and the discrimination by ‘autochtonous’ Dutch people.  
    The interviewer however (Anke Manschot) is much more critical about the 
headscarf. She argues that the headscarf is a sign of oppression and she regrets the 
fact that women wear it. See for instance these questions, posed by her to van Roode 
during the interview:  
 
“But isn’t it terrible that despite a Second Feminist Wave now also women in 
Dutch  neighbourhoods have to wear a headscarf in order to be left alone?”64 
(Van Roode, 2006, cited in: Manschot, 2006) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
kansen op een baan ongeveer nihil, en we zouden toch graag zien dat ook moslimvrouwen 
onafhankelijk worden. De kans op het vinden van Nederlandse vrienden wordt ook ernstig belemmerd 
door de boerka. Via dit kledingstuk kies je dus voor het isolement.” 
64 Orignal text: “Maar het is toch verschrikkelijk dat het ondanks een Tweede Feministische Golf nu 
ook al in sommige Nederlandse buurten zover gekomen is dat een vrouw een hoofddoek moet dragen 
om met rust gelaten te worden” 
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Interviewee van Roode however argues that we should acknowledge the different 
meanings of the headscarf: 
 
“We should not blame the headscarf. I am not against the headscarf. For a 
number of Muslim women it really is an expression of their faith. Others use it 
to emphasise their identity. And others indeed to be left alone, like women in 
Egypt told me. But when you fight against the headscarf, you only fight the 
symptoms. The continuous discussion about the headscarf is a sign of the lack 
of understanding of each other and the big differences between groups.”65 
(Van Roode, 2006, cited in: Manschot, 2006) 
 
An interesting aspect of this quote is that in the first part van Roode recognises 
different possible meanings of the headscarf, but in the second part she still considers 
it as part (a symptom) of a problem. In the next quote she explains what the ‘real’ 
problem is:  
 
“In our culture we have achieved that a woman is not considered to be a whore 
when she has sex before she is married. Muslims come from a culture in 
which the virginity of unmarried women is very important. Only a pure 
woman can count on respect.”66 (Van Roode, 2006, cited in: Manschot, 2006) 
 
In other words, van Roode believes that individual women can wear the headscarf for 
different reasons, and thus also choose to wear it, but the background of the headscarf 
is still considered to be related to a rather conservative view of gender relations.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Original text: “We moeten niet de schuld aan de hoofddoek geven. Ik ben niet tegen de hoofddoek. 
Voor een aantal moslima's is het echt een uiting van hun geloof. Anderen gebruiken hem weer om hun 
identiteit te benadrukken. Weer anderen om inderdaad met rust gelaten te worden, zoals vrouwen in 
Egypte me vertelden. Maar wanneer je tegen de hoofddoek ageert, doe je aan symptoombestrijding. De 
aanhoudende discussie over de hoofddoek is een symptoom van het grote onbegrip en van de grote 
tegenstellingen die er tussen bevolkingsgroepen bestaan.” 
66 Original text: “In onze cultuur hebben we bereikt dat een meisje geen hoer meer is als ze seks voor 
het huwelijk heet. Moslims komen uit een cultuur waarin de maagdelijkheid van een ongetrouwde 
vrouw nog reuzebelangrijk is. Alleen een kuise vrouw kan op respect rekenen. Wanneer je je in hun 
ogen etaleert als een keurige dame, en dat doe je blijkbaar met die hoofddoek, kom je zelfs in 
aanmerking voor positieve behandeling zoals ik in de tram ondervond.” 
 	   173 
    After discussing the different meanings of the headscarf Manschot moves on to 
transformation. According to van Roode, we can only achieve change through the 
development of a liberal Islam and dialogue between different groups:  
 
“If we want to live together in a positive manner, we will have to get to know 
each other. For too long, we have lived in separate worlds and now we have to 
pay for it. For that reason, the debates between Muslims and non-Muslims 
should go on. I also believe in personal conversations between Muslims and 
non-Muslims. The positive results of those  will seep through, I believe, as a 
very optimistic person. Muslims will have to be prepared to discuss their own 
culture and interpretation of their religion.”67 (Van Roode, 2006, cited in: 
Manschot, 2006) 
 
This quote shows that van Roode focuses on the approach to the relationship between 
multiculturalism and feminism. Her answer to the question ‘how should we deal with 
differences in our society?’ is dialogue. Both groups should talk to each other with an 
open attitude. This also means that she does not say much about the expected results 
of these dialogues, or how she feels about certain (feminist) values. To put it in other 
words, she does not make a statement about what is negotiable and what is not, she 
just says we have to negotiate.  
    The interviewer has a rather different view on this issue and is much more focussed 
on certain values than on dialogue. When van Roode says that she will also try to talk 
to the boys on the streets, who whistle when she walks by, the interviewer responds: 
 
“A much more effective strategy would be that all women take off their 
headscarf. Then we will be right away released of the difference between 
‘whores’ and ‘non-whores’.”68 (Van Roode, 2006, cited in: Manschot, 2006) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Original text: “Willen we goed kunnen samenleven, dan zullen we ons in elkaar moeten verdiepen. 
We hebben te lang in gescheiden werelden geleefd en krijgen nu de rekening daarvan gepresenteerd. 
De debatten tussen moslims en niet-moslims die steeds meer gehouden worden, moeten daarom 
voortgaan. Ik geloof ook in een-op-eencontacten tussen moslims en niet-moslims. Positieve uitkomsten 
daarvan sijpelen dan weer door, denk ik als rasoptimist. Moslims zullen daarbij bereid moeten zijn hun 
eigen cultuur en interpretatie van het geloof ter discussie te stellen.” 
68 Original text: “Een veel effectievere strategie zal zijn als alle vrouwen hun hoofddoek afdoen. Dan 
zijn we in een klap af van het onderscheid tussen 'hoeren' en 'niet-hoeren'.” 
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The interviewer is not concerned about approaches; instead she wants to make sure 
that women are not divided into “whores and non-whores” anymore. Van Roode 
replies to this that such a policy wouldn’t be very strategic: women will not just stop 
wearing the headscarf overnight (Manschot, 2006).  
    Some might argue that the above-described differences of opinion are related to the   
divergence between universalism and relativism. I purposely have not used these 
terms however, because I believe that something else is at issue here. Interpreting this 
disagreement through the framework of universalism versus relativism will not help 
us to better understand the situation. Van Roode’s arguments cannot be described as 
relativist. Even though she does not want to commit to certain values beforehand, she 
does not say that every group’s values should be respected in all cases. Instead she 
proposes dialogue in order to get to know each other and debate different values and 
issues. Hence, van Roode focuses on the approach towards diversity, rather than the 
outcome she would prefer.  
    The discrepancy between thinking about processes/approaches and general values 
is probably an important cause of some of the disagreements between feminists in 
discussions about cultural and religious issues. There are not just different arguments 
in the debates, but different ways of thinking about the issue. I believe it is important 
to be conscious of these variations in thinking about multiculturalism and feminism 
and not to reduce them to classic frameworks such as relativism/universalism.  
 
 
Governing Minorities: Multiculturalism, Integration or Assimilation? 
 
Some authors/interviewees talk about the positive influence of religion/culture in 
women’s lives, most however discuss the problematic aspects of these concepts. Yet 
in the academic debates about multiculturalism and feminism, many authors, such as 
Susan Moller Okin, move beyond this theme and argue in favour of or against group 
recognition and state protection. This is connected to one of the most recurrent 
interpretations of multiculturalism, which starts from the idea that it is important to 
recognise cultural groups and safeguard the traditions and customs of these groups by 
granting specific group rights. In the recent public debates in the Netherlands on 
culture and religion we hardly ever find someone defending this interpretation of 
multiculturalism. Instead, most statements are about integration (and sometimes 
 	   175 
assimilation) of minority groups and hence the restriction of group rights and 
difference. Here, I will present the statements in Opzij regarding this aspect (minority 
policies) of multiculturalism. These remarks are either about, or aimed at, those who 
are involved in policy making (the government, members of parliament etc), or those 
who can be considered to be the objects of these policies (migrants, 'allochtonous' 
etc). In most cases authors or interviewees plead for the active involvement of the 
state in the integration or assimilation of migrants.  
    Writers Hafid Bouazza and politician Boris Dittrich both argue that the integration 
of migrants should be a ‘mutual project’, where gender equality is an important aspect 
of this reciprocal interpretation of integration. Dittrich makes the following statement 
about intervention:  
   
“First of all, we should not leave that to them alone, also it is very important 
that they discuss it among each other. That is why I am happy with Ayaan, 
because she functions as a booster. But we also have to intervene, as Dutch 
people and as politicians.”69 (Dittrich, 2005, cited in: Dresselhuys 2005a) 
 
This quote from Dittrich is a very general remark about intervention and the 
responsibility of both the 'autochtonous' Dutch and the migrants. What stands out 
however is that even though he argues that both the majority and the minority have a 
responsibility when it comes to integration, he does not seem to mean that both have 
to give in when it comes to norms and values. This fits exactly the division that Tariq 
Modood makes between assimilation, integration and multiculturalism (Modood, 
2007). Where assimilation is used to describe a one-way process, multiculturalism 
and integration are considered as two-way processes for which both minorities and 
the majority have to do something. Multiculturalism can be distinguished from 
integration because it combines the reciprocal process with respect for different 
groups. Hence, the concept of integration treats people as individuals; 
multiculturalism on the other hand also aims to give space to certain groups in 
society. Dittrich’s remarks fit the category of integration; he does not believe that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Original text: “Vooropgesteld: dat moeten we niet aan hen alleen overlaten, ook al is het heel 
belangrijk dat zij erover met elkaar in discussie gaan. Daarom ben ik blij met Ayaans functie als 
aanjager. Maar wij moeten ons er ook terdege mee bemoeien, als Nederlanders en als politiek.” 
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migrants alone can be blamed for a lack of integration. Society as a whole is 
responsible for that, which also means that, for example, governments and employers 
must take a lead in this process (Modood, 2007).  
Hafid Bouazza also refers to the responsibility of the majority (when asked about 
integration, but not in the sense of the above-described two-way process:  
 
“Dutch people have to interfere in this intensively. Self-reflection and change 
in Islam have to come from Europe. Simply, because according to the Qu’ran, 
the basis for Islam, it is forbidden to ridicule the prophet. And everything that 
differs from  the traditional dogma is regarded as ridiculing, and, again 
according to the Qu’ran, this will be heavily punished, sometimes even with 
the death penalty.”70 (Bouazza, 2004, cited in: Dresselhuijs 2004b) 
 
Bouazza does not want the majority to get involved because he thinks both groups 
should work together, but because he believes that change will not come from within. 
He argues that Dutch people have to get involved in order to change Islam (into a 
more self-reflective religion). This statement includes many sub-arguments and 
assumptions about certain groups, but if we apply the ‘assimilation-integration-
multiculturalism division’ to this quote, we also see that Bouazza’s main message is 
one of Muslims having to adapt to Western values.  
    Paul Cliteur argues that we should not give in to the wishes of “multiculture-
lovers” (Dresselhuijs, 2004b), who believe that our multicultural society should be 
made visible everywhere. Instead, he argues, we should aim for a ‘neutral state’:  
 
“Especially a pluriform society would benefit from a further neutralising of 
the state. Just as with a football game, where the referee should be upright 
neutral in order to be able to bring together parties with huge differences; a 
plausible state authority has to be neutral too. Hence: we can have 
headscarves, yarmulkes and crosses in parliament, because they are 
representatives of the people, but not in the government, nor in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Original ext: “daar moeten Nederlanders zich intensief mee bemoeien. Want zelfreflectie en 
verandering in de islam moeten uit Europa komen. Heel simpel, omdat in de koran, de basis voor de 
islam, een verbod staat om te spotten met de profeet. En alles wat afwijkt van de traditionele leer wordt 
gezien als spotten en daar staat, alweer volgens de koran, een zware straf op, soms zelfs de doodstraf.” 
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courtrooms, the army or the police. Balkenende, as prime minister, should not 
refer to Jesus or Mohammed anymore, nor should the Queen. The Dutch 
should focus on the French model of the neutral state.”71 (Cliteur, 2004, cited 
in: Dresselhuijs 2004a) 
 
According to Cliteur, the influence of religion in the public sphere should be as little 
as possible: religion should be a private thing. This also includes a strict separation of 
church and state. Besides the question of whether one could call the French laïcité 
model neutral, one could argue that the model that Cliteur proposes here, is very 
different from the general Dutch interpretation of state neutrality, which is highly 
influenced by pillarization. 
    When we move attention to what these authors say about gender equality (in 
relation to integration) we see a similar pattern. Dittrich wants dialogue between 
different groups, but also points out that certain values are non-negotiable: 
 
“Politicians should lead the discussions, in the sense that we say: certain 
things such as the equality between men and women and heterosexuals and 
homosexuals are achievements in our society, we do not compromise on 
that.”72 (Dittrich, cited in: Dresselhuys 2005a) 
 
He mentions circumcision as an example; according to him all girls should be 
checked at school (also non-Muslim) and he wants heavy punishments for parents 
who circumcise their daughters, for instance withdrawal of the residence permit.  
    Hafid Bouazza is again more explicit in his statements here than Dittrich. When it 
comes to the integration of Muslims he sees two priorities to fight: illiteracy and the 
oppression of women. The emancipation of women is an important aspect of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Original text: “Juist een pluriforme samenleving is gebaat bij een verdere neutralisering van het 
staatsgezag. Zoals je bij een voetbalwedstrijd een scheidsrechter van onbesproken neutraliteit moet 
hebben om heftig verschillende partijen tot elkaar te brengen, zo moet ook de staat geloofwaardig zijn 
als neutrale arbiter. Dus: wel hoofddoeken, keppeltjes en kruizen in de Kamer, want dat zijn door het 
volk gekozen vertegenwoordigers, maar niet in het kabinet, noch bij de rechtbank, noch in het leger of 
bij de politie. Balkenende zal, als staatsman, niet meer moeten verwijzen naar Jezus Christus of 
Mohammed, net zomin als de koningin. De Nederlandse staat moet zich oriënteren op het Franse 
model van de neutrale staat.” 
72 Original text: “De politiek moet zelfs leiding geven aan de discussie, in die zin dat men zegt: 
bepaalde zaken als de gelijkstelling van mannen en vrouwen en hetero's en homo's zijn 
verworvenheden in onze samenleving, daar leveren wij geen centimeter van in.” 
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integration (or assimilation) of a whole group and should therefore have priority over 
other things, such as respect for cultural or religious groups (Dresselhuys, 2004b). For 
that reason he very much supports Ayaan Hirsi Ali and her approach to these issues: 
 
“We have to realise that we live in a free country, but that a large part of our 
citizens, Muslim women, do not have this freedom. If you regard Muslim 
women, whom she defends, as a part of the Dutch society, then you fight for 
them; if you do not and argue that they are part of Islamic culture then you 
exclude them twice. This struggle should not be gradual, but rebellious, with 
great steps in a revolutionary way.”73 (Bouazza, cited in: Dresselhuys 2004b) 
 
In this quote, we can see all the aspects of the previously mentioned themes: his view 
on integration as a rather one-way process and his provocative, neo-realist style of 
argument. In the following section, I will move attention to a particular issue in the 
integration debates: the headscarf.  
 
 
The Headscarf Case: More Discussion and Stricter Laws 
 
Cisca Dresselhuys has an in-depth conversation on the headscarf in the Meetlat 
interview with Afshin Ellian. Like the previously mentioned authors, Ellian believes 
that the Dutch should intervene: people in the Netherlands should have had a (more 
engaged) discussion on the headscarf, just as they did in France. According to him:  
 
“It would have given an enormous support to 'allochtonous' women and girls. 
(…) What kind of support do you give these girls when you say: ‘well, a 
headscarf, what does it matter, just a piece of cloth’. It matters a lot because in 
most cases it is not a free choice. Or do you call it a free choice when a girl 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Original text: “We moeten beseffen dat we in een vrij land leven, maar dat een groot deel van onze 
eigen burgers, de moslimvrouwen, die vrijheid niet hebben. Beschouw je moslimvrouwen, voor wie zij 
opkomt, als onderdeel van de Nederlandse maatschappij, dan vecht je voor ze; doe je dat niet, zeg je 
dat ze tot een eigen islamitische cultuur behoren, dan sluit je ze tweemaal buiten. De strijd moet niet 
geleidelijk gaan, integendeel: het moet rebels gaan, met schokken, revolutionair.” 
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decides to wear a headscarf not to be bothered by 'allochtonous' boys and 
men.”74 (Ellian, cited in: Dresselhuys 2006b) 
 
Ellian does not believe that women choose freely to wear a headscarf and therefore 
wants the Dutch government to help them with a public debate and restrictive 
policies. In his view, people very often oversimplify things when they say that women 
should have the choice to wear a headscarf or not. According to Ellian the party 
leader of the green left party (Femke Halsema) for instance supports the oppression of 
women with her noncommittal standpoint on the headscarf: 
 
 “If a girl tells her family she does not want to wear the headscarf, the father 
will say: Femke Halsema thinks it is ok. You are a whore if you don’t wear 
one”75 (Ellian, 2006, cited in: Dresselhuys 2006b).  
 
    Ellian’s ideas about ‘helping Muslim women’ are based on the idea that they are 
forced to wear a headscarf. He believes that these women are oppressed and that a 
liberal government that believes in the equality of its citizens should intervene in this 
kind of situation. He might have an important point, but only if these women are 
really oppressed (and/or hurt) and need the government’s help. The intrusion of the 
state in the lives of individuals should not be taken lightly, especially when one thinks 
from a liberal perspective. The question is however: how do we know if these women 
are really oppressed? Ellian does not really answer this question (in this interview).  
    What he does say clearly is that he condemns the fact that Muslim women do not 
have a free choice when it comes to the headscarf. He believes that laws (or policies) 
can be an instrument for girls in the discussions with their fathers and give them more 
space to make their own decisions. One could question whether his proposal is 
consistent with this idea. When Dresselhuys for instance mentions the special 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Original text: “daarmee hadden wij veel allochtone vrouwen en meisjes een enorme steun in de rug 
gegeven. Wat voor steun geef je zulke meisjes als wij zeggen: "Ach, zo'n hoofddoek, wat maakt het uit, 
zo'n stukje textiel" Het maakt heel veel uit, want in de meeste gevallen gaat het niet om een vrije keus. 
Of noem je het een vrije keus als meisjes de hoofddoek omdoen omdat ze dan met rust gelaten worden 
door allochtone jongens en mannen.” 
75 Orginal text: “als een meisje thuis zegt dat ze geen hoofddoek om wil, zegt haar vader: ‘Femke 
Halsema vindt dat wel goed. Jij bent een hoer als je het niet doet” 
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headscarves that girls wear at work in her local supermarket (with the company’s logo 
and colour), Ellian argues we should boycott these stores: 
 
“That boss could have helped that girl by saying: no headscarves behind the 
pay desk. Then this girl could have told that to her father. And the choice 
would have been: headscarf or job.”76 (Ellian, 2006, cited in: Dresselhuys 
2006b) 
 
In my view, this suggestion does not give much extra space for these girls’ decisions. 
In the above quote there are only two people who are making decisions: the girl’s 
employer and the girl’s father.  
    In the next quote, Ellian takes his argument a step further. Here he not only argues 
that Dutch society should ‘help’ these women with regulations against headscarves, 
but he also accepts the fact that this might mean that these women have to have 
serious fights about it with their families. When we forbid the headscarf in public 
spaces: 
 
“the father could say two things: ‘you stay at home’, or ‘leave the headscarf’. 
In Muslim culture, children are the true pensions of their parents. Therefore it 
is very important that the children have good jobs, people will give up a lot for 
that. If the father chooses the headscarf, there will be a little civil war in that 
home. That is not so bad, as long as there are no weapons used. Civil wars 
often lead to democracy.”77 (Ellian, 2006, cited in: Dresselhuys 2006b) 
 
In my view, Ellian is asking a lot from Muslim women in this quote. Even if they 
agree with Ellian’s standpoint, many women might not want to risk family relations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Original text: “Ik zou er niet willen kopen. Die baas had dat meisje juist kunnen helpen door te 
zeggen: Geen hoofddoek achter de kassa. Dan had dat meisje dat thuis tegen haar vader kunnen 
zeggen. De keus was dan geweest: hoofddoek af of geen baan.” 
77 Original text: “Dan zou vader twee dingen kunnen zeggen: ‘Je blijft thuis’ of ‘Doe de hoofddoek dan 
maar af’. In de islamitische cultuur vormen kinderen het echte pensioen. Het is dus heel belangrijk dat 
kinderen een goede baan krijgen, daar heeft men veel voor over. Als vader voor de hoofddoek kiest, 
dan wordt het daar thuis een kleine burgeroorlog. Dat is helemaal niet erg, zolang er maar geen wapens 
aan te pas komen. Uit burgeroorlogen komt vaak de echte democratie voort.” 
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on the basis of it. Furthermore, again the Muslim women themselves are not making 
any choices here, which was the original problem Ellian wanted to solve.  
    To summarise, we can say that all three of these authors want more intervention 
when it comes to issues related to multiculturalism. Discussions about integration and 
stricter laws are the most important suggestions. Even though these authors differ in 
their focus and style, they all propose to have more debates and develop more policies 
for culture-related issues. None of the authors however suggest laws to accommodate 
the cultures and/or religions of minorities in society.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I have analysed 3 years of Opzij articles on the relationship between 
feminism and multiculturalism. All articles were analysed through a combination of 
critical discourse analysis and argumentation analysis. This combined method made it 
possible to evaluate both the content and structure of arguments and the rules of the 
discourse (who is included and who is excluded, what categories are used etc). The 
central questions asked in each section were: what problems and what solutions are 
proposed? For most of the articles the answers to these questions covered the most 
important messages. Some articles however centred on other questions or statements. 
The group of articles on Muslim women for instance dealt mostly with the question: 
why do these women make certain choices? A majority of the articles on 
multiculturalism were in fact about Islam and Muslims, which is probably related to 
the fact that this religion plays a growing role in the current (Dutch) discussions about 
migrants. 
    The chapter was divided into three main themes: the style of the debates, 
interpretations of feminism and emancipation, and discussions about culture, religion 
and multiculturalism. The first section, on the style of debating, showed that many 
articles in Opzij contained neo-realist elements, such as the ‘dare to face the facts’ 
arguments and the strict aversion to the left-wing elite. The structures of the debate 
were also shown to have become an important aspect of the debate itself. In other 
words, arguments about style and approaches were often used to back certain 
statements. Ayaan Hirsi Ali was the most-discussed person in this context. Many of 
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the interviewees and authors reviewed her approach towards Islam and gender 
equality and either valued her for her courage or disapproved of her style.  
    In the second section, it became clear that Muslim women were included in Opzij 
articles (for instance through interviews), but in a rather limited way. In the sections 
on feminism, the issues of experience and feminist standpoints played a very 
important role. ‘Should we or should we not listen (more) to the opinions of Muslim 
women?’ was the question that many authors and interviewees asked. The theoretical 
issue connected to that question is: what counts as a feminist standpoint? Some 
women argued that white feminists should get more involved in the struggles of 
Muslim women, others disagreed and pleaded for more particular interpretations of 
feminist values such as equality. What all articles in this section shared though was 
the aim to theorise feminism. In the articles on Muslim women, feminism was not 
theorised. The biggest difference between these articles on feminism in Opzij and 
those on Muslim women is that the first explicitly discussed how feminism should 
deal with culture and religion, in the latter authors and interviewees mainly focussed 
on why Muslim women make certain religious or cultural choices. In other words, 
there was one category of articles in which feminism and feminist standpoints were 
theorized and a separate one in which Muslim women’s choices were investigated. 
This means the articles that focus on Muslim women do not theorise how Muslim 
women see feminism. It seems that this is connected to the conceptualisation of 
feminism in Opzij. Instead of discussing different interpretations of feminism, such as 
Muslim feminism and secular feminism; Opzij’s articles either talk about how 
feminists should deal with difference or about the decisions of Muslim women. This 
way, it seems they position secular/white feminists on one side and Muslim women 
on the other.  
    The final part of this chapter focussed on religion, culture and multiculturalism. In 
some articles, authors and interviewees discussed the positive influence of culture or 
religion on their lives, for example because the Qur’an was a source of inspiration. 
Others talked about the negative aspects and for example the possible dangers of a 
fundamentalist Islam. The first group had a much more personalised and flexible view 
of religion and culture, while the latter focussed more on certain dominant 
perspectives. The headscarf and burqa were much-discussed themes. Differences of 
opinion arose because some authors focussed on the individual choices of women, 
while others were more interested in symbolic meanings. These different layers of the 
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discussion were hardly ever made explicit in the Opzij articles, which made it difficult 
to have a proper discussion of the actual arguments. Just as with the standpoint and 
experience issue, it would improve the discussion to make these different layers more 
overt.  
    Another point we see in this chapter is the discrepancy between those who focus on 
certain interpretations of feminist values and those who consider feminism to be a 
process or guide with whose help we can think about progress. In the first case, 
authors or interviewees argued that we should not allow certain cultural practices 
without critical evaluation of their content and consequences. Feminists in the 
Netherlands fought against patriarchal customs in our culture and should not allow 
similar issues in other cultures. The second group state that white/secular feminists 
should inform themselves on how, for instance, Muslim feminists fight for gender 
equality, often within their religious communities. This means that white/secular 
feminists should try to understand Muslim feminists’ choices, have respect for them 
and start a dialogue about feminism. In some cases these two standpoints collide 
because they approach feminism in a different way. But, in my view they can also 
come together and learn from each other: we can think about productive and 
respectful feminist dialogues without giving up on certain feminist values.  
    This in-depth analysis of the arguments and discourse structure of Opzij teaches us 
that the many different views on the relationship between feminism and 
multiculturalism are partly related to a lack of clarity in the discussions. Often the 
many layers of these discussions were not recognised or made explicit. Furthermore, 
this analysis demonstrates how feminism is interpreted in Opzij, who is included in 
the theorization of it and who is excluded. In order to enhance our understanding of 
the relationship between multiculturalism and feminism, I would argue that we need 
to uncover the many different layers of the arguments and to make explicit the power 
relations and in/exclusion in the interpretation of the main concepts. In the next 
chapter, I will analyse the focus groups I held with women from women’s 
organisations to investigate these central issues further.  
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Chapter 6 Exploring the Public Debate Further: Grassroots Organisations 
and Minority Group Voices 	  	  
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter I investigated the way multiculturalism and feminism have 
been discussed in the feminist magazine Opzij in the years 2004 -2007. Various 
patterns and arguments could be recognised in the articles on these themes. Feminist 
standpoints for instance played an important role in many of the articles. ‘Should we 
or should we not take into account the experiences of Muslim women?’ was a central 
question for many authors and interviewees of Opzij. It was noteworthy that such 
epistemological questions around feminist standpoints were mostly discussed from a 
white and secular perspective. Muslim women were generally not involved in the 
theorization of these issues, and often only came into the picture through the 
discussions about their choices. Questions such as ‘why do Muslim women wear the 
veil?’ are an example of this. In other words, it was not the case that Muslim women 
could not speak in Opzij or that they weren’t listened to. On the contrary, there were 
many interviews with Muslim women. But most of the time they were objects of 
certain ‘why’ questions, instead of active agents of feminism. Their choices were 
investigated, but never became part of an (alternative) analysis of what feminism is 
about.  
    In this chapter I will build on the conclusions from the previous chapter and move 
to the analysis of the focus groups that I conducted with women from various 
women’s organisations. The interviews were only semi-structured and generally 
covered three main aspects of the discussions about multiculturalism and feminism: 
the debates in the media about this subject, the women’s personal experiences, and 
their collective or political activities and strategies. The goal was to find out these 
women’s ideas about the concepts of multiculturalism and feminism and to theorise 
the relationship between these concepts with them. The overall aim was then to 
provide a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between 
multiculturalism and feminism, and to attempt to reach a consensual conclusion to the 
issue of the presumed tensions between these concepts. The in depth argumentation 
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for talking with these women and to theorise these issues with them, can be found in 
the previous chapters (3 and 4), but can be summarised by arguing that there are many 
differences between women and that feminism should work with these differences by 
developing situated knowledges, in which various standpoints are taken into account. 
Women in general and feminists in particular are struggling to find ways to position 
themselves in debates about religion and culture. We need to give voice to these 
different opinions and try to find openings for dialogue in order to prevent feminism 
to becoming an exclusionary concept that only appeals to a limited group of women. I 
do not mean to say that feminism should therefore take a relativist perspective, but I 
would like to argue that feminism should be open to different interpretations and 
dialogue. Or, as Tariq Modood puts it when he talks about multiculturalism: ‘We are 
not being asked to approve or disapprove in an ultimate way but to allow co-presence, 
public support, interaction and societal redefinition’ (Modood, 2007, p 67).  
    The interaction and multivocal narratives that occur in focus groups make them a 
highly suitable method for accessing certain marginalised or ‘subjugated’ voices 
(Leavy, 2007 in: Nagy, Biber, and Leavy (ed). 2007). First of all, focus groups are 
generally considered to create the most equal relationship possible between researcher 
and interviewees (Wilkinson, 2004). Contrary to a one-to-one interview, in a focus 
group the researcher is outnumbered by the interviewees. This can make it easier for 
them to take control of the conversation and shift the balance of power. The effect is 
strengthened by the fact that focus groups are often only partly structured by the 
researcher. In other words, there are plenty of possibilities for the interviewees to 
influence the development of the discussion and to steer it in a different direction 
from the one the researcher might have planned. For some researchers this might be a 
disadvantage, but feminist researchers have argued that the possibility for 
“participants to contribute to setting the research agenda, results in better access to 
their opinions and conceptual worlds” (Wilkinson, 2004). In this research project 
these characteristics of focus group analyses are considered to be highly valuable. The 
main aim of doing the interviews was to investigate the opinions of various women 
who are active in women’s organizations; about multiculturalism and feminism, and 
to scrutinize which arguments, strategies and experiences are excluded from the 
public debate. If the researcher had total control over the conversation, it would have 
been very difficult, if not impossible, to get to the heart of these (marginalised) 
arguments and strategies.  
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     Another advantage of doing focus groups in a research project like this one is that 
focus groups produce socially situated knowledges. The dynamics in the group can 
make it possible for participants to make connections between certain opinions, which 
they had not been able to make before. If one woman for example mentions a certain 
experience, another might remember she has been through something similar and can 
possibly explain the way she has dealt with it. This is important because it might help 
participants to mention things they had forgotten about or would otherwise consider 
as unimportant, but it also shows how individual experiences can be turned into 
‘collective sense making’ (Wilkinson, 2004). Even though the women in my focus 
groups were already active in women’s organisations and rather conscious about 
issues such as emancipation and religion/culture, there were several instances where 
they also learned from the experiences of other group members and used the 
opportunity to theorise these issues together during the conversation. This shows that 
focus groups in general, but the ones conducted for this research project particularly, 
are also a good instrument for developing alternative arguments and strategies. This 
was the main aim of the focus groups from the beginning; they should not be 
considered as a representation of women’s opinions on multiculturalism and 
feminism, but are instead more comparable to ‘think tanks’ that try to put forward and 
develop alternative views on these issues (compared to the ones we generally 
encounter in public debates).  
    Before moving to the description of the content of the focus groups, I will first 
describe the sample and approach. The analysis of the group interviews that follows 
will be divided into three main parts (in accordance with the prescriptions of the first 
part of the empirical study that explored the debate through a feminist media outlet): 
media and representation, multiculturalism and the implications of religion/culture, 
and finally different interpretations of and approaches to feminism and emancipation  
 
 
Sample 
 
The main purpose of this fieldwork is to describe and compare different discourses on 
multiculturalism and feminism that are not found in the popular media. This chapter 
will therefore aim to broaden the perspectives on these issues by referring to the 
arguments and experiences of women from many different backgrounds. Do they 
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think about these issues differently from the way they are covered in the mainstream 
media? Do they experience tensions between their culture or religion and feminist 
thinking? What other related problems are they faced with and what coping strategies 
do they employ to solve these? In order to get an adequate range of answers to these 
questions, it was necessary to get a broad sample that would be representative of the 
diversity in women’s organisations in the Netherlands. A total of nine different 
organisations were chosen to cover the major groups that have a say in the debate: 
BIZ, ZAMI, FNV Vrouwenbond, Daral Arqam, Yasmin, Al Nisa, E-quality and 
SCALA en Interreligieuze Dialoog. The organisations differed in terms of their main 
target group (country of origin, religious affiliation, civil status), their action process 
(discussion, self-help, or information centres) and their focus of intervention 
(emancipation, empowerment, or experience sharing). The aim was to bring together 
as many different organisations as possible, in order to produce as many different 
arguments as possible, on the basis of a fair representation of women’s organisations 
in the Netherlands. The organisations in the sample were selected because they were 
not only interested in feminism- or emancipation-related issues but also in cultural 
and religious issues (or diversity).  
    All organisations were approached via either email or telephone and informed 
about the aims and approaches of the research. Most organisations responded 
positively to the project, only few declined the invitation to participate, mainly for 
time-management reasons. Prior to the interview, the groups were sent an information 
sheet (see appendix I) about the content of the research project and their participation 
in it. Before the interviews all participants signed the consent form (see appendix II). 
Different numbers of women attended the various focus groups; there was a variation 
from 4 to 20 participants. In all cases, my initial contact person at the organisation 
arranged the time and place of the meeting and also invited the women of her group. 
Depending on the group, the women involved were either doing paid work for the 
organisation or worked there as volunteers. Because most of the focus groups were 
held in the organisations’ own spaces, the women usually felt comfortable and had 
rather informal discussions about the issues involved. For more information on the 
prepared questions, see appendix III.  
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    The first group to be interviewed was the network BIZ. This nation wide Turkish 
women’s group aims to give a voice to Turkish women in the Netherlands who have 
experienced higher education78 They do this by bringing women together through 
their own network and by uniting other different networks. BIZ aspires to develop a 
common vision from where the group can respond to current issues in society and be 
a soundboard for politicians, media and policy makers. BIZ also helps women to gain 
information and knowledge about various subjects for Turkish women. Through this, 
the network also aims to improve the position of migrant, especially Turkish, women 
in the Netherlands. The (4) women in the interview were all volunteers of the 
organisation. They meet regularly to share experiences, to support each other and to 
set up meetings for all members of the organisation. The women were all of Turkish 
background, though some were born in the Netherlands and were between 20-40 
years old. They all called themselves Muslim, but only some were practicing 
Muslims.  
    The second group in the sample is ZAMI.79 This is a self-organisation of black, 
migrant and refugee women.80 The main objectives of ZAMI are: to promote the 
consciousness and identity of black, migrant and refugee women, to provide insights 
into the position of migrant women in Dutch society, and to contribute to knowledge 
about these women. ZAMI provides a political and cultural podium for all black, 
migrant and refugee women in and outside of Amsterdam. The main activities are a 
multicultural café with entertainment, discussion and a restaurant (ZAMI CASA), a 
magazine that focuses on the activities and experiences of black, migrant and refugee 
women (ZAMI MAGAZINE), and an annual prize for black, migrant and refugee 
women whose motivation, example and work provide inspiration for improving the 
position of black, migrant and refugee women in the Netherlands (ZAMI AWARD). 
The (5) women in the interview were volunteers and board members of the 
organisation. They were from different national and religious backgrounds. Some 
were born in the Netherlands; others had migrated to this country later in their lives 
(one as refugee). Their ages varied between 26-60.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 This information comes from: http://www.netwerk-biz.nl 
79 This information comes from: http://www.zami.nl 
80 This term (in Dutch: zwarte/migranten/vluchtelingen vrouwen, or ZMV-vrouwen) is used in the 
Netherlands to describe various non-white women. 
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    The third group is rather different, but also very engaged with issues related to 
women and diversity: FNV Vrouwenbond, the trade union’s women’s group.81 The 
organisation aims to improve the position of all women, with a special focus on 
‘forgotten groups’ such as women who combine work with taking care of children, 
women on welfare, widows, volunteers etc. Another important aspect of the FNV 
Vrouwenbond strategy is to try to reach women from all backgrounds such as 
young/old, doing paid/unpaid jobs, black, migrant and refugee women and white 
women. This is reflected in their activities, which are not just related to paid work, but 
also to care-related issues or other work-related issues, such as pensions. Finally, 
FNV Vrouwenbond has its own magazine and is politically active, for instance by 
advising political parties how to improve the position of women. The interview was 
held on one of the discussion evenings (that day’s theme was diversity) and was 
attended by (7) board members who were volunteers for the group. The majority of 
the women came from the Netherlands and were raised in Christian families. Most of 
them were not religious (anymore). Two women were originally from Turkey, one of 
them called herself an atheist now; the other was a practicing Muslim. The women’s 
ages ranged between 28-61.  
    The fourth group interviewed is Daral Arqam. Like the first two groups this is a 
self-organisation, but Daral Arqam is based on religion instead of national or other 
ethnic categories.82 Several Dutch women who chose to live according to Islam 
started the group. Today the group brings together women of different ages from 
many different countries. Daral Arqam organises lectures and meetings to discuss 
issues related to Islam. The group’s main aim is to contribute to the emancipation 
process of Muslim women without letting go of their identity. They study Islamic 
texts themselves and bring forward ways to combine Islam and emancipation. Other 
activities of the group are children’s education (on the Qu’ran) and a buddy project, in 
which Muslim women support other women who need help. The (6) women in the 
interview were very diverse in both national background and age, which is consistent 
with the organisation’s goals. They all shared their Islamic faith, but some were born 
in a Muslim family while others had converted to this religion later in life. Some of 
the women were volunteers for the organisation; others were active members who 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 This information comes from: http://www.fnvvrouwenbond.nl/index 
82 This information comes from: http://www.moslimainrotterdam.nl/ 
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attended the meetings. The youngest participant of the interview was 16 and still in 
high school; the oldest was 49.  
    The fifth group in the sample is Yasmin. This is an educative and cultural centre for 
migrant women, mainly from Turkey, Morocco and Arabic speaking countries. The 
main aims of Yasmin are: to fight the isolation of many migrant women, to promote 
the emancipation, participation and integration of migrant women and girls, to 
promote social cohesion between different (ethnic) groups in the Netherlands, and to 
protect the interests of these women and empower them. Yasmin organises social 
meetings, informative meetings, conferences, debates and cultural activities. Most of 
the (7)  women in the interview were members of the cultural centre, who meet once a 
week to eat, drink and discuss their experiences. One participant was a paid staff 
member of the organisation. The women were all from either Turkish or Moroccan 
background and had migrated to the Netherlands. They all called themselves Muslims 
but only some of them were practicing their faith. The women’s ages ranged from 35-
55.  
    After Yasmin, the organisation SCALA was interviewed. Unlike the other groups, 
SCALA is an expertise centre with the main goal to emancipate women in 
Rotterdam.83 The organisation is dedicated to realising structural improvements to the 
position of women in general, as well as women from minority groups. SCALA aims 
to achieve this by providing policy advice and through the development of projects. 
The information centre also helps individual women with questions and problems. 
Women can simply come round for a talk. There is a care worker present who will 
listen, give advice and help find appropriate addresses or referrals. The (4) women in 
the interview were all paid staff members of the organisation. One woman was born 
in the United States and had been very active in the black feminist movement there; 
the others were born in the Netherlands (one in a Surinamese family). None of them 
called themselves religious. The women were between 26-48 years old.  
    The seventh group in the sample is Al Nisa. This is a self-organisation for and by 
Muslim women.84 The group originally started for converted women, but is now open 
to all Muslim women in the Netherlands. Their main goals are to provide information 
about Islam which is as independent as possible from specific cultural backgrounds, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 This information comes from: http://www.scalarotterdam.nl 
84 This information comes from: http://www.alnisa.nl/index.html 
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and to stimulate (Muslim) women to become better informed on issues related to 
Islam, the position of women in Islam and the position of Muslim women in Dutch 
society. Al Nisa’s main activities include: organizing social meetings for women, a 
monthly magazine, a quarterly youth magazine for children between 8 -15 years old, 
discussion meetings in which different groups (for instance from different religions) 
meet, and seminars about specific themes. In this interview, more women than usual 
participated (20) because the interview was integrated in a national volunteer’s day of 
the organisation. This also means that the participants were a mix of  (unpaid) board 
members and active volunteers. The women were from different national backgrounds 
(mainly Turkish, Moroccan and Dutch), but were all practicing Muslims. Some of 
them were not only personally but also professionally interested in the position of 
Muslims in Dutch society. The women were between 28-48 years old.  
   The eighth group is another self-organization, which is based like Al Nisa on 
religion, but this one brings together women from different religious backgrounds. 
The Amsterdamse Vrouwengroep (Vrouwengroep van de Raad voor 
Levensbeschouweingen en Religies te Amsterdam) is a network organization of 
women from various religious backgrounds with various viewpoints or philosophies 
of life. Since May 1998, the Women’s Group has been actively involved in organizing 
bi-annual meetings for women who wish to be involved in inter-religious and inter-
cultural dialogue. The group also publishes a digital newsletter once a month with 
articles, reports and a calendar of activities on the subject of inter-religious dialogue. 
Their main aim is to equip women with knowledge about the many different religions 
and cultures in the Netherlands, to create a bridge in the present multicultural society 
and to search for similarities in life’s goals and points of view. The (4) women in this 
interview were unpaid, active members of the network who meet regularly to organise 
inter-religious meetings. They were from different national (American, Turkish and 
Dutch) and religious (Jewish, Muslim and Christian) backgrounds. The youngest 
participant was 30; the others were between 48-59).  
    The ninth and final group in the sample is E-quality. Like SCALA, E-quality is an 
information and expertise centre.85 The organization’s main themes are emancipation, 
family and diversity. Unlike SCALA, E-quality does not work with individual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 This information comes from: http://www.e-quality.nl 
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women. Instead, they gather and analyse facts, figures, research data and practical 
examples. With the knowledge gained, they inform and advise governments, 
politicians and public organisations. E-quality aims at stimulating equal treatment, 
individual growth and equal development of all people. The website plays a central 
role in the distribution of E-quality’s publications and their news magazine E-Quality 
Matters provides people with information on emancipation and diversity. They also 
organise expert meetings, network events and training, and try to stimulate public 
debate by arranging speeches and lectures and publishing articles in magazines. The 
(5) women who participated in the interview were all paid staff members of the 
organisation. The majority were from a Dutch and Christian background, but did not 
identify themselves as religious (anymore). Most of them had been active in the 
feminist movement in the Netherlands; their ages varied between 35-48.  
 
 
Approach: to the Interviews and Analysis 
 
This thesis aims to scrutinize various discourses on multiculturalism and feminism 
and the concepts and ideas that lie beneath them. The analysis of the interviews in this 
chapter is the result of a search for lines of thinking that were not represented in the 
public media. Focus groups are an ideal instrument for producing this kind of 
knowledge. The conversations were informal and there was ample time for the 
women to propose certain themes to be discussed or not.  
    I conducted a total of 9 focus groups, each with the members/employees of one 
organisation. All focus groups were held in the period between April and June 2008. 
The average time of each discussion was 90 minutes; they were all taped with a 
digital recorder. The number of women in each focus group ranged from 4 - 20. In 
some cases the number of women was so high because the organisation arranged the 
focus group to coincide with one of their activities and invited volunteers to 
participate. A focus group with 20 participants is far from the norm, and such a large 
group is indeed difficult to lead.  However the women in this group knew each other 
very well, and were used to discussing these themes with each other and in fact had a 
very fruitful discussion.  
    I led all the interviews myself; except for the women from the group nobody else 
was present. I always started the conversation by introducing myself. I explained my 
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background, current work, and the aims of the research project. I also mentioned to 
the women that I was born in the Netherlands and not religious, but added to this that 
I didn’t consider myself to be a strict secular feminist. My purpose in doing this was 
to be open with them, in order to make the distance between them as interviewees and 
me as interviewer as small as I could. At the same time, I did not want to influence 
them, and so tried not to go into detail about my own ideas about multiculturalism and 
feminism. In some cases the women asked me afterwards how I felt about these 
issues, which often led to an interesting discussion in an opposite situation (they as 
interviewers, me as interviewee).   
    The interviews were semi-structured, which means that I prepared certain questions 
on important themes, such as culture, religion, emancipation, empowerment, 
participation and current political issues, while also allowing for free association on 
the relationship between multiculturalism and feminism. The main aim of these 
interviews was to explore different ways of thinking about multiculturalism and 
feminism, so it was important to discuss certain themes, but also to leave enough 
space for the interviewees to put forward other issues. My aim was to lead the 
discussion around the main themes of multiculturalism, feminism and the media. 
Depending on the particular discussion I would focus more on one or the other of 
these, and either go into certain detailed questions or not. In some focus groups I had 
to ask questions regularly in order to keep the conversation going, but in others there 
was more of a natural flow. I tried to use the input of the women as much as I could 
without losing sight of the structure of the conversations or the aims of the fieldwork. 
    In all focus groups the participants were very willing to discuss their experiences. 
Some women were more dominant than others; especially in the larger groups, but in 
the end all women shared their ideas and opinions. Sometimes the more vocal women 
corrected themselves and gave the word to others; in other cases I tried to involve the 
more silent women. Often, women showed initiative and brought up certain issues 
and posed extra questions to the group. These were generally interesting additions to 
the discussions and made the focus groups more democratic and less formal.  
    Like the media texts discussed in the previous chapter, the interviews will be 
analysed with a combined approach of argumentation and discourse analysis. This 
means that I will both focus on specific arguments made by the women, and also look 
at the context and inter-textual relations of the discourse. In my view, both parts are 
essential for a thorough analysis of a debate such as this one on multiculturalism and 
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feminism. As I want to rethink the relationship between multiculturalism and 
feminism, I cannot just focus on the second part, or I would run the risk of turning 
into a referee, who only checks whether the game is played by the rules, instead of 
looking at the issues at stake. On the other hand, an analysis of mere arguments would 
never be able to give a complete picture of the interests and power relations that 
influence the discussions.  
    The interview results were approached in a similar way to the Opzij articles. After 
conducting all the focus group interviews, I listened to all the recordings and made 
summaries of the discussions. In these abstracts, I briefly described the points that 
were made and issues that had come up. Just as in the previous chapter, two main 
questions were central for the data analysis: who or what is considered as the problem 
and who or what as the solution? I thus collected all the remarks that were made and 
grouped them according to the problem or solution they were referring to. 
Corresponding to the previous chapter, these were divided into 3 main categories: 
‘popular media and representation,’ ‘feminism and emancipation’ and 
‘multiculturalism, culture and religion-related issues’.  
    For each of these categories, I described the points of discussion that had come out 
of the interviews. All the problems and solutions that were put forward are included in 
the chapter; I did not make a selection at this point. However, I did select the quotes 
to be used in the chapter. In order to describe the different views on each topic, I 
chose those examples that best represented the variety of opinions about the different 
subjects of the interviews. Hence, only statements that were very similar to others I 
had included were not used in the chapter. Note though that the 3 categories were 
discussed in all the interviews, but in some groups the participants talked more about 
one theme than another. This means that I do not refer to all groups for all themes. 
    The chapter is structured by the main themes of the focus groups. First an analysis 
will be presented of the women’s arguments on media and representation; this will be 
followed by a section on multicultural issues and the implications of culture and 
religion. The final section, in which the focus group results are described, is dedicated 
to feminism and emancipation.  
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Media and Representation 
 
All interviews began with various questions around the debates on multiculturalism 
and feminism in the popular media. Islam and Muslims have been much-discussed 
themes in the Netherlands (and elsewhere) and often women’s issues were part of 
these debates. In particular, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders have 
become world famous with their comments on Islam-related issues. The short film 
Fitna, made by Geert Wilders, was released only a week before the first focus group 
was held and had already been endlessly discussed in the previous months (both in the 
Netherlands and abroad).86 The film shows footage of several terrorists attacks (for 
instance Madrid and New York), and warns of Muslim extremism in the world and 
the influence of the Islam on the Netherlands. Through this film, Geert Wilders 
showed his fears and negative associations with Islam in general and the Qur’an 
specifically. Many politicians judged the film harshly for presenting a generalised and 
sometimes just wrong perspective on Islam and Muslims. Geert Wilders was even 
denied entry into the United Kingdom, where he wanted to show his film in the House 
of Lords.87 
    The interviewees were both asked about the discussions on Islam, Muslims and 
women’s issues in general and about discussions on these issues from a more explicit 
feminist standpoint. The idea behind this was that even though most participants in 
discussions about multiculturalism refer somehow to women’s issues, the arguments 
of women who explicitly mean to speak from a female or feminist perspective might 
be experienced differently. The women from the various organisations responded in 
very diverse ways to both questions. The first question was mostly dealt with by 
arguing whether we should take these people seriously or not and whether we should 
even take the time to discuss them (again). The second question was answered more 
in relation to good or problematic strategies, approaches and intentions.  
    When asked about the public debate in the Netherlands on multiculturalism and/or 
Islam, Geert Wilders came to mind quickly.  Most women argued that they did not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 See for instance: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7318363.stm (UK) or 
http://www.rtl.nl/actueel/rtlnieuws/dossiers/dossier_paginas/film_geert_wilders.xm (NL) 
87 See for instance: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7885918.stm 
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take him seriously. They considered him to be a fool, who did not deserve this kind of 
attention. In one interview a woman said she felt that it was a waste of her time to talk 
about him: 
 
 “He has a democratic right to think what he wants, arguing against him will 
only put you on the same level. We should leave him and think for ourselves 
how we want to think about Islam” (FNV, 16 min). 
 
She compared the situation in the Netherlands with a family where one child has 
psychological problems: very often the only thing the family can talk about is the 
illness and the child’s problems.  
    In other interviews similar ideas were put forward about not taking Wilders too 
seriously, for example because his standpoints are too radical or because he is not 
even prepared to debate with his opponents. However, there were also women who 
believed he is a threat to Dutch society. They feared his influence and wanted to think 
and talk about how to stop him. In the interview with Interreligieuze Dialoog a 
woman mentions:  
 
“as a Jew I know what racism can do and I find it a scary idea that racists are 
living so nearby” (Interreligieuze Dialoog, 9 min). 
 
A comparable argument was put forward in the interview with ZAMI members. 
Wilders, one woman said, excludes certain groups of people who for that reason could 
feel less safe in our society: 
 
“The general vision of mister Wilders goes beyond Muslim women. The 
dangerous thing about him is that he has many followers among Dutch 
citizens and we cannot rule out the possibility that in 3 or 5 years he will be in 
government. And, how will his vision then be translated into policy? This idea 
is more frightening than the consequences of his remarks now. As an 
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organisation we should get prepared for this and think about strategies.” 88 
(ZAMI, 4 min). 
 
Another women in this group mentioned that we now see the enormous influence that 
Pim Fortuyn has had on the public debates in the Netherlands in general and on what 
can and cannot be said in particular. Finally, a woman in the same group points out 
that the kind of stereotyping of certain groups which Wilders uses can have negative 
consequences for the integration of these groups: “people do not want to integrate into 
a society they feel excluded from” she argued (ZAMI, 9 min.). In short, all women 
found the presence of a politician such as Geert Wilders problematic, but there were 
many different opinions about how to deal with such an issue. In general, none of the 
groups undertook any actions against Geert Wilders or his film. 
    When I asked the interviewees about their opinions on Ayaan Hirsi Ali, in 
comparison to for example Geert Wilders, women responded in a rather different 
manner. Where Geert Wilders was mostly discussed in a framework of ‘should we 
take him seriously or not?’, Ayaan Hirsi Ali was evaluated far more on her strategies. 
Interviewees talked about her in both positive and negative words, but almost always 
used her approach/tone/strategies as an argument for their statements about her. In a 
sense neither of these politicians were really accepted as ‘equals’ in the political 
arena. Wilders could or should be left aside because he is too extreme: people often 
seem to believe that extremists are foolish and do not have to be taken seriously. Ali 
on the other hand was evaluated more on the basis of her personal character, 
experience and approach: she is selfish, hurt, and her approach does not make sense. 
Her actual arguments were almost never scrutinized. In that context it is interesting 
and important for researchers to not only analyse her discourse on Islam and 
emancipation, but also to also evaluate how people talk about her and her politics.  
    Gloria Wekker shows us how the intersection between sexuality and race influence 
Dutch discourse and analyses the case of Ayaan Hirsi Ali (Wekker, 2009). Black 
women’s representation is always connected to sex and sexuality, and when we look 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Original text: “Die hele visie van meneer Wilders gaat veel verder dan alleen moslimas. Het 
gevaarlijke van hem is ook dat hij een grote aanhang heeft onder nederlandse bevolking en we mogen 
niet uitsluiten dat hij over 3 of 5 jaar ook echt in de regering zit. En hoe zal zijn gedachtegoed zich dan 
dan vertalen in beleid? En dat is beangstiger dan wat hij nu met zijn uitspraken al te weeg brengt. Als 
organisatie moeten we ons daarop instellen en er rekening mee houden en strategieen bedenken” 
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at how Ali is represented, we see a highly sexualised image. Wekker describes a 
collective feeling of being in love with her; she was the beautiful princess who said 
the things we wanted to hear: we don’t have to change; Muslims have to change 
(Wekker, 2009). In my focus groups, I don’t really recognise this sexualisation of 
Ayaan Hirsi Ali, but I would argue that it is remarkable how personalised the 
discourse on her is. Whether people are in favour of or against her; they use 
arguments related to her personality and personal experiences. In the magazine Opzij, 
most articles were also about Ayaan Hirsi Ali personally. Maybe the women I talked 
to did not ‘sexualise’ her as was done in the popular media, but they definitely talked 
about her in a different way from the way they talked about other politicians. 
Wekker’s approach helps us to understand the discourses on Islam and Muslims in a 
more nuanced way, because we can analyse and compare the anti-Islam discourse by 
Ayaan Hirsi Ali, with the discourse on Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Among other things, it will 
prevent us stigmatising one person for being anti-Islam and focus more on the 
mechanisms at hand in both discourses.  
    The most common remark by the interviewees on Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s contribution to 
the emancipation of women (in general and Muslim women specifically) was that 
they understood and supported (to a certain extent) what she was fighting for, but 
disapproved of her methods. Some women argued that Ali’s methods were 
counterproductive, others mentioned that she was self-obsessed or doing nothing new. 
In most cases, the criticism was rather personal, much more than for example with 
Geert Wilders. One woman from Daral Arqam asked an interesting counter question: 
 
 “why do we feel more attacked by Ayaan Hirsi Ali, than by someone like 
Geert Wilders? Is it because she is an ex-Muslim or just because her 
arguments are more intellectual?” (Daral Arqam, 3 min.). 
 
It was difficult to find an answer to this question, but the women did make some 
remarks about Ali that were echoed in most of the other interviews as well. Their 
primary argument was that she raised some interesting and important points, but the 
way she generalises her personal experiences to the rest of the Islamic world, is very 
problematic: 
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 “In Morocco for example, circumcision is no issue; she should have more 
attention for the differences within the Islamic world” (Daral Arqam, 4 min.). 
 
One interviewee of Daral Arqam continues that because Ali never worked together 
with any women’s organisation and her work was so explicitly anti-Islam, she didn’t 
reach the women she talked about. A woman from E-quality adds to this that if we 
hold on to strict interpretations of emancipation, we never change anything; 
 
“instead it is better accept the situation as it is, and to be prepared to make 
small steps towards emancipation” (E-quality, 7 min.). 
 
Finally, a woman from Interreligieuze Dialoog argued: 
 
“above all, we need positive examples for women, the negative debates as 
those initiated by Ayaan Hirsi Ali, bring us nowhere” (Interreligieuze Dialoog, 
16 min.). 
 
These examples show how women criticise Ali’s political strategies and suggest what 
other strategies might be more productive.  
    In most interviews we also talked about how the many debates in Islam in general 
influence the women’s lives. The responses ranged from being tired of it, to getting 
more faith. Before elaborating on the negative and/or positive experiences that 
women talked about in the interviews, I would like to mention the discussion about 
representation of Muslims that arose in the interview with women from Daral Arqam. 
After talking about Geert Wilders and Ayaan Hirsi Ali, one woman in this group 
asked: 
 
 “What do you think of the other side of the coin; we have people like Geert 
Wilders on the one hand, but what about the Muslims that we see on 
television? Do you recognise yourselves in what they say?” (Daral Arqam, 9 
min.) 
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The discussion that followed, I believe, tells us much about Islam in debates in the 
popular media in the Netherlands: the women argued that only the extreme voices are 
heard. 
 
 “We either see extreme Muslims (certain radical imams for example) or very 
political correct types, never a mainstream Muslim” (Daral Arqam, 10 min.) 
 
Another woman in this group mentioned that Muslims who reach headlines in a 
positive way, are often not called Muslim. They mention the Moroccan singer Hind as 
an example: “Is she Muslim? We don’t know” (Daral Arqam, 10 min.) “No”, added 
another woman, “because if Muslims reach the news positively, all of a sudden it 
doesn’t matter that they are Muslim” (Daral Arqam, 11 min.). A discussion with Al 
Nisa connects to this. The former director of this group mentioned that in all the years 
she was chair of Al Nisa, the feminist magazine Opzij never gave any attention to her 
or Al Nisa. The moment she left and a new chair took over (a woman who didn’t wear 
a headscarf) Opzij sent a request for an interview (Al Nisa, 24 min.). Just like the 
women from Daral Arqam, these interviewees from Al Nisa wondered why possible 
positive Muslim role-models hardly ever seem to be acknowledged.  
    Let us return now to the influence of the ‘Islam debates’ on the women in the 
interviews. When Islam is discussed in the popular media, it is mostly from a negative 
perspective. For example in Opzij it appeared that Muslim women were not included 
in the theorization of feminism. For many women in the interviews this is a difficult 
thing to deal with. First of all because they are so often asked to defend their way of 
life or beliefs: “as if the whole world lies on your shoulders”, as one woman put it (Al 
Nisa, 3 min.). Many women had some experience with prejudices, attacks, or 
judgments and most of them found it difficult to constantly have to respond to a fixed 
perception of ‘The Muslim woman’. One woman from Al Nisa found a way to play 
with this when she was verbally attacked on the street. A man came to her and said: 
“you dirty Muslim whore, I will get you”.  Her cunning answer was: “only if you 
convert to Islam you will be able to get me” (Al Nisa, 4 min). This way, she used the 
idea that Muslim women only marry Muslim men to respond to this man’s 
aggression. This is one of many examples of how these women have found ways to 
deal with the stigmatisation and discrimination they are confronted with, by holding 
on to their religious beliefs. I will discuss this in more detail in the next section.  
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    In other interviews the material consequences of prejudices were again put forward. 
A girl in the Daral Arqam group mentioned that she noticed that some of her friends 
(teenagers) were not applying for the jobs related to their education, because they 
didn’t want to have to defend their headscarves: 
 
“it is easier to just work for a call-centre, where nobody asks questions about 
your appearance and many other Muslim girls work”, (Daral Arqam, 32 min.). 
 
One of the older group members told the girl that this is a very problematic 
development and that we should encourage girls to apply for jobs on the level of their 
education: “Women who wear a headscarf can do every job there is, except maybe 
call-girl” (Daral Arqam, 30 min.). She clearly tried to convince her younger 
colleague/friend that the headscarf does and should not influence your functioning in 
the public sphere, and that these kinds of strategies mean you accept the prejudices 
about the headscarf and the idea that it does prevent you from properly executing 
certain functions.  
    In most of the interviews, women mentioned above all the positive effects of the 
extreme debates on Islam in the Dutch popular media. Most women argued that the 
radical attacks on their religion strengthened their faith and the belief that Islam is 
predominantly about peace: “I actually feel sorry for those who feel they need to 
attack our religion” (Al Nisa, 4 min.). Another thing that several women put forward, 
was that all the commotion around Islam, lead to a growing amount of younger 
people who are more interested in the background and basics of their religion: “they 
are now doing their own research so that they can position themselves in the debates” 
(Yasmin, 16 min.). Hence, this woman argued, the growing (negative) attention for 
Islam results in more knowledgeable believers.  
 
 
Multicultural Politics: Towards a Situated and Gendered Approach 
 
Besides representation issues, other aspects of the relationship between 
multiculturalism and feminism were discussed in the group interviews. In most 
interviews the women’s conceptualisation of feminism and emancipation were talked 
about most elaborately, but also multiculturalism and culture and religion related 
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issues were important aspects of the conversation. I asked the interviewees about their 
thoughts on multiculturalism, but most of the time, the women didn’t discuss 
multiculturalism in its strict interpretation (an ideology that aims to give space, both 
in the private and public sphere, to the different cultures living in a country). Instead 
most arguments were related to creating more understanding among Dutch people 
about, for example, certain Islamic traditions, the differences between religion and 
culture, and most of all about their own knowledge about their religion. The debates 
around the headscarf also returned in almost all interviews. In short, I would argue 
that these women were not so much thinking or talking around more or extra rights 
specifically aimed at their communities; instead they were trying to work with (and 
sometimes against) a variation of restrictions in their lives, connected to both their 
own community and others.  
    First of all, multiculturalism is generally connected to group rights. However, as I 
argued above, for many of the women in my focus groups, such group rights were not 
very much of an issue. In several interviews, the women argued that they did not want 
any extra rights; they just wanted to be treated equally, and as human beings (for 
instance Daral Arqam, 40 min.). Also in the interview with Interreligieuze Dialoog a 
woman argued that she just wanted to be a world citizen; we have to work together if 
we want to live a good life. For her this meant that she wanted to give space to 
cultural traditions, but not use the word multiculturalism: “multiculturalism is and 
should be self-evident; (…) it widens our view and brings us farther” (Interreligieuze 
Dialoog, 66 min.). A woman from another group said, that in her view, human rights 
correspond to Islam. Hence, specific group right are not an issue for them. 
Furthermore, they did not want to have stricter laws concerning cultural/religious 
customs either. Problematic customs such as circumcision are already prohibited, they 
argued. These statements led to an interesting discussion about maintaining these 
laws. One of the women’s husbands comes from Sierra Leone, where circumcision is 
practiced broadly. She would be in favour of school doctors asking the parents about 
their views on this, but was against yearly check ups (as suggested by for instance 
Ayaan Hirsi Ali). This would be too stigmatising and traumatising to the children, she 
argued (Daral Arqam, 36 min.). After a short discussion, the women in the group 
concluded that these things should be dealt with, but very carefully, and by constantly 
taking into account all the consequences of certain decisions. Summarising, one could 
argue that these women were not struggling to change the law or their legal 
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possibilities; instead they were more aiming to be treated like human beings in daily 
life. This doesn’t mean that they didn’t believe in differences and recognising them, 
but they did not feel that the law needed to be adjusted for this.  
    The fact that these women were not asking for extra group rights, but thinking more 
about how to deal with difference-related issues in their lives, very much connects to 
perspectives on multiculturalism such as those suggested by scholars as Paul Gilroy 
and Tariq Modood. They argue that more attention should be given to on the one hand 
‘conviviality’ (Gilroy, 2004) or how we work and live together in daily life, and on 
the other hand to ‘difference’ as perceived by ‘outsiders’ of a minority group 
(Modood, 2007). We can see that it is important to look at how these women (and 
other members of their groups) are perceived and treated by others outside the group 
(they want to be treated like humans). Moreover, just as Gilroy points, these women 
also argue that on a daily basis people are already living together and constantly 
making decisions about how to deal with certain differences. One can add to this that 
these women advise us to keep the discussions on multiculturalism localised instead 
of trying to develop general theories or opinions about multiculturalism related issues. 
The idea that perception of differences and daily experiences are important, and 
should not be dealt with through universal theories, is also confirmed by the many 
women who emphasised improving their own and other women’s knowledge of for 
instance Islamic traditions and the Qur’an, in order to judge better how to combine 
religious beliefs with daily practice, and ideas about for instance emancipation. Note 
that this interpretation is far from relativist. These women are not arguing that every 
culture has its own values, but rather try to put forward a more nuanced and situated 
viewpoint on both minority and majority perspectives on our multicultural society. In 
this context they very much stressed the importance of knowledge and understanding.  
        In the Daral Arqam interview, the women emphasised the importance of making 
local analyses and to be very careful with general policy, based on so called universal 
ideas. This counts for circumcision, they argued, but also for things like language 
lessons. These can be a fruitful tool to integrate women more into society, one of the 
women argued, but obligatory courses can also turn out to be very patronizing (Daral 
Arqam, 37 min.). Hence, we should always take into account the context and 
specificities of certain cases. This connects to a remark made by a woman from 
Yasmin about being able to recognise the possible different meanings of certain 
issues: “virginity can be a woman’s own choice; it can also lead to suicide because it 
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is an instrument of oppression” (Yasmin, 57 min.). We have to learn about the 
difference in order to prevent the latter from happening. Let me emphasise again that 
this is not about relativism, but an argument for more nuanced analyses. Or as a 
woman from ZAMI put it: “there is no general recipe for multicultural politics” 
(ZAMI, 41 min.).  
    Besides the above case for ‘situated knowledges’ (Haraway, 1991), other strategies 
or approaches to multicultural issues were mentioned in the focus groups. The three 
most recurrent ones were dialogue, consciousness raising and bans. To start with the 
latter, none of the women I talked to believed in the solution of banning customs or 
traditions. The law as it is now was the starting point for this discussion, meaning that 
it was assumed that for example circumcision was already illegal. Most women 
argued that bans do not solve anything (for example BIZ and ZAMI) and often result 
in new forms of oppression of women (BIZ, 35 min.). The women from SCALA 
argued for a more practical approach to multicultural issues. While they were very 
much in favour of dialogue and consciousness raising, they also emphasised the 
importance of helping individual women: 
 
“Big symbols are put against the interests of individuals. (…). Look for 
example at a country like Morocco, (…) doctors there also choose to use the 
pill89, rather doing something against their principles than finding a dead girl 
the next morning” (SCALA, 64 min.) 
 
The women of this group proposed a dual approach, in which there is both attention to 
the interests of individual women and to dialogue with a certain group in order to 
address problematic issues.  
    The last issue that I would like to raise in connection to strategies and approaches 
regarding multicultural politics is the combination of consciousness raising and the 
recognition of difference (or more inclusive models of feminism). In several group 
interviews these approaches were mentioned or discussed, but in the ZAMI focus 
group this led to a highly interesting and important discussion on the relation between 
these two concepts. The latter option assumes that there are different ways of looking 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 The pill this woman is talking about is the pill which is used to imitate so-called ‘virginal bleeding’ 
after intercourse.  
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at and dealing with feminist issues, while the first one starts from the idea that one 
group knows something and wants to make the other conscious of that. In other 
words, they have contradicting backgrounds and aims: change the other’s view, or 
accept the other’s view as legitimate. So, when is the first and when is the other 
appropriate? I will describe these women’s interpretation of feminism in more detail 
below, here it is important to understand the argument about difference. How to 
realise change is central is this discussion. Apparently, some things need to be 
stopped or transformed through consciousness raising and dialogue and other issues 
need more understanding and respect. It is impossible and undesirable to develop a 
‘masterplan’, but it appeared that more located approaches were also difficult to 
discuss. The main conclusion of the conversation was that we have to acknowledge 
that these issues should be approached as a process: there cannot be instant change. 
Starting from that, it was argued it should be made possible for people to grow 
(education) and to prevent one group dominating another (both when it comes to 
gender and ethnicity). Finally, one woman argued that these kinds of processes 
always entail tensions; we should not try to solve them, but go through the process 
(ZAMI, 55-78 min.). One woman concluded with the remark that friction creates 
shine90. Or, to use Rosi Braidotti’s ideas on affirmative ethics: work through the pain, 
instead of trying to deny or go against it (Braidotti, 2008). Note that this view differs 
much from many of the arguments posed in Opzij, where instant change was often the 
main aim.  
 
 
Religion and Culture: Knowledge is Power 
 
In the beginning of this section, I already mentioned that knowledge about religious 
and cultural traditions and customs was very important for many of the women in the 
focus groups. They aimed both at developing their own knowledge and informing 
people outside of their communities about their values and customs, in order to create 
more understanding. When it came to more understanding we see on the one hand that 
women wanted to familiarise non-Muslims with certain traditions and customs, on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 She used the saying: “Wrijving geeft glans” (ZAMI, 73 min.)
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other hand they also pointed out that they did not want exceptional treatments. One 
woman argued that she didn’t like it that her employer asked her (well meant) 
questions about how the discussions on Islam influenced her and whether she still felt 
at home in the Netherlands. These kind of remarks exactly confirmed that she is an 
outsider: “I am one of you, so don’t ask me whether I feel at home here, because I am 
at home here” (Al Nisa, 9 min.).  So even though this employer aimed to support her 
in this, for her it felt like again someone was placing her outside of Dutch society. 
This does not mean that people shouldn’t take certain differences into account, but 
instead that these differences should be more incorporated into the definition of 
‘being Dutch’. Another woman for example, mentioned that she regretted the fact she 
always had to ask for halal food: 
 
“I have to keep asking whether they have taken my (or certain customer’s) 
wishes into account and why I live according to certain rules” (Al Nisa, 17 
min.). 
 
So where the women of Al Nisa were asking for more understanding and 
consideration from their direct environment, they were also involved in initiatives to 
make people more familiar with Islamic traditions and customs. One woman for 
instance did workshops where people could get to know more about headscarves. 
People are often very reluctant to familiarise themselves with the piece of clothing, 
she argued. However, the first response after trying it on is often, “Oh, that actually 
does not look ugly at all” (Al Nisa, 11 min.). “Of course not” the woman replies: “it 
was never meant to make you ugly” (Al Nisa, 11 min.). The thing is, she argues, is 
that people make it ugly, which makes it also very difficult to wear (Al Nisa, 12 
min.). I will go into the headscarf debate in more detail later, this is just to show that 
the women in this group ask for a certain balance, which means that on the one hand 
they like to inform non-Muslims about their customs, and on the other hand, resist 
having to explain certain things over and over again.  
    We can see that the interpretation of multiculturalism by the women in the group 
interviews does not confirm the straight ‘group rights’ definition. The women from E-
Quality, who stated that diversity is a key term for them (rather than 
multiculturalism), confirmed this. They aim to make people aware of the power 
relations in the Netherlands and for example try to resist when yet another white man 
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is appointed for an important job in government or administration (E-Quality, 47 
min.). Just like the women of Daral Arqam these women argue that “the law itself is 
not the problem, but its implementation is” (E-Quality, 53 min.).  
    During the interview with E-Quality another issue was mentioned which I would 
argue should also be taken into account in our thinking about multiculturalism and 
feminism; namely the framing of the issues that is talked about and fight for. One 
woman from E-Quality argues that when they are thinking about issues such as 
circumcision they first of all start from the UN women’s treaty (E-Quality, 70 min.). 
Another adds to this that with these kinds of issues, they believe it is important to 
look at the broader context (E-Quality, 71 min.). In other words, do not just focus on 
this one issue, but try look at how this issue is related to other matters that influence 
the lives of women. This way, one could for example work on a broader alliance 
against violence. The attractive aspect of this approach, I would argue, is that it helps 
us to bring together many women who can struggle together for issues that are 
important to them, without any particular group being attacked for its view on gender 
relations. Hence, the focus is on the problem, not the possible cultural or religious 
arguments that are used to back it up. Again this shows that the women’s views on 
multiculturalism and feminism are often not about special group rights or relativism, 
but about re-framing our perspective on certain issues, or making more nuanced 
analyses of the problems and solutions.  
    Another aspect of the more dynamic perspective on multiculturalism in the 
discussions of the women involved in the interviews, is their emphasis on knowledge 
of their religion in general and the Qur’an specifically. In previous chapters, I 
described how Muslim women have developed various strategies when it comes to 
thinking about and working with their religion and emancipation. For instance, they 
develop multiple discourses connected to religious traditions, and re-interpret and re-
translate holy texts (Cooke, 2002). Thus, they criticise individuals and institutions that 
limit and oppress them (both within and outside Islam) and argue that we need to 
invest in alternative explanations of the Qur’an, which start from the main messages 
of the Qur’an and also contextualise the texts (Barlas, 2005).  
    The women in the focus groups also referred to these kinds of strategies in order to 
navigate between religious traditions and obligations and emancipation. Their views 
on emancipation and feminism will be discussed in detail in the next section, here it is 
important to note how essential it was for many of the women in the interviews to 
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improve their (and other women’s) knowledge of their religious and cultural customs. 
The differences between religion and culture are also part of this. One woman from 
Al Nisa for example argued:  
 
“We cannot just blame culture; religion also plays a part in it, and therefore it 
is so important that women have proper knowledge on for example the Hadith. 
If a man for instance uses a Hadith (…), which is very negative. (…) As a 
woman you should have knowledge of the Hadith so that you can say, ok, you 
have one, I can show you ten that say the opposite.” (Al Nisa, 43 min.). 
 
Another woman adds to this that we have to acknowledge the relation between culture 
and religion:  
 
“The traditional interpretations of the Qur’an and the Hadith are cultural and 
date from the 7th century Arabic peninsula, which was a patriarchal society. So 
it is not just culture. We have to be aware how culture has influenced religion 
and the interpretation of religion, and how it has become oppressive to women 
in certain ways” (Al Nisa, 43 min.). 
 
The interesting aspect of this woman’s argument is that she on the one hand tells us to 
recognise how culture and religion are interwoven in the interpretation of religion as 
we now know it (see above), but that at the same time we have to be aware of the 
distinction between religion and culture and recognise that Islam often leaves much 
more space to women than culture does (Al Nisa, 44 min.). This way, she can both 
criticise certain practices within her religion and resist those same practices by 
referring to holy texts. The key here is to recognise the power relations involved, the 
possible differences within religious traditions and the distinction between certain 
practices (or in this case religious traditions) and theory (or the holy texts). This 
approach opens a road to resistance from within, which is necessary, the women from 
Al Nisa add, because just recognising the differences between culture and religion and 
text and interpretation does not change anything about the interpretations that are still 
dominant (Al Nisa, 44 min.). An interesting example of this kind of resistance from 
within is the remark of one woman, who recalls the moment when a woman on the 
street addressed her about her blouse: 
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 “supposedly my blouse was to tight on the back, because she saw a man 
looking at me. The only thing I told her was: then, why did you not approach 
that man then?” (Al Nisa, 53 min.). 
 
Of course this is just an innocent incident, but it does show how one can make others 
conscious of the fact that being modest is not just expected from women, but also 
from men and hence, that it is a mistake to only hold women responsible for this.  I 
would argue that this also relates to Rosi Bradiotti’s interpretation of subjectivity as 
described in chapter 4. This woman’s remarks are closely connected to the “multiple 
micro-political practices of daily activism or interventions in and around the world we 
inhabit” (Braidotti, 2008 p 16) of which political subjectivity consists in Braidotti’s 
words.  
     
 
 
The Headscarf: Multiple Interpretations, Multiple Critiques 
 
The headscarf is a much-discussed subject in popular media and politics. I have 
analysed the many arguments in Opzij about headscarves and burqas, as well as in the 
broader public sphere where it remains an important theme. In France there were 
extensive debates that eventually led to a general ‘headscarf ban’ at public schools.91 
In the Netherlands parliament has also been discussing a possible ban. Unlike the 
situation in France, the Dutch government only aimed at the face covering Burqa, but 
not just in schools; in all public spaces.92 Most recently, politician Geert Wilders 
proposed introducing a tax for women who wear headscarves; they would have to pay 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 For more information, see for example: Scott, J.W. 2007. Politics of the Veil. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 
92 This was the government standpoint in 2005, see for more information for example: 
http://www.nos.nl/nosjournaal/artikelen/2006/11/17/171106_boerka_verbod.html. The government at 
the moment of writing has a different standpoint and aims to ban burqua’s first of all at schools and 
maybe also in other public spaces, such as public transport. See for more information: 
http://www.minbzk.nl/110521/brief-aan-tweede_1 
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1000 Euros a year to wear a scarf in the public sphere.93 In my focus groups, the 
women also talked about the headscarf, in its many forms and meanings. Again we 
see that even though the focus groups dealt with multiculturalism and feminism in 
general, the actual discussions often moved to Islam related issues. This is partly 
related to the fact that quite a few Muslim women were present in the focus groups, 
but also because these themes are most recurrent in the popular media and politics. It 
was evident that the women were also trying to position themselves in these particular 
debates on Islam and emancipation.  
    Even though the women in the different groups did not always agree on the 
meaning of the headscarf, not one of the women I talked to was in favour of a ban. 
The reasoning behind this was that the decision to wear (or not wear) a headscarf is a 
personal one, and should always be left to individual women. The only thing 
opponents of the headscarf could do is to inform women and help them to make a 
conscious decision. In most cases however, the discussions went more in the direction 
of making opponents aware of the possible different meanings of the headscarf. In the 
4th  chapter of this thesis I  described how this awareness of the multiplicity of certain 
traditions and customs is essential for Islamic feminism. The term ‘multiple critique’ 
is important in this context. The background for this is that many Muslim women are 
placed in a complex position. In order to combine their attachment to their religion 
with a desire for emancipation Muslim women have developed multiple critiques. 
This means that they discuss gender roles in their local and religious communities; 
challenge conventional interpretations of holy texts and traditions and at the same 
time defend their religious and national communities. This way, Muslim women are 
creating new histories and knowledges about their lives that were previously often 
only produced about them. Debates about veiling are an important example of the 
struggle of Islamic feminists. Where most outsiders see the veil as a sign of 
oppression, more and more women are now claiming that the veil can be empowering.  
    In the focus groups, these ‘multiple critiques’ are also recognisable. Three main 
themes were important: multiple meanings and context of the headscarf, the paradox 
of the anti-headscarf viewpoint and finally, the reasons and background why people 
from Islamic communities wear the headscarf. Let us first move to the paradox issue, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 See for example: 
http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2009/09/anger_at_wilders_headscarf_tax.php 
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which was mentioned in many focus groups (Interreligieuze Dialoog, Daral Arqam, 
SCALA, Yasmin, ZAMI). A woman from Daral Arqam argued: 
 
 “If they say you are being oppressed; you shouldn’t wear a headscarf, then 
they are also oppressing me. They are completely interpreting the situation for 
you” (Daral Arqam, 28 min.). 
 
Hence, this woman and her colleagues are complaining about the fact that people so 
often think for them, instead of with them. In the SCALA focus group, one woman 
adds to this that feminists from the second wave have made it possible for many 
women to make their own decisions, at the same time however, some of them are now 
trying to prevent some women making their own choices. The SCALA group 
contextualised the headscarf discussion by connecting it to mini skirts and other 
possible forms of dressing that could be called ‘anti feminist’. When we are talking 
about these issues, respect should be central, one woman argued: 
 
 “If I get in such a situation, it is my responsibility to start a conversation 
about it and to say I respect your opinion, I understand you see it that way, I 
am also happy you don’t do it yourself because I don’t want you to do things 
that go against your values (…) This is who I am” (SCALA, 55 min.). 
 
This first of all connects to how emancipation is interpreted and whether this is about 
‘a woman’s own choices’ or not. This will be discussed in the next section on 
emancipation and feminism. Another point of connection is the discussion that 
followed after Cisca Dresselhuys’ famous words on headscarves as signs of 
oppression.94 According to Dresselhuys headscarves are impossible to combine with 
feminist ideas. Other feminists have responded to her by arguing that Dresselhuys 
wants women to choose their own lifestyle, as long as it corresponds to hers (Prins 
and Saharso, 2001). Furthermore, even though Dresselhuys claims that feminist 
values are universal values, these remarks prove the exact opposite (Prins and 
Saharso, 2001).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 See chapter 1 for a description of this debate 
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    The above was just one example of many forms of criticism the women in my 
focus groups presented when it came to ‘outsider discourses on the headscarf’.  In the 
next paragraph I will look at another part of the discussion: the criticism from within. 
Even though almost all women argued that wearing a headscarf is a personal choice 
and emphasised the different meanings of the headscarf, there was also criticism. In 
some cases, this took the form of a distinction between a woman’s own perception 
and ‘general religious rules’. This kind of criticism of the headscarf acknowledges 
that individual women can have different reasons for wearing a headscarf, but at the 
same time believes that the general background of the piece of clothing is to control 
women and their sexuality and is thus linked to patriarchal views on women. Most 
women however, presented a less fixed interpretation of the headscarf. Even though 
this last view is less stigmatising to individual women; it does not leave much space 
for transformation or change.  
    In the Al Nisa group a more dynamic form of criticism was the subject of the 
discussion. One of the women argued that because of the aggressive media debates, 
Muslims themselves tend to be more defensive and less critical about the headscarf. 
We could have a more open discussion on how we deal with the headscarf: 
 
 “I believe that it is very often thought that the headscarf’s function (…) is to 
control sexuality and that it is assumed that therefore the woman is responsible 
for sexual behaviour of men. (…) That premise cannot be found in the Qur’an, 
(…) but is very dominant and oppressive to women” (Al Nisa, 51 min.). 
 
Women are held responsible for the behaviour of men and that is oppressive, she 
argues. The interesting aspect of this nuanced analysis is that this woman recognises 
certain dominant views, argues for discussion about them and presents an opening by 
referring to the Qur’an. This makes this quote a very good example of the concept of 
‘multiple critique’. Furthermore, it opens up possibilities for women without 
stigmatising a whole group or community. Finally, the remark she makes about the 
headscarf’s function in Muslim societies needs more investigation. In an article on the 
headscarf debates in France, Joan Scott also refers to this aspect of the discussion. She 
argues that part of the reason why the French were so critical about the headscarf is 
because it was conflated with the French republican notion of sexuality (Scott, 2005). 
Where the French interpretation is based on sameness and abstraction of differences, 
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the headscarf does the opposite: it emphasises sexual differences between men and 
women. These remarks about sexual difference, sexuality and the headscarf raise 
many new questions regarding the exact relation between these concepts and need 
more research. Here it suffices to say that this woman tells us to recognise the 
difference between the command to dress modestly and the responsibility to control 
sexuality. Emphasising this distinction might help in the discussion about 
emancipation and the headscarf.  
 
 
Would You Call Yourself a Feminist? 
 
In the above, I mentioned the word ‘emancipation’. In the interviews this was a much 
and rather easily discussed theme. When the word ‘feminism’ was brought up 
however, the atmosphere changed almost immediately. Laughter and yelling were in 
many cases an important part of the response. Some women instantly said they were 
feminists; others were opposed to using the term. In this section, I want to discuss the 
different interpretations of feminism and emancipation that were presented during the 
focus groups, the themes that were put forward as important and the proposed 
strategies of the women.  
    The different interpretations of feminism and emancipation were important to many 
women in the focus groups. In the focus group with Al Nisa women for example, we 
had an interesting discussion about calling yourself a feminist or not. All the women 
in the group were interested in Islam and emancipation (those were also the central 
themes of their organisation), but the term feminism lead to a rather heated debate. 
What is a feminist was their main question. The first woman who tried to answer the 
question argued that if there were any term she would like to use to describe herself, it 
would be ‘Muslim woman’95 (Al Nisa, 30 min.). In her view, this word automatically 
entails all the other things that are important in life. This connects to remarks made by 
the women in Daral Arqam. The argument is that as a Muslim you are already 
committing to constant learning and developing the self and hence to emancipation. 
This means that she does not just argue that emancipation and Islam are compatible or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 She used the Dutch term ‘Moslima’ 
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that Islam inspires her in her struggle for emancipation, but that Islam is 
emancipation. This interesting perspective could have consequences for how we look 
at the relationship between culture/religion and emancipation/feminism. I would 
argue that her remark perfectly shows why we first of all have to re-think the link 
between emancipation and feminism, and secondly the concept of feminism itself and 
how it is connected to culture/religion.  
    The differences and similarities between feminism and emancipation were 
mentioned in almost all the focus groups. In most groups, women could not agree on 
what feminism was or is, but very often it was associated with a struggle for and by 
women (for example Al Nisa, FNV, Daral Arqam), contrary to emancipation, which 
was considered to apply to everybody. Some women did not want to call themselves 
feminists because they associated it with ‘hating men’ or ‘being against men’ (see for 
instance Yasmin). The relationship between feminism and men was discussed in more 
focus groups, and I will return to it later. Here I want to focus on the reasons why 
some women do not want to call themselves feminists. Besides the above-mentioned 
and rather stereotypical argument, the most mentioned reason was a general feeling of 
alienation from most Western mainstream feminism, or ‘Cisca Dresslhuys feminism’, 
as the women from Al Nisa called it (Al Nisa, 37 min.).  
    It appeared that many women associated feminism with the standpoints of Opzij, 
and for that reason do not call themselves feminists (Al Nisa, 37 min.). Feminism in 
this interpretation is based too much on the male norm: 
 
“They want women to become ‘less female’96 and that goes against my views 
on the relationship between men and women. And also within Islam you can’t 
work on feminism and emancipation this way. (…) You should actually stay 
close to the people that are close to you. Within Islam there is more than 
enough space to emancipate and become feminist. So I would suggest making 
a clear distinction between Opzij feminism (…) and Islamic feminism, which 
all women in this group would support. ” (Al Nisa, 37 min.).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 She said: “Ze doen aan ontvrouwelijking” 
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As becomes clear from this quote, it is almost impossible to discuss the relationship 
between feminism and emancipation without addressing the negative associations 
many Muslim women have with (mainstream) feminism. These women are interested 
in a feminist struggle, but not as it is interpreted by certain Western feminists at this 
moment. One of the main reasons for this seems to be a different interpretation of 
sexual difference. Or, as one of the women in the focus groups argued: 
 
 “All kinds of ideals related to women’s appearance are not criticised; nudity, 
being young and all the photo-shopping, and the women who want something 
else, than what men want, are not accepted” (Al Nisa, 37 min.). 
 
This is an often-heard comparison or complaint: women with a headscarf are 
criticised for being anti-feminist and women in mini-skirts are considered to be 
feminists. As mentioned above, these different views on feminism can be related to 
religion, but first of all seem to refer to a different interpretation of sexual difference. 
Or, as Joan Scott describes so clearly to explain the French headscarf debates:   
 
“French feminists, who in the name of the emancipation of Muslim girls, 
rushed to support a law that offered the status quo in France (women as the 
object of male desire) as a universal model of women’s liberation. Entirely 
forgotten in the glorification of the freedom of French sexual relations was the 
critique of these same feminists, who for years have decried the objectification 
of women and the overemphasis on their sexual attractiveness.” (Scott, 2005, 
p 29).   
 
According to Scott, French republicanism deals with sexual difference by denying it, 
Islam on he other hand, acknowledges that sexual difference can cause problems in 
society and should therefore be managed. Hence, the discussions about the headscarf 
might not be about equality between men and women, but about making Muslim 
women equal to French women. Apparently, French women could only be ‘equal’ by 
openly displaying their sexuality and sexual desire. The real problem of the headscarf, 
from this perspective, is that by ‘covering women’s sexuality’, the Western secular 
view of sexual difference is countered. Of course the French debates on headscarves 
are particularly located in the French context and cannot be too easily be compared to 
 	   216 
discussions in other European countries, but we can use the argument proposed 
above. For example if we apply the ideas about the importance of sexual difference to 
the remarks made by the women of Al Nisa, we see that these women not only have 
different ideas about the relationship between religion and feminism, but from there 
also make different feminist analyses.  
    The above-described criticism of certain interpretations of feminism was broadly 
shared in most focus groups. For some women however, this led to the belief that we 
have to fight for different interpretations of feminism, others felt more for the term 
emancipation and did not want to be associated with feminism. I would agree with 
scholars such as Miriam Cooke that feminism is not just a political ideology, but 
instead refers to a certain attitude about the role of gender in society: “feminism seeks 
justice wherever it can find it” (Cooke, 2002, p 143). This means that in my definition 
of feminism, many of these women’s ideas about emancipation would be included. Of 
course I respect these women’s own choices, so I will not press my terms on them, 
but when I theorise different interpretations of feminism, I will take their views on 
emancipation into account and will therefore use the concepts of feminism and 
emancipation simultaneously in certain arguments.  
 
 
Thinking through Different Feminist Waves 
 
When the women of SCALA discussed the problematic associations with the word 
feminism and asked themselves whether ‘feminists’ should for that reason come up 
with a new term, it was argued that this would be disrespectful to the generations 
before us who had achieved so much already in respect to women’s rights (SCALA, 
50 min.). Very soon after agreeing on having respect for previous generations 
however, the tensions between these different generations turned up. Especially with 
the women from SCALA and ZAMI, the discussions showed very explicitly how we 
have to find a middle ground between respecting the achievements of previous 
generations and at the same time accept the fact that different circumstances can lead 
to new feminist analyses. The women of SCALA experienced the differences between 
generations in their own group, for instance in the following conversation between 
two women: 
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 “There are certainly tensions, especially when we talk about clothes.” 
  “You should hear them, if my heels are too high.”  
     “That’s why I am an older feminist; you don’t show your body in public.  
  “I think she rather sees me in a burqua than in a miniskirt.”  
 
After this, a discussion followed on (symbolic) meanings of things like miniskirts and 
the difficulties in deciding when a woman makes her own choice or not. The 
‘younger’ woman makes the following argument: 
 
 “Second wave feminists made it possible for us to make our own choices, but 
are now also stopping us from making choices that they don’t like” (SCALA, 
55 min.). 
 
 This connects to remarks made by other women, such as those in the ZAMI group.  A 
woman in this focus group explained how ‘second wave’ feminists stick too much to 
just sexual difference and neglect to pay enough attention to other axes of difference, 
such as ethnicity or religion (ZAMI, 17 min.)97. So because they look at different 
issues, they make a different analysis of problems and solutions. Before I explain this 
further, let me make clear that these women are not making the same point as I made 
above about different interpretations of sexual difference. They are not arguing for a 
focus on sexual difference solely, but for an intersectional analysis. As I explained in 
chapter 3, this means that you look at gender, ethnicity, sexuality (and maybe other 
axes of difference) at the same time and analyse how these influence each other. In 
other words, you imagine people to be positioned at an intersection where all kinds of 
different aspects of their identity come together and influence each other.  
    To summarise the women’s arguments on generations; it was first of all argued that 
‘second wave’ feminists made it impossible for women to actually make their own 
choices and secondly that they are too much focussed on sexual difference. Another 
point, which is related to this, is that most ‘second wave feminists’ are paying too 
much attention to the issue of work: the only thing women still have to achieve is to 
work more and to get to higher positions (Al Nisa, 38 min.). These generational 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Please note that this does not apply to all second wave feminists. As I described in chapter 3, many 
feminists from that generation worked on these issues.  
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differences are very apparent and need to be theorized further, also in the context of 
multiculturalism and feminism. As becomes clear in the previous statements, many 
women in my interviews have certain complaints about ‘second wave feminism’ and 
they connect it to the issue of difference. To put it bluntly: second wave feminism is 
associated with a limited interpretation of feminism that focuses on sexual difference 
and issues such as work, and does not leave much space for other interpretations. This 
brings many questions to mind: how we define ‘second wave feminism’, which 
feminists are ‘second wave’ (is it automatically linked to age?) and how generations 
are connected to each other?  
    The history of feminism is mainly understood in waves. This helps us to understand 
and recognise certain peaks in feminist thought and activism, but at the same time it 
also erases other feminist instances and the differences between feminists within a 
certain time. Furthermore, it easily leads to linear thinking about feminism; moving 
from a basic conception to a more and more nuanced analysis for example. Finally, 
this perspective on feminism is very centred in the West and does not really recognise 
non-Western feminist developments. If we connect these issues to the subject of this 
thesis, all kinds of other questions come up, such as: how we can locate Islamic 
feminism in this account of history. Are there first and second Islamic feminist 
waves? Or, is Islamic feminism part of the third feminist wave? It would take another 
thesis to answer all these questions, but I do believe that we need to take this 
‘generational issue’ into account when we think about multiculturalism and feminism. 
We first of all have to be conscious about the fact that feminist waves are 
constructions that need to be used critically. Secondly, thinking about new 
interpretations of feminism for some means talking about a ‘third wave’. We have to 
think about how this wave is located, both chronologically and geographically.  
    In her work on epistemology of different generations of feminism, Iris van der Tuin 
investigates how we can capture generational change (Van der Tuin, 2009). She 
proposes a methodology of ‘jumping generations’, in order to use and implement 
parts of second wave feminism, where it is useful for current generations, without 
falling into the trap of linear thinking. We should neither idealise previous feminist 
generations nor reject them completely. This is exactly how I read the remarks of one 
of the women in SCALA: she did not want to let go of the word feminism, but to start 
from the struggles that previous generations have fought and think how we can 
conceptualise feminism from there, taking into account changes in our societies. One 
 	   219 
of these changes, I would argue, is that religion has become such an important issue 
that feminists have to take it into account in their analyses. The women in ZAMI, who 
also described how problematic it is to ignore religion as an important factor in 
feminist analyses, confirm this:  
 
“For white women religion apparently is not an issue, but for black, migrant 
and refugee women it is. But also politically it is an important issue, aren’t 
these  women looking at our society? It is on the political agenda. These were 
all second wave feminists, and they are completely outside of reality” (ZAMI, 
16 min.).  
 
This woman’s remarks are rather harsh towards second wave feminists, but I would 
agree with her that, even as a secular/atheist feminist, you couldn’t ignore the political 
developments in the world. Or, as Rosi Bradiotti puts it “feminists cannot be simply 
secular, or be secular in a simple or self-evident sense. More complexity is needed” 
(Braidotti, 2008, p 4). 
        Concluding, I would argue that generational developments are important in 
relation to feminism and multiculturalism. Furthermore, we have to find nuanced 
ways of looking at these developments and the differences between generations. 
Making use of the feminist ideas of previous generations and combining them with 
changes in our current societies would be a good starting point. One of the women 
from SCALA connects to this with her remarks on the third wave: 
 
 “if you want to make the new wave a vibrant one, you have to create a 
situation where women can be themselves, where women (…) can choose to 
do what they want ” (ZAMI, 57 min.). 
 
Or, as she put it earlier in the interview: the third wave should be a “warm wave” 
(ZAMI, 36 min.). In this context she proposes to think through connections instead of 
all working on our own ‘little corners’. 
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Back to Basics? 
 
The above remark on focussing on connections is a very important one regarding the 
relationship between multiculturalism and feminism. Connected to this are questions 
such as: which themes should be on the feminist agenda and how will we try to 
achieve what we want? The next section will focus on different feminist strategies, 
but here I want to pay attention to the different themes that are important for feminism 
at this moment and how we want to approach them.  
    One of the things that came up in many of the interviews was the question: how do 
we frame the subjects that we are fighting for? One can for instance focus on 
something like circumcision, but another possibility would be to concentrate on 
broader issues that can connect more people; violence against women for example. 
This vision seems to correspond to the remarks described above where a woman 
proposes to think through connections instead of “working on our own little corners”. 
Also in the E-Quality focus group, the women aim to work through such a model. 
They want to work on equality and equal opportunities for everybody in the 
Netherlands: male and female, secular and religious, ‘autochtonous’ and 
‘allochtonous’.  
 
“Autochtonous women can learn from for example Surinamese women, 
because they dealt with work issues and participation in a different way. 
Allochtonous women are not in all cases in a disadvantaged position. There 
are areas in which black, migrant and refugee women are ahead, we can learn 
from that and there are areas where it is the other way around, or where men 
are in a worse  position, that also needs attention. In that context all inequality 
is problematic” (E-Quality, 27min.)   
 
The starting point for E-Quality is the concept of ‘equal opportunities’. This makes it 
possible to produce a more nuanced analysis of the problems and solutions at hand. It 
also helps them to go beyond the dichotomous relation of the supposedly oppressed 
Muslim women and the emancipated ‘autochtonous’ women. This means looking at 
economic positions, educational levels, and social influence (E-quality, 10 min.). The 
advantages of defining feminist struggle on such a broader basis, is that it will 
probably appeal to more women, but also that there is less chance of denigrating 
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women from certain cultures/religions. The struggle for equality is central, not the 
supposedly oppressed or oppressive group.  
    Another issue put forward by the women of E-Quality was the focus on women at 
the top. Feminists such as Cisca Dresselhuys they argued, talk too much about the 
‘glass ceiling’ and forget about what happens on the ‘ground floor’:  
  
“You cannot work at the top if you do not combine that with looking at what 
happens below. If you do this, you turn the pyramid upside down, and it will 
fall down. What about girls in primary schools, who are still advised to go the 
‘safe’ way, and choose for alpha courses, instead of stimulating them to do 
beta98. The situation is much more complex than people make us believe it is.” 
(E-Quality, 11 min) 
 
Summarising the above arguments, we see that these women propose to make more 
nuanced analyses of what inequality means and how we can work on equal 
opportunities. Furthermore, they emphasise the importance of not focussing on 
specific issues connected to specific groups of women, but building alliances and 
joined struggles between women. One of the ways to achieve this is to work on 
broader themes that prevent women being divided into ‘the oppressed’ and ‘the 
emancipated’, and make space for more dynamic cooperation. This could entail a 
return to certain ‘classical’ feminist themes, such as safety, economic independence 
and equal opportunities. But it doesn’t mean that feminism should be restricted to 
these issues or that they are the same issues as 30 or 80 years ago. or that we should 
approach them as it has been done in the past: “certain discussions are being repeated 
over and over again. The issues are still important, but the methods are not always up 
to date anymore” (SCALA, 37 min.).  
    The women also warned against focussing solely on work related issues; 
emancipation for most of the women in the focus groups was about making your own 
choices. Emancipation should not only be about work or having a career. A woman in 
Daral Arqam explained very clearly that emancipation is about making choices within 
a certain context:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Alpha courses are for example history and English; beta courses are chemistry or physics 
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“Emancipation is about making your own choices, but everybody makes those 
choices within a certain framework. For me this means that I am emancipated 
because I most of the time choose to do what I want, but I also take into 
account the needs and wishes of my husband and children.” (Daral Arqam, 17 
min.). 
 
If we bring these remarks about emancipation together with the above, we can 
conclude that the women in the focus groups are constantly emphasising the 
importance of broadening and contextualising the debates and struggles for 
emancipation. Their aims are to work with broader themes to enhance solidarity, with 
broader definitions to include more women’s perspectives and adjust analyses to 
current and local situations.  
    Before I link the previous statement to the different approaches women proposed 
towards feminism and/or emancipation, I would like to add one more issue that came 
up in many of the conversations on emancipation: men. A common complaint of 
many women in the focus groups was that feminists often exclude men, both from 
their analyses and their activities. Emancipation is both about women and about men, 
was an often-heard statement. They propose an interpretation of emancipation that 
does not focus on a male norm (women have to work just as men do) and wants 
women to be proud of themselves as women, and at the same time they want to 
include men, so that they can work on emancipation together: “we always say include 
men in the struggle for emancipation; white women on the other hand often say, men, 
no we don’t want that” (ZAMI, 17 min). The difference between white and black, 
migrant and refugee women that is put forward in this quote is probably partly related 
to the different struggles they are fighting for. The latter group is not just suffering 
from sexism, but also from racism.99 One of the consequences of this is that these 
women often do not want to fight against men as white women sometimes do/have 
done. Another point that might have to do with the difference in the in/exclusion of 
men is connected to the difference between emancipation and feminism. Most women 
who call themselves feminists often look at this as a female identity. In the focus 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Note that they are not suffering from racism and sexism separately, but from the intersection of 
racism and sexism.  
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groups, it was also regularly argued that men could not be feminists and that the 
feminist struggle was a female one. These were mainly the women who did not want 
to include men in their struggles; men could not feel what being a woman is about and 
could therefore not be feminists (FNV Vrouwenbond, 70 min). The women who 
preferred to use the term emancipation on the other hand, had a more practical 
approach and explicitly aimed at both men and women (see for instance Al Nisa, 30 
min.). In one group the women explicitly argued that feminists couldn’t afford to 
exclude men from their struggles anymore:  
 
“What is the ideal situation that we as feminists aim for? (…) You cannot 
conclude anything else but that we strive for equality. That means that men 
also have to take this route together with us. (…) If you look at it form this 
perspective you cannot argue anymore that feminists are women” (SCALA, 43 
min.). 
 
Another woman in the group directly supports these remarks when she adds: 
  
“We cannot afford standpoint theory anymore anymore. (…). We have to 
think contextually. We need Gloria Wekker’s intersectionality, we need 
hybridity. It has to be about that.” (SCALA, 44 min.). 
 
This argument shows, among other things, that thinking about a more inclusive 
feminism is not just about the themes you work with, but also very much about the 
approach you take to these issues. This particular quote includes many small 
statements about different feminist approaches (against standpoint theory, in favour of 
intersectionality and hybridity). These concepts have been important throughout this 
thesis, but in the next section I will pay specific attention to the arguments of the 
women in the focus groups regarding these different approaches towards feminism. 
 
 
Approaching Feminism and Diversity 
 
In many of the interviews, the women in the group suggested that if we want a more 
inclusive feminism, we need to contextualise and be open to alternative 
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interpretations of feminism. The SCALA woman in the above quote has clear ideas 
about what road feminism should take. We need to take the context into account, 
according to her. Everybody brings his/her background into the feminist struggle and 
this background is constructed through many different axes of meaning (gender, 
ethnicity, race, sexuality, ability etc). Feminist standpoints cannot be formed 
(automatically) through one’s gender anymore, she argues. In other words, she 
opposes the argument that women can automatically produce more objective 
knowledge about society because they are in a marginalised position (see also chapter 
4). She does not explain this more elaborately, but my reading of her statement would 
be that instead of applying rather fixed ideas about female standpoints, feminism 
should start from the idea that gender alone does not explain a person’s position and 
that we should always look at he context of a certain issue before we make a 
judgment. An example of this is put forward in this focus group in the discussion 
about the tensions between individual choices and general principles:  
  
“When I make a choice I start from the situation as I experience it, at that 
moment. (…). When we think about these choices, an outsider can only help 
with  making the best possible choice and talk to this person and make sure 
they make a  conscious decision, well informed about the possible 
consequences.” (SCALA, 58 min.). 
 
The women later explain this further by arguing that feminists cannot make general 
and in principle statements about women’s individual choices, but have to look at the 
context of each situation. When we think about virginity for example, we might want 
to put an end to virginity ideals and forbid doctors to do virginity tests etc, but in 
certain cases the only way to save a woman could be to (accept the tradition as it is 
and) give her a blood pill (SCALA, 63 min.).  
    Women in the ZAMI group also argued that we should not try to pin down what 
feminism is. Feminism in their view is always about diversity (ZAMI, 34 min.). In 
that context one woman in this group introduces the (as she calls it) “and/and 
strategy”100: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 She used the term “en/en strategie”. 
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 “we should let go of the either/or strategy of referring to people as either 
woman, or black. You are a black woman, a mother maybe. That perspective 
gives you the total image.” (ZAMI, 37 min.). 
 
When I asked the women in this group whether they are sometimes confronted with 
issues that make it difficult to think through the “and/and strategy”, they mentioned 
some cases in which it is difficult to see whether something needs to be respected as a 
different interpretation of emancipation or considered as a harmful tradition. But 
according to another woman in the group it is important to realise that: 
 
 “the and/and strategy does not mean that you cannot be critical or search for 
dialogue. Being critical and the search for dialogue also help with 
consciousness raising” (ZAMI, 43 min.). 
 
This important remark can be helpful when one combines it with the contextualising 
strategy in the previous paragraph, but it also shows a certain tension within these 
women’s thinking on feminism. On the one hand they want feminism to be inclusive 
and respectful towards diversity; on the other hand they want to raise women’s 
consciousness. In the beginning of this chapter (section on Multicultural Politics) I 
briefly introduced this tension; here it is important to look at it from the perspective of 
creating an inclusive feminism. One woman in the ZAMI group emphasises the 
importance of getting to know each others’ standpoints and working together, despite 
certain differences:  
 
“Try to find reciprocity and create something new that way, use your 
creativity. This way you do not hold on to your own thing, but by working 
together you create something new (…) a new society, that starts from 
working together” (ZAMI, 45 min.).  
 
So, the starting point for the women in this group is respect for difference, being 
open to other women’s standpoints, experiences and strategies and creating a 
dialogue and maybe cooperation from that. However, as I mentioned before, this 
does not necessarily mean agreeing on everything; rather it means beginning with an 
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open mind. If you really believe something needs to be changed or that women 
should become more conscious on certain issues, you can always try to convince 
them, but only in an open dialogue. Or, as one woman put it: “you have to work on 
different levels, you have to fix things in more areas than one” (ZAMI, 52 min.). In 
some cases these different levels will work simultaneously, in other cases there 
might be tensions that need to be discussed in their own context: “we shouldn’t try 
to pin everything down beforehand” (ZAMI, 58 min.).  
    In the focus group with the women from FNV Vrouwenbond, another tension in 
their thinking about diversity arose. In the ZAMI focus group the women themselves 
discussed how to work with the tensions within their own ideas about feminism and 
diversity. In this focus group only I was of the opinion there was a tension in their 
ideas and policies. Let me first explain that this organisation is the women’s group of 
one of the biggest trade unions in the Netherlands, which means that their main 
themes are work (paid and non-paid) and care-related. According to their own mission 
statement diversity is a central issue in their work and at the time of the focus group 
they were working on conducting several analyses in order to find out how they could 
improve diversity in their organisation (FNV Vrouwenbond, 87 min.). After listening 
to their main aims, I asked the women in the group whether diversity in their 
organisation was mainly about representation or whether they also tried to diversify 
the content of their work (FNV Vrouwenbond, 92 min.). The answer was positive, but 
they also made clear that they did not want to go beyond their main themes. One 
woman gives the following example of what they do with diversity: 
 
 “We already try to have more allochtonous women in higher positions (…). 
We try to make employers more conscious of the advantages of hiring more 
allochtonous women” (FNV Vrouwenbond, 93 min.). 
 
In my view, this confirmed that diversity in their work is more about representation 
than about diversifying the content of their work. One of the women in the group 
mentioned the issue that certain female Muslim nurses do not want to bath men, and 
in her view this was not something the FNV should address: 
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 “women can make their own choices, but you cannot change certain jobs, a 
job is a job, you cannot become a surgeon and say you are only doing certain 
tasks.” (FNV Vrouwenbond, 103 min.). 
 
I tried to argue that we could compare this situation with the case of a woman who 
wants to have a higher position in a company without having to work 80 hours a 
week. If they would support such a case, they are also changing the interpretation of a 
certain job. After a long discussion it became clear that we could not come to an 
agreement about what diversity means and how you can or maybe should apply it in 
your organisation. In a way this shows how difficult it is to have an open dialogue, as 
proposed in the ZAMI group. While the women of the FNV argued that diversity is a 
key issue in their organisation, I would say that this was only the case on the level of 
representation, not on the level of content. Important to note at this point however is 
that the woman who was against ‘cutting down on jobs’, did emphasise that women 
can make their own choices (in their private lives).  
    In the above, I have paid attention to the importance of contextualising issues 
before making judgments, to the importance of taking into account the different 
interests at micro and macro level and finally to the challenges and tensions that are 
faced when one works through the concept of diversity. Before I conclude this 
chapter, I would like to move our focus to one more aspect of finding the right 
approach towards feminism and diversity. This was mainly discussed in the focus 
group with Al Nisa, but also briefly put forward in other groups where Muslim 
women were present. The main difficulty these women were faced with lies in 
bringing together the intellectual and more activist strands of Muslim Feminism. In 
the section on religion and power, I discussed the importance of finding the right 
strategies for improving the position of women in Muslim communities. In the 
context of the issues of feminism and emancipation this theme came back in the 
interviews: 
 
 “I think it is a challenge for Al Nisa to bring together the more intellectual 
branch and the activist one. It is very nice to work with Asma Barlas and 
Amina Wadud etc, but try to apply their theories to you own life that is a 
completely different story.” (Al Nisa, 61 min.). 
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One woman replied that we couldn’t do everything at the same time; you have to start 
somewhere. Another woman argued that we should not want to rush things, but take 
them step-by-step. It would be very difficult and also undesirable to produce a general 
answer to this question at this point, but it is important to note that together with the 
knowledge on contextualisation, and different approaches towards diversity it does 
become possible to generate a more nuanced analysis of the issues at stake in the 
relationship between multiculturalism and feminism. This analysis should eventually 
function as a road map that can help us to navigate between the themes, approaches 
and tensions.   
 
 
Towards a More Comprehensive Understanding of Multiculturalism and 
Feminism 
 
In this chapter I have described and analysed the results of the nine focus groups I 
held with women from various women’s organisations in the Netherlands. The main 
aim of these group interviews was to produce alternative and situated knwowledges 
about various issues related to the relationship between multiculturalism and 
feminism.  
    The chapter, like focus groups, was divided into three main issues: media and 
representation, multiculturalism and culture/religion related issues and finally 
feminism and emancipation. In the first part the women discussed the strategies and 
arguments of people like Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Geert Wilders, but also the more 
general debates about Islam in the Netherlands. It appeared that when the women 
talked about Geert Wilders they were mostly thinking about the question ‘should we 
take him seriously or not?’.  With Ayaan Hirsi Ali on the other hand, her chosen 
strategies were mostly at the centre of the debate. Often the women were sympathetic 
to Ali’s aims, but her approach was considered very problematic. Furthermore, the 
women talked about the broader Islam debates in the Netherlands, such as those on 
the headscarf, and the influences of those debates in the lives of the women in the 
group. It appeared that, for example, some young girls applied for jobs much below 
their educational level, just because they would not have any trouble with their 
headscarves in such occupations. From there the interviews moved to issues of 
multiculturalism and feminism.  
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    From the many conclusions that we can draw from these conversations, it is first of 
all important to note that the women’s interpretations of what multiculturalism means 
or should mean were not so much about extra group rights, but more about 
recognition of difference and finding ways to live together in a positive manner. The 
women argued against developing grand universal theories, and in favour of more 
nuanced and contextualised analyses and decision-making. Furthermore, they made it 
clear how knowledge about religion can help to fight traditions that are considered to 
be oppressive to women. Finally, they were active to develop multiple critiques about 
certain traditions within their communities as well as the negative discourses about 
their communities. This way they tried to navigate between possible harmful 
(interpretations of) religious/cultural traditions and the stereotyping of their 
community/faith.  
    Feminism was a rather contested term among the participants of the focus groups; 
often they referred to interpretations of feminism that either completely ignored 
culture and religion in their analyses or had a very different perspective on what 
sexual difference is. Moreover, the women emphasised a clear difference in thinking 
about emancipation and feminism between the different generations. Some mentioned 
the fact that many ‘second wave’ feminists are ignoring religion and culture in their 
feminist analyses; others noticed generational differences within their own group, for 
example regarding clothing styles. In several groups the women theorised what a third 
wave should look like; warm and inclusive was the general outcome of these 
discussions. Other conclusions that came out of the interviews were related to the 
issues at stake and the approaches to take towards them. Several women warned 
against fighting for ‘your own little corners’ and instead proposed to frame problems 
in a larger context in order to make it possible for women to connect on these issues. 
Finally, they argued for a contextualised and intersectional approach towards 
feminism.  
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Chapter 7 Weaving the Threads Together: Situated Knowledges on 
Multiculturalism and Feminism 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this thesis I have investigated the relationship between multiculturalism and 
feminism, focussing on recent debates in the Netherlands. It was long assumed that 
both multiculturalism and feminism are connected to progressive movements and 
hence have comparable and compatible goals. However, both in academia and in the 
popular media the critique of multiculturalism has grown and is often accompanied by 
arguments related to gender equality and/or feminism. This thesis started with the 
well-known article of Susan Moller Okin, in which she argues that there are 
incompatibilities between multiculturalism and gender equality. Many others have 
made similar comments, some of these are directed, like Okin’s, towards 
multiculturalism in general, but often criticism is centred on Islam and Muslim 
traditions.  
    How feminism should deal with difference is (and has been for a long time) an 
important question for the feminist project. Women from various backgrounds, areas 
and generations have confronted this issue and theorised feminism’s relation to 
difference. As this work is largely ignored in many of the arguments about 
multiculturalism and feminism (or Islam and gender equality) the first aim of this 
thesis was to include it in these debates. I have broadened the interpretation of 
feminism, in relation for example to the one proposed by Susan Moller Okin, by 
taking into account these theories of difference, I have also evaluated the common 
comprehension of multiculturalism. By critically evaluating the key concepts, the 
issues at stake become more apparent. Furthermore, as has become clear in the 
previous chapters, it is important to discuss the possible meanings and 
conceptualisations of feminism and multiculturalism, in order to make the debate more 
productive.  
    However, as much as I believe that these re-conceptualisations of multiculturalism 
and feminism are essential, I do not believe that they provide us with final answers to 
the questions and issues at stake. In order to give proper attention to all arguments and 
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statements, we need to broaden the debate further. It is important to become conscious 
of the many aspects of the relationship between multiculturalism and feminism and to 
understand that tensions can arise for many reasons and also be addressed in many 
different ways. In order to do this properly, we have to be accountable for our own 
position (recognise whiteness for example), recognise the historical relations between 
feminism and colonialism, take into account the intersections between gender and 
ethnicity, critically evaluate our conceptualisation of agency and finally analyse the 
discursive elements of the debates. In this thesis I have worked with all these aspects 
of the debates and in this final chapter I will weave all the threads together to develop 
a more productive, positive and inclusive way of thinking about multiculturalism and 
feminism.  
 
 
Summing up 
 
This thesis combines a theoretical approach towards the relationship between 
multiculturalism and feminism with extensive empirical research. The reason for this 
approach is that our understanding of this topic is greatly strengthened by a 
combination of detailed knowledge of the different discourses, practical arguments 
and experiences of stakeholders, along with critical exploration of relevant theories.  
    I started by outlining the debate as initiated by Susan Moller Okin. Even though 
Susan Moller Okin was not the first to discuss or theorise the relationship between 
multiculturalism and feminism, she doubtless refuelled the debate with new clear-cut 
arguments and statements. In her view there are serious tensions between the 
commitment to gender equality and the desire to respect the customs of minority 
cultures (Okin, 1999a). Therefore, she concludes that if we take gender equality in our 
societies seriously, we should not allow group rights that are a potential threat to such 
equality. Okin’s statements led to a complex and highly important debate that was not 
restricted to academia, but also moved into popular media. In the Netherlands, the 
relationship between multiculturalism and gender equality has been high on the 
political agenda. Moreover, the Dutch discourse on multiculturalism has become more 
and more intensive; the neo-realist genre that arose within it was identified by fierce 
directness (i.e. ‘daring to face the facts’) and with common references to gender 
equality and women’s issues. After several critical essays about Islam and 
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multiculturalism by male politicians in which gender equality was mentioned, Ayaan 
Hirsi Ali (a champion of neo-realism) brought the issue to the centre of the national 
debate by her harsh and uncompromising vision of Islamic culture.  
    In the theoretical chapters, I developed a more critical view on the relationship 
between multiculturalism and feminism than I had encountered in either the academic 
or the public debate in the Netherlands. I analysed the two main concepts of 
multiculturalism and feminism, and scrutinized the notion of experience. In this 
manner I was able to show different possible interpretations of multiculturalism and 
feminism, investigate how these are connected to the issue of difference, and finally 
develop a more comprehensive understanding of these concepts that could lead to a 
new relationship between multiculturalism and feminism.  
    Multiculturalism can generally be described as the normative response to a 
multicultural society. Okin mainly refers to multiculturalism as ‘group rights’ but 
there are many possible interpretations of what multicultural politics ought to entail. 
Different forms of multiculturalism start from various ideas about the value of culture 
and how it influences people’s lives, what equality means, and how it is related to 
difference. New notions of multiculturalism move beyond the concept of culture and 
incorporate the notion of difference in an alternative way. If we move away from the 
traditional interpretations of multiculturalism and emphasise the issue of difference 
(e.g. discrimination) while acknowledging the importance of people’s daily 
interactions, we can look beyond the limited issue of group rights and promote a 
multiculturalism that is more dynamic, practical and compatible with feminism.  
    When we concentrate on the concept of feminism, we see that difference has been, 
and still is, very important. Whereas Okin applies a rather straightforward 
interpretation of gender equality, various feminist theorists have pointed out the 
problems that arise when ‘women’ are considered to be a homogeneous category. It is 
evident that women’s experiences are determined by various parameters, such as race, 
sexuality, class, religion, ability etc. These categories of difference do not shape 
women’s lives separately but instead converge into an interdependent whole. 
Separating gender from ethnicity in an analysis would therefore prevent us from truly 
understanding how their combined influence works. Furthermore, a more 
comprehensive understanding of feminism demonstrates that it is important to 
acknowledge that whiteness is also a racial position. For example, through the notion 
of ‘politics of location’ researchers should be accountable for their position and 
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consider how their location influences their experiences and ultimately their research 
(e.g. questions, methods and results). Such an interpretation of feminism not only 
accounts for difference between women but also demonstrates why we cannot actually 
separate multiculturalism and feminism but have to develop a ‘multicultural 
feminism’.  
    Related to the definition of feminism are the conceptualisations of ‘experience’ and 
‘subjectivity’. In the debates about multiculturalism and feminism, people often show 
their concerns for gender inequality in Islam. Although one could refer to 
interpretations of feminism and multiculturalism in such arguments, this would leave 
the issue of experience unresolved. I have put forward two important arguments for 
taking into account the experiences, opinions and strategies of the women involved in 
the debate. First, there are many women from minority groups who are also fighting 
for equality in their own particular way and from within their communities.  They 
deserve the support of (other) feminists and their experiences and opinions should be 
included in the debate about multiculturalism and feminism. Secondly, not all women 
want the type of freedom and equality that feminists like Okin fight for. If we want to 
understand the lives and experiences of these women and take them into account in 
our analyses, we need to develop more nuanced frameworks and better definitions of 
notions such as agency, subjectivity and experience.   
    Whereas the theoretical analysis of the thesis worked to create a broader and more 
comprehensive understanding of the relation between the notions of multiculturalism 
and feminism, the empirical work exposed the rules of the discourse and content of the 
arguments that leads to an alternative perspective on the relationship between 
multiculturalism and feminism. 
    In Opzij, many authors and interviewees referred to subjectivity and the value of 
women’s experiences in the debates about multiculturalism in general, or Islam in 
particular. An important result of this analysis is that, although there were many 
interviews with Muslim women (they were certainly not ignored by the magazine), 
there was a clear difference between the articles on/with Muslim women and those 
with non-Muslim women. Whereas the articles on Muslim women mainly focussed on 
why these women make certain religious or cultural choices, the other articles 
explicitly discussed how feminism should deal with culture and religion. In other 
words, there was one category of articles in which feminism and feminist standpoints 
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were theorized and a separate one in which Muslim women’s choices were 
investigated.  
    Another important result is the apparent discrepancy between those who focus on 
certain interpretations of feminist values and those who consider feminism to be more 
a process or a guide to help us think about progress. Some women argued that white 
feminists should get more involved in the struggles of Muslim women; others 
disagreed and argued for more fixed interpretations of feminist values such as 
equality. The last group was generally more critical towards multicultural politics 
while the first was more focussed on informing themselves about Muslim women’s 
struggle for equality. Furthermore, those who were critical about multiculturalism 
often referred to certain dominant interpretations of culture/religion, while 
authors/interviewees who were positive about it, had a much more personal and 
flexible view on these issues. In general, the analysis made it clear that the debates and 
arguments about multiculturalism and feminism are multi-layered, but often these 
layers are not made explicit and prevent the discussants actually exploring the issues at 
stake.  
    Among the participants of the focus groups, alternative interpretations of cultural 
and religious traditions were important. Multiculturalism was for them not about 
group rights but rather about recognition of difference and finding ways to co-exist in 
a positive manner. The women argued against developing ‘grand universal theories’ 
and were clearly in favour of more nuanced and contextualised analysis and decision-
making. Also, they were clear that knowledge about religion helps to fight traditions 
that are considered to be oppressive to women. In most focus groups, feminism was a 
rather contested term. The women often referred to interpretations of feminism that 
either completely ignored culture and religion or had a very different perspective on 
what sexual difference is. Most of them therefore preferred to use the term 
‘emancipation’ instead. Moreover, participants emphasised a clear difference in 
thinking about emancipation and feminism amongst different generations. Some 
mentioned the fact that many ‘second wave’ feminists ignore religion and culture in 
their conceptualisation of feminism. In several groups women theorised what a ‘third 
wave’ should look like: warm and inclusive were the prominent characteristics 
suggested. Other points in the focus groups were related to the issues that feminists 
fight for and the approaches taken towards them. Several women, for instance, warned 
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against fighting for ‘your own little corners’ and instead proposed to frame problems 
in a larger context in order to make it possible for women to connect on these issues.  
 
 
Redefining Multiculturalism 
 
The theoretical and empirical work in the thesis allows us to develop alternative 
interpretations of the notions of multiculturalism and feminism. This is necessary in 
order to reconceptualise the relationship between them.  
    We have seen how multiculturalism is generally described as an ideology that aims 
to give space to the different cultures that live in a society by granting them specific 
group rights. Central to this interpretation of multiculturalism are the concepts of 
culture, group identity, recognition and legal rights. However, it is clear from the 
media analysis and the group interviews that different groups describe 
multiculturalism differently. In the Opzij articles, the main focus of the debate was on 
Islam, and hence not only on one particular group (instead of several) but also a 
religious group (rather than a cultural one). Furthermore, some describe this religious 
group as not only ‘non-secularizable’ but also prone to fundamentalist interpretations. 
More importantly, a direct link is made between religious traditions and gender 
inequality. Many authors and interviewees are concerned about certain dominant 
interpretations and traditions and their symbolic meanings. These concerns represent a 
larger development in the Netherlands against multiculturalism. Most statements in the 
public discourse are about integration (and sometimes assimilation) of minority groups 
and hence the restriction of group rights.  
    In this thesis I propose a redefinition of the relationship between multiculturalism 
and feminism because I believe these concepts can and need to be defined in more 
positive and productive terms. As I explain in chapter 2, some authors (who are also in 
favour of a politics of difference) find the term multiculturalism so troubled that they 
have developed alternative concepts to deal with difference. Even though I agree with 
some of their critiques, I would argue that as public discourse in many European 
countries (such as the Netherlands) is rather negative about multicultural societies and 
the influence of different cultures on these societies, alternative arguments need to 
engage in the discussion about multiculturalism. As many critics use the concept of 
multiculturalism to point out that ‘political correctness’ and relativism have led to 
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many problems, I believe that a redefinition of this much contested term is necessary 
(rather than the introduction of new and  - for many people - abstract terms) to show 
that different cultures are valuable in our societies and that it is possible to give more 
space to difference yet still be critical about certain problems, such as gender 
inequality.  
    In that context I agree with Tariq Modood who also defends multiculturalism and 
makes clear why multiculturalist ideas are compatible with democratic politics:  
 
“Multiculturalism of course challenges certain ways of thinking and certain 
political positions but the challenge is of inclusion and adjustment, not of 
giving up one comprehensive politics for another” (Modood, 2007, p 19).  
 
This quote shows that contrary to what certain critics would have us believe, 
multiculturalism is not a threat to democratic values, but an asset. It helps us to 
develop ways to include different cultural and religious groups in our societies.  
Hence, in order to connect to the recent debates about migration and integration, and 
to put forward more inclusive perspectives, critical theorists need to develop more 
comprehensive ideas about multiculturalism.  
    Both in Opzij and in the focus groups we also find many positive statements about 
multiculturalism or the influence of religion/culture in people’s lives. Often though, 
women do not defend the interpretation of multiculturalism as described above but 
propose a more dynamic version. In Opzij for example, more practical approaches 
towards multicultural issues, such as the headscarf, were put forward. Also some of 
the women in the focus groups emphasised that it is more important to guard the 
interests of individual women than to fight certain patriarchal traditions in general. In 
this context, they proposed the use of ‘virginity pills’ if women ask for it. Note though 
that even though such an approach might be helpful for individual women it does not 
leave much space for alternative interpretations of cultural and religious traditions, and 
hence for change. Therefore, I would argue that even though it is important to take the 
above into account, it is not enough to change the relationship between 
multiculturalism and feminism. It is probably most fruitful to combine such practical 
perspectives with more critical ones.  
    Many women in the interviews emphasised how important it is to know more about 
their religion and the holy texts and develop a better understanding of the relationship 
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between religion and culture. This way, women can criticise certain religious 
traditions by referring to holy texts. The key here is to recognise the power relations 
involved, acknowledge the possible differences within religious traditions and create 
distinctions between certain practices (or in this case religious traditions) and theory 
(or the holy texts). This brings Muslim women into a complex position; in order to 
combine their attachment to their religion and to emancipation, Muslim women have 
developed multiple critiques. This means that they discuss gender roles in their local 
religious communities by challenging conventional interpretations of holy texts and 
traditions while at the same time defending their religious communities. Through 
multiple critiques women show that certain cultural traditions can be interpreted in 
misogynist ways but in fact have multiple meanings. For instance, many women point 
out the many different meanings of the headscarf: even though it might be a sign of 
oppression to some, for others it shows their relationship to God without this affecting 
their notion of emancipation.  
    If we take these arguments back to the definition of multiculturalism, we should 
first of all conclude that multicultural politics need a combination of more practical 
approaches with critical perspectives. Furthermore, one needs to be aware that critique 
and change do not automatically lead to an aversion for multiculturalism. Muslim 
women have shown very well how they criticise certain interpretations of religious 
traditions without turning against their religious beliefs or communities. Moreover, 
besides a critical and practical view towards cultural and religious issues, the concept 
of multiculturalism itself can also be approached differently. Many made it clear that 
group rights were not really an issue for them; instead the focus should be on respect 
for difference in daily life. They wished they would not have to explain to strangers on 
the street why they wear a headscarf or ask their colleagues to make sure there is halal 
food for lunch. This connects to the alternative views on multiculturalism that I 
discussed in chapter 2 and confirms the importance of difference and daily encounters 
for these interpretations.  
    The final aspect of multiculturalism is the importance of making local and 
contextualised analyses, rather than developing general theories. We should always 
take into account the specificities of certain cases and recognise that the same 
phenomenon can have different meanings in different situations. One way of 
responding to these more localised analyses is to frame multicultural issues 
differently. Connected to this is the idea that multicultural issues should be approached 
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as processes; there cannot be instant changes. Therefore, it is important to make it 
possible for people to grow (through education) and to prevent one group dominating 
another (both when it comes to gender and ethnicity) and to remain open to the 
possibility that we can learn from each other. Or as Tariq Modood puts it: 
 
 “we are not asked to approve or disapprove in an ultimate way but allow co-
presence, public support, interaction and societal redefinition” (Modood, 2007, 
p 67).  
 
 
Redefining Feminism 
 
Okin argues that feminism refers to “the belief that women should not be 
disadvantaged by their sex, that they should be recognized as having human dignity 
equal to that of men and that they should have the opportunity to live as fulfilling and 
as freely chosen lives as men can” (Okin, 1999a, p 10). This might sound like a rather 
straightforward and broadly shared interpretation of feminism but, as I demonstrated 
in chapter 3, the term ‘feminism’ is rather more contested and difficult to define than 
Okin lets us believe. The media analysis showed that one of the main points of 
discussion was who is included in the feminist ‘us’ and who is not. The key concepts 
in these discussions were experience and solidarity. Can feminists develop general 
ideas about what feminism is or should they be more open to the experiences and 
opinions of other women? The essential question here is: when we talk about 
experience, whose experience do we mean? Those who want to take experiences into 
account seem to refer to a specific, rather political, interpretation of standpoint theory. 
They do not propose to ask ‘average’ women what they think of certain issues, but 
instead propose to work more closely with Muslim feminists. The opponents of this 
approach, on the other hand, often mention a much more individualistic interpretation 
(‘taking average women’s experiences into account’). In chapter 4, I extensively 
discussed the issue of experience in feminist research and activities and argued that 
there are good reasons to produce knowledge from a marginalised position. However, 
I also mentioned the importance of developing critical standpoints and warned that 
people in a marginalised position do not automatically provide better knowledge. 
Through for example the idea of multiple critiques, Muslim feminists have developed 
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critical standpoints and important alternative knowledge that should be taken into 
account in the debates about multiculturalism and feminism.  
    Another conceptual issue that was highlighted in the empirical research is the co-
existence of gender and ethnicity. The women in the focus group mentioned that in 
order to develop a feminism that appeals to different women, not only sexual 
difference should be taken into account, but also other axes of difference, such as 
ethnicity, sexuality, class and religion. Some argued that white second wave feminists 
especially centre their struggles on sexual difference while ignoring how ethnicity is 
related to gender and gender relations. In my theoretical chapters I demonstrated how 
various categories of difference arise together and influence each other, for example 
through the work of black feminists, such as the Combahee River Collective. Hence, 
in order to understand the lives of women from minority groups, feminist analysis 
should include the effects of culture, religion, class and sexuality (and the intersections 
between these categories) on the experiences of these women. Moreover, feminists 
should not solely focus on stimulating women to work, but also pay attention to other 
issues. Women from different regions and generations might point out different key 
issues. For that reason it is highly important to feminism to find productive ways to 
develop through different generations. Van der Tuin’s concept of ‘jumping 
generations’ (2009) is in my view a good starting point for this and very helpful in the 
debate about multiculturalism and feminism as it provides us with an instrument to see 
possibilities of change within feminism, without linear thinking or turning away from 
the struggles of previous generations of feminists.  
    Interpretations of feminism and emancipation varied greatly between the different 
women in the focus groups. Some women instantly acknowledged themselves as 
feminists while others were opposed to using the term. In the case of the latter, many 
preferred to think themselves as ‘emancipated’. These women are interested in a 
struggle for equality but not as it is interpreted by certain Western feminists at present. 
Some women therefore argue that we have to struggle for different interpretations of 
feminism; others prefer to use the more neutral term emancipation. For most of the 
women in the focus groups, emancipation was about making your own choices and not 
just about having a career. Furthermore, the women made the important point that 
emancipation is about making choices within a certain framework, such as the needs 
and wishes of your friends and family. In that sense they explicitly criticised 
individualistic interpretations of emancipation that ignore these ties. This connects to 
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the politics of location and accountability for one’s background; all women have a 
certain background and are influenced by their previous experiences, locations and 
surroundings. Feminists should not ignore these, but include them in their analyses 
and be accountable for them. The results of the focus groups show that a more 
inclusive feminism can be applied in practice by working with overlapping themes in 
order to enhance solidarity, developing alternative definitions of emancipation to 
include more women’s perspectives and adjusting analyses to current and local 
situations. 
 
 
Revisiting the Debate through Critical Theory 
 
In the course of this research project, more and more literature has been published that 
could be called ‘postsecular’. Postsecular theorists aim to develop a better 
understanding of current issues related to religion, by moving beyond the strict 
differentiation between religion and secularism. They criticise religious 
fundamentalism as well as strict secularism and argue that both approaches 
essentialize religion, either by affirming or negating the concept. William Connolly for 
instance, argues that we should acknowledge the instances in which secularism 
becomes too narrow and intolerant and that we have to explore new possibilities in 
order to accommodate a wider variety of claims and to imagine pluralism on that basis 
(Connolly, 1999).  
    This thesis has been much inspired by this postsecular turn, and in this conclusion, I 
would like to make it explicit that even though I write this as a non-religious or secular 
feminist, I believe that feminism can no longer afford a strict secular approach. First of 
all, this would exclude a large group of women for whom religion/culture are very 
important. And secondly, it seems impossible to disconnect this approach from 
islamophobist politics. In many public debates, gender equality functions as one of the 
arguments against multiculturalism in general or Islam specifically. Sometimes this 
means that feminism is (mis)used for racist purposes. I do not mean to argue that this 
kind of misuse of feminist theories should automatically mean that feminists have to 
change their ideas, but I do think that we might need to reconsider our strategies. In 
my view postsecular theory can be an important step in that direction and help to 
rethink the relationship between multiculturalism and feminism. 
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    Bracke and Schmitt argue that despite of the: “historic reluctance of traditional left 
wing and feminist movements, we can already recognise a greater interest in religious 
issues and identities within these groups” (Bracke and Schmitt, 2006, p 11). This is 
connected to the above-mentioned conservative claim on secularism and the 
consequential link to racism and islamophobia. Another important reason to commit to 
religious or postsecular dialogues is to create a pluralist alternative to the current 
polarization. Interestingly, this approach can often borrow ideas and approaches from 
other groups from outside of Europe (e.g. anti-colonial movements), who do include 
religion in their struggles. I argue that feminism cannot be strictly secular anymore 
and that the postsecular turn needs to be taken into account in the discussions about 
multiculturalism and feminism. In other words, a critical perspective on secularism 
and its relation to religion is a necessary aspect of a productive redefinition of the 
relationship between multiculturalism and feminism, in which terms such as religion 
and secularism are often taken for granted. Among other things, this includes critical 
analyses of what secularism is and does in our society.  
    Secularism builds on a certain concept of the world and the problems in that world 
(Asad, 2003, p 191-192). This means that it has different meanings depending on time 
and location. Thus above all, secularism is not the logical and reasonable ‘successor’ 
of faith. Bolette Blaagaard refers to this simplistic dichotomous use of secularism and 
religion as ‘secular illiteracy’ (Blaagaard, 2007). She argues that both secularism and 
the Enlightenment have strong ties to Christianity and that only forgetfulness makes 
the strict opposition between a religious ‘them’ and a secular ‘us’ possible. 
Furthermore, the ignorance of the secular legacy is closely connected to whiteness, or 
the invisibility of the white norm. Therefore, we need more knowledge and 
understanding of the relationship between Christianity, secularism and so-called 
enlightened Western societies (Blaagaard, 2007, p 13). I absolutely agree on this and 
would like to argue that an inclusive feminism should invest more in critically 
evaluating feminism’s (assumed) relation to secularism. This connects to the 
accountability and recognition of power relations that I described above. Furthermore, 
it removes the ‘Other’ from the centre of attention and creates space for a feminist 
analysis on a broader basis, without stigmatizing certain groups of women.  
    Another aspect of the postsecular turn is the critical evaluation of terms such as 
agency and subjectivity. The women in the focus groups mentioned that they want to 
become emancipated in a non-self-centred way and take into account the wishes and 
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needs of their families and friends. This connects to the work of Saba Mahmood, who, 
among other things, reconceptualises the traditional conception of agency by 
detaching it from the simply dichotomous relation of subversion and subordination 
and leaving open the possibility of learning from others (Mahmood, 2005). However, 
despite the fact that it is important to note that there is agency beyond oppositional 
consciousness, the comments of the women in the focus groups on religion and 
knowledge also show that we need alternative analyses of what oppositional 
consciousness is. I would like to refer again here to Rosi Braidotti’s conceptualisation 
of political subjectivity, that starts from “multiple micro-political practices of daily 
activism or interventions” (Braidotti, 2008, p 16). This interpretation of subjectivity is 
a crucial instrument in many debates about multiculturalism and feminism, because it 
helps us to conceptualise a feminism that can fight certain harmful traditions or 
customs, without condemning religions or cultures in a general and stigmatising way.   
The final aspect that I would like to mention at this point in regard to rethinking 
multiculturalism and feminism through critical and postsecular theory, is the concept 
of ‘affirmative ethics’. In the above discussion we could already read how the women 
in the focus groups argued that we should not try to create general theories about 
multiculturalism and feminism, but should produce more contextualised and situated 
analyses of the issues at stake. One of the consequences of this approach is that we 
have to acknowledge the fact that we cannot change the world in a second; change 
takes time. Or as one of the women said: we have to see this as a process and not try to 
pin everything down beforehand. I would argue that we could theorise these remarks 
further through Braidotti’s ideas on ‘affirmative ethics’. This interpretation of ethics is 
not “tied to the present by negation”, but is instead “affirmative and geared to creating 
possible futures” (Braidotti, 2008, p 11). Thus, instead of trying to deconstruct or 
criticise certain identities or subjectivities, we should affirm them and think about the 
possibilities they create and the alternatives they can offer to current views on these 
issues. This means that difference is regarded as positive (instead of negative) and can 
form the basis of transformation or “creative becoming” (Braidotti, 2008, p 11). 
Central to Braidotti’s approach is that we affirm otherness and hence do not focus on 
sameness. According to Braidotti, we can do this by changing our view on pain and 
suffering. Instead of dealing with pain by denying it, or trying to go against it, we 
should find ways to work through the pain (Braidotti, 2008, p 16). This confirms the 
argument of the women in the focus groups that we should approach the relationship 
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between multiculturalism and feminism as a process, rather than trying to achieve 
instant change. Furthermore, it connects to the idea that it is more productive to 
develop alternative interpretations of certain traditions and practices, rather than 
dismissing them altogether.  
 
 
Ground Rules for More Nuanced and Productive Debates  
 
While postsecular theories offer important insights into the re-conceptualisation of the 
relationship between multiculturalism and feminism, they still leave some issues 
unresolved. Demonstrating the complexity of these debates is one of the main aims of 
this thesis. Here I would like to describe what other dimensions were made explicit in 
this research project and how we can transform its conclusions into ground rules for 
the debate. As became clear in the focus groups, it is impossible (and undesirable) to 
develop general theories about the relationship between multiculturalism and 
feminism, but that does not mean that we cannot develop certain road maps that help 
us to better understand the issues at stake. Depending on the argument or statement 
one would reply to, different aspects of this reconceptualisation of the relationship 
between multiculturalism and feminism can be applied.  
    First of all I would like to point out again how important it is to recognise the many 
layers of these issues and also the connections between these layers. In that context, I 
would argue that Okin’s interpretations of the tensions between multicultural group 
rights and gender equality are not necessarily incorrect, but only cover a small part of 
the equation. I acknowledge that it is impossible to always take everything into 
account, but one can recognise complexity and acknowledge one’s starting points and 
prevent generalisations. Okin would probably have received more positive responses if 
she had focussed on criticising certain problematical cultural practices, rather than 
dismissing multiculturalism as a whole.  
    Secondly, I want to emphasise the importance of the discursive aspects of 
multiculturalism and feminism. How is the relationship between multiculturalism and 
feminism discussed? What frameworks are used? And, who is talking and who is 
talked about? I have described how the Dutch public discourse can be recognised by 
speakers who aim to break through taboos and ‘dare to face the facts’, claim to speak 
for ‘normal’ people and are critical of left-wing elites. It is important to recognise 
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these discursive aspects, as they resonate in other aspects of the relationship between 
multiculturalism and feminism. The many attacks on Islam in the public sphere, for 
example, make it more difficult for Muslim women to change things from within. 
    Another point that I believe should be taken into account when thinking about 
multiculturalism and feminism is feminism’s connection to colonialism and the long 
history of exclusion. Throughout the first wave for example, white women felt the 
need to save others, and ‘civilise’ colonial societies. Furthermore, they often referred 
to the supposedly ‘backwards position of indigenous women’ to promote their own 
emancipation. One of the consequences of this is the construction of women from the 
colonies as ‘victims of their brutal men’. Not only is their suffering under imperialism 
not taken into account, they are also presented as ignorant, poor women who need help 
from Western saviours. In order not to repeat these approaches, it is important that 
feminists are conscious of the differences between women and the power relations at 
play, recognise the strategies of resistance of formerly colonized women and 
acknowledge how important religion and culture can be. Through a politics of location 
women can be accountable for their background, avoid easy generalisations and ask 
themselves under which circumstances (when/where) their statements are true. 
Furthermore, in this context it also becomes clear that rather than ‘helping other 
women’, one can better think about strategies for combined struggles.  
    Fourth, I would like to emphasise again the importance of understanding the 
connections between gender and ethnicity. Intersectional theory demonstrates how 
various axes of difference coincide and influence each other: gender is ‘ethnicised’ 
and ethnicity is ‘gendered’. Also in the group interviews women underlined both their 
gender and their ethnicity and the fact that they could not and would not choose 
between the two: they were both and needed to develop a framework for emancipation 
accordingly. In that sense, it is a mistake to separate multiculturalism and feminism, 
and a necessity to find a way to combine them. Furthermore, it demonstrates that any 
feminist attempt that starts from the idea that women have to give up their 
cultural/religious identity in order to be emancipated is highly problematic. It would 
be more productive to think together about ‘how’ to develop alternative views on 
certain traditions and ‘how’ to fight misogynist interpretations.   
    A fifth point that is important in this context is the interpretation of subjectivity. 
Alternative views on this key concept can help feminists to open up alternative ways 
of structuring one’s life and achieving change. This approach would also make it 
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possible to start a dialogue amongst women about feminism, without asking minority 
women to give up their beliefs or cultural background. A radical dismissal of these 
beliefs and traditions on the basis of certain dominant views would completely erase 
these women’s struggles and power to achieve change. Furthermore, it prevents 
feminists from actually discussing the issues at stake, rather than constantly 
emphasising certain principles.  
     
 
Feminism in Multicultural Societies 
 
“if you want to make the new wave a vibrant one, you have to create a 
situation where women can be themselves, where women (…) can choose to do 
what they want. We have to make the third wave a warm wave” (ZAMI, 57 
min.).  
 
In this final chapter I have presented the outcomes of this thesis and put forward an 
alternative perspective on the relationship between multiculturalism and feminism. As 
becomes clear from the various chapters of this thesis, this relationship is highly 
complex and multi-layered and needs an approach that corresponds to this. Even 
though I appreciate Okin’s attempt to defend the rights of women from minority 
groups, I do not support her methods and interpretations of the issues at stake. Not 
only does her conclusion reflect just one of the many aspects of the relationship 
between multiculturalism and feminism but her perspective also corners minority 
women even more. Gender equality is often misused as an argument in islamophobic 
and anti-migration discussions that harm the position of minority women. Therefore, 
in order to rethink the relationship between multiculturalism and feminism in a more 
fruitful manner, we need to acknowledge the different aspects of it, rather than 
focussing on only one. This includes taking into account related (and possibly older) 
debates, such as those of feminists about difference and multiculturalists about culture. 
But more recent developments and considerations also need our attention. In this 
context one can think of the postsecular turn and its critical work on secularism and 
the relationship between secularism and religion, but also of recent debates among 
feminists about a possible third wave and the notion of ‘jumping generations’. 
Moreover, a fruitful discussion about multiculturalism and feminism not only critically 
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evaluates the notions of feminism and multiculturalism, but also includes 
accountability of the positions of the speakers, and takes into account the intersections 
between gender and ethnicity, as well as developing critical accounts of religion and 
secularism, colonial history, theories of agency and discourse. This might sound rather 
impractical to some, but the empirical research in this thesis has clearly shown that 
most women actually approach the relationship between multiculturalism and 
feminism in such a way. 	  	  
 
 
 	   247 
 	   248 
Appendices 
 
Appendix I: Information Sheet 
	  
Information sheet for focus groups  
 
MULTICULTURALISM AND FEMINISM: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
DEBATES IN THE NETHERLANDS   
 
You are being invited to take part in a PhD research study conducted by Eva Midden, 
Centre for Professional Ethics, University of Central Lancashire, UK. Before you 
make a decision it is important for you to understand why the research is being done 
and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully 
and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if 
you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take 
part. 
 
Thank you for reading this.  
 
Aims of the research 
 
The main aim of this research is to discuss the relationship between multiculturalism and 
feminism. According to several academics and politicians like Susan Moller Okin or 
Ayaan Hirsi Ali, there are fundamental conflicts between our wish to achieve gender 
equality in society and the desire to respect and protect the customs of minority cultures 
and religions. They use examples like forced marriages, female circumcision and burqas 
to show that multiculturalism could be bad for women. Therefore, they say, we should 
not permit cultural traditions that could be oppressive for women. 
Claims like those of Okin and Ali have led to a significant debate. Many people don’t 
agree with them and have responded to their arguments by saying that their ideas are one-
sided and biased from a Western perspective. Another important point of critique is that 
this perspective has a view on cultures that ignores progressive forces, like younger 
people, that might want to and have the ability to change certain norms. 
Overall, the academic debate on this subject is highly charged but also very theoretical. 
The aim of this research is to provide more practical input by asking members of the 
public belonging to organised groups of minority cultures to express their views on the 
subject of the relationship between multiculturalism and gender equality.   
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What will happen to me when I take part? 
A number of focus group discussions (ca 5-9) will be conducted as part of this study. 
The discussion you will participate in will take about 60-90 mins and there is no need 
for preparation. The discussion will be tape-recorded. 
During the focus group the relationship between multiculturalism and feminism will 
be discussed. Most questions will refer to general themes such as culture, religion, 
emancipation, rights, empowerment and participation. As a participant you can also 
introduce new themes that are important in this debate according to you. 
 
Why have I been chosen? 
A main aim of this research is to get a better understanding of the relationship 
between multiculturalism and feminism by analysing it from a lay person’s 
perspective, looking at daily experiences and provide a voice for cultural minority 
women in the debate. Since most debates refer to minority women without providing 
evidence, it is important to ask them directly to take part in a research that analyses 
this debate.  
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
You will not be identified by name in this research and all information that is 
collected about you will be kept strictly confidential. During the discussion only your 
age, ethnic background, education and profession will be asked. The discussions will 
be recorded and later transcribed anonymously. The tapes will be kept in a secure 
location by the researcher and later destroyed. No direct comparisons between 
organisations taking part in the study and participants will be undertaken and as such 
it is guaranteed that no one will be able to identify you on the basis of the results in 
the PhD thesis.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part.  If you do decide to take part you 
will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If 
you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a 
reason.   
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
None of the participants will be identified in any report or publication that comes out 
of this research. The research is expected to be concluded in September 2009. All 
participating organisations will receive a copy of the research report. 
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Contact for further information 
Contact details for further information or questions: 
 
Eva Midden 
 
Centre for Professional Ethics 
Harrington Building 
University of Central Lancashire 
Preston, PR1 2HE, England 
 
Email: evamidden@hotmail.com 
Mobile number in the Netherlands: 0031 6 28467683 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. 
 
You will be given a copy of this information sheet and a signed consent form to keep. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date: 
Version number: 
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Appendix II: Consent form 	  
 
Study Number: 
Interviewee Identification Number for this trial: 
 
CONSENT FORM  
 
 
Title of Project:  
MULTICULTURALISM AND FEMINISM: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEBATE IN 
THE NETHERLANDS   
 
Name of Researcher:  
Eva Midden 
Centre for Professional Ethics 
Harrington Building 
University of Central Lancashire 
Preston, PR1 2HE, England 
Email: emidden@uclan.ac.uk 
Mobile number in the United Kingdom: 0044 7737487857 
Mobile number in the Netherlands: 0031 6 48781330 
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Please initial box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated for the 
above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.    
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time without giving any reason.        
 
3. I understand that I will be identified as the author of the views expressed in this 
interview for subsequent analysis and publications of thesis results                                                          
            
             
 
4. I agree to take part in the above study.       
 
 
 
 
Name of Interviewee Date Signature 
 
 
 
 
Researcher Date  Signature 
 
 
 
 
  1	  for	  interviewee;	  1	  for	  researcher;	  1	  to	  be	  kept	  with	  other	  notes 
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Appendix III: Questions for the focus groups 
	  
 
Basic structure of the interviews 
 
1. Personal Introduction 
2. Introduction group 
3. Public debate 
4. Multicultural Issues 
5. Feminism/Emancipation 
6. Other issues/ Conclusions  
 
 
 
1. Personal Introduction (5 minutes):  
- Personal Background 
- Professional background and current position 
- Research project content and aims 
 
 
 
2. Introduction questions for group (10 minutes): 
 
- When and with what goals is your group founded? 
- How would you describe your background? 
- What kind of work/activities do you do with the organisation? 
- How is that work related to multiculturalism? (basic) 
- How is that work related to feminism? (basic) 
 
 
Explain what plan is for this focus group (time, subjects, questions etc) 
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3. Public debate: general and feminists (25 minutes):  
 
Introduction: 
In the popular media many statements are made about multiculturalism, religion, 
Islam, the emancipation of Muslim women, etc. Very often these statements are rather 
negative. In this part of the interview I would like to discuss with you what you think 
about this and how it influences your own ideas and struggles. In this discussion I 
would like to separate the statements from male (non-feminist) politicians such as 
Geert Wilders and those of feminists, such as Cisca Dresselhuys.  
 
Questions: 
A. There has been a lot of discussion about the film of Geert Wilders, but before the 
film came out, he also made many remarks about Islam and Muslim women, such as: 
“I could eat Muslim women raw”. In this quote he refers to the fact that we should 
convince women not to wear headscarves.  
 
- What do you think of such remarks?  
- Are these kinds of statements important points of discussion in your group?  
- How do they influence your standpoints in your struggle for emancipation and 
does it change people around you?  
 
 
B. Remarks like those of Wilders are very provocative and rather radical. Also 
feminists have argued they are worried about the emancipation of 'allochtonous' 
women. Cisca Dresselhuys argued that women who wear headscarves couldn’t work 
for her because she believes that the headscarf is a sign of women’s oppression. But 
also others, such as Nahed Selim have talked about the possible tensions between 
multiculturalism and feminism.  
 
- Is there a difference according to you between the remarks and arguments 
made by politicians like Geert Wilders (but also Ellian, Ephimenco, Cliteur, 
etc.) and feminists like Cisca Dresselhuys?  
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- Do you ever read Opzij? Is it an interesting magazine for you?  
- What do you think of the interpretation of feminism in Opzij? 
- Do you identify with the articles in Opzij? Do they correspond to you own 
ideas and experiences? Are the issues that you find important (related to 
multiculturalism) discussed?  
 
 
C.  The above statements are rather extreme examples of the Dutch public debates 
about these issues. If we could influence the media, what would you want to come 
forward in the discussions? 
 
- How would you like that popular media in general and feminist media such as 
Opzij discuss the relationship between multiculturalism and feminism? 
 
 
 
4. Multicultural Issues (25 minutes):  
 
Introduction: 
Political scientist Susan Moller Okin argues that cultures are suffused with practices 
and ideologies concerning gender and that most cultures facilitate the control over 
women in various ways. Okin concludes that there is a fundamental conflict between 
our commitment to gender equality and the desire to respect the customs of minority 
cultures and religions. If we agree that women should not be disadvantaged because of 
their sex, we should not accept group rights that permit oppressive practices, she 
argues (Okin, 1999). In this part of the interview, I would like to discuss how you deal 
with cultural and religious issues in your lives.  
 
Questions:  
A. In a Meetlat interview with Cisca Dresselhuys in Opzij, Afshin Ellian argues that the 
government should be more restrictive when it comes to certain cultural traditions (for 
instance headscarves). This, he argues, will help Muslim women in their discussions at 
home about these issues. 
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- What do you think about this? Do you agree with Ellian? 
- Have you had an experience that either confirms or goes against this statement? 
- How do remarks like these about religion of culture influence your personal 
lives?  
 
 
B. Because home is the place where culture is practised, preserved and transmitted to 
the young, Susan Moller Okin argues that the defence of cultural traditions will have 
much more influence on the lives of women and girls, since they spend most of their 
time and energy preserving and maintaining the personal, familial and reproductive side 
of life. She believes this will also have an effect on women’s and girls role in the public 
sphere and hence for emancipation.  
 
- Do you consider yourself as religious? How do you experience your religion, in 
connection to emancipation?  
- What about culture? Some people argue that not religion but culture is related to 
oppressive practices, do you agree with this?  
- Do you believe that women should/could decide themselves whether certain 
customs are acceptable? Or should the government interfere, for instance when 
it comes to traditions such as circumcision? 
- Do you think that the Dutch government should have a more multiculturalist 
approach, and give more (legal) space to certain religious/cultural traditions? 
 
 
 
5. Feminism and Emancipation (25 minutes): 
 
Introduction: 
In this last part of the interview, I would like to move attention to feminism and 
emancipation related issues. In many debates about multiculturalism and feminism, 
the women involved are considered as possible victims, instead of political actors. 
One of the aims of your organisation is the emancipation of women, how are your 
own struggles connected to (debates about) the relationship between multiculturalism 
and feminism and how would you interpret feminism and emancipation?  
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Questions: 
 
A. In statements such as those from Okin or Dresslhuys, multiculturalism is discussed 
as a possible threat to gender equality. Gender equality itself however is considered as 
something fixed: about freedom and equality. How do you experience feminism?  
 
- What does feminism mean to you personally?  
- Would you call yourself feminist? 
- What does emancipation mean to you? 
 
- Do you think that religion and feminism can be combined in a constructive 
way, and if yes how? What could cause tensions do you think?  
- How do culture and religion influence your struggle for emancipation? 
- What are important feminist/emancipational values and can they be interpreted 
differently for different groups?  
 
 
 
 B. In Opzij, Jolande Withuis says that feminists should show more solidarity with 
Ayaan Hiris Ali and her struggle against gender oppression in Islam, others say that 
we should show more solidarity with Muslim women. When you think about your 
own experiences within your group, and the influence of culture/religion on 
emancipation, how would you think about these issues? 
 
- Do you experience in the work with your group that women are somehow 
oppressed because of their culture? How do you deal with that?  
- Have you experienced racism and does that influence your standpoints on these 
issues? 
- What should feminist/female solidarity look like according to you? 
 
C. In the previous we discussed whether there are different ways of thinking about 
feminism and thus also about the relationship between multiculturalism and 
feminism. This still implied that women, even though in different ways, somehow 
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fight for the emancipation of women. In 2005, Saba Mahmood argued that feminists 
should also try to understand the choices of much more orthodox women. Women do 
not necessarily need to resist patriarchal customs in order to have agency, she argues.  
 
- What do you think about this?  
- Where to you draw the line when it comes to recognising differences?  
 
D. In several articles of Opzij it seemed that there might be a generational aspect in 
the discussions about multiculturalism and feminism. One author for instance clearly 
stated that she could not understand that young women who convert to Islam 
voluntarily give up the rights that her generation fought for so fiercely.  
 
- Do you have clear differences of opinions within your group between different 
generations of women?  
- Have you experienced generational differences otherwise? 
- Do you believe that the discussions between feminists on issues of 
multiculturalism, religion and culture are related to the differences between 
Second Wave and Third Wave feminists? 
 
6. Other issues/conclusions 
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